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From: European External Action Service

To: Delegations

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Subject: Revised Draft Concept of Operations "Plus" (CONOPS PLUS) for the CSDP mission EUBAM Libya

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The General Secretariat of the Council will find attached the EEAS document EEAS 00768/13 rev4 regarding the revised Draft Concept of Operations "Plus" (CONOPS PLUS) for the CSDP Mission EUBAM Libya.

This document is put under a CivCom silence procedure ending on Friday, 19 April 2013 at 11.00 hrs. In case silence is broken, the document will be discussed at the CivCom meeting the same day. If silence is not broken, this document will be submitted to a short PSC silence procedure.

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**EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE**



**Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability - CPCC**

**Brussels, 18 April 2013**

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**DRAFT CONOPS PLUS FOR A CSDP MISSION  
ON BORDER MANAGEMENT IN LIBYA**

**Reference documents:**

- A. European Security Strategy (2003 and 2008)
- B. Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Cooperation (November 2009);
- C. European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (September 2011);
- D. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2040 (UN Support Mission in Libya of 12 March 2012);
- E. Integrated Border Management Need Assessment for Libya (MD 70/12 of 12 June 2012);
- F. Non Paper on Possible CSDP action in Libya (MD 74/12 of 15 June 2012);
- G. Libya Country Strategy Paper (MD 72/12 of 15 June 2012);
- H. EU Support to Libyan Border Management (MD 87/1/12 of 11 July 2012);
- I. PSC Conclusions on Libya 17 July 2012 (COREU/SEC/0538/12 of 17 July 2012);
- J. CSDP Mission in Libya – Crisis Management Concept (CMC) doc 5065/13 of 9 January 2013;
- K. Civcom advice on draft CMC for a possible civilian CSDP Border Security Mission in Libya (doc 5411/2/13 of 23 January 2013);
- L. SIAC Risk Assessment (March 2013).

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## **1 BACKGROUND**

### **1.1 Situation**

#### **1.1.1. The Gaddafi legacy**

After 42 years of Gaddafi dictatorship, the Libyan people toppled him with international support on 23 October 2011. His rule had been dominated by fear and Human Rights violations and a state administration with decisions made by a single man aimed exclusively at maintaining the regime.

In many ways the Libyans still suffer from the Gaddafi legacy. It is a legacy of fragmentation, caused by Gaddafi's method to divide and rule.

Firstly this causes fragmentation of the state, its authorities and institutions, and in particular its security sector. There were no clear roles and responsibilities defined for the state institutions, and overlapping mandates made Gaddafi sure that no institution would have any power to consistently and legitimately exercise its function. Since the decision making was centralised with one person, there is today a lack of decision making culture in the government administration at all levels. There is neither a sufficient degree of middle management capacity nor culture of coordination.

Furthermore, Gaddafi advanced a culture of secrecy as sharing information was considered dangerous for the state, which often lead to poor or no coordination between institutions or even within ministries. As there was only limited substantial support from abroad, there is also little experience in dealing with international partners.

The second fragmentation is territorial. The three traditional regions are Tripolitania in the northwest, Fezzan in the southwest and Cyrenaica in the East. Tripolitania is home to Tripoli and most of the Libyan population (approximately 3.6 million out of 6.4 million). The country is governed from Tripoli, much to the dissatisfaction of the other regions, which have expressed a wish for self determination. This is particularly the case for Cyrenaica, home to Benghazi from where the revolutionary efforts were led.

Thirdly it is the fragmentation of the population, since the Libyan society is largely structured along tribal lines with more than 20 larger tribes. The Fezzan region is home to the nomadic Tuareg in the southwest and the Toubou in the southeast. These pastoralist societies have moved and lived across

the borders with Algeria, Niger and Chad for centuries, where a line on a map meant little in a desert region. Part of Gaddafi's strategy for remaining in control of a vast country, with a relatively small population, was using the tribes against each other, always making sure no one was in control, letting them fight each other. Control was to some degree delegated to certain tribes in exchange of preferential treatment. Libyan authorities have always struggled with controlling the borders, which is not surprising given the sheer size (over 6000 km) and the ruggedness of the terrain. The situation is currently even more worrisome than before. Certain tribes, such as the Toubou and the Tuaregs, have unresolved issues on citizenship and do not fully recognise the central government as well as question the principle of the borders. These tribes continue to play an important role in the Libyan society, especially in the south, and could destabilise Libya's fragile democracy.

Many of these fault lines existed even before Gaddafi, but his regime has actually deepened them.

### **1.1.2 The challenges for the new Libyan state**

The revolution which toppled Gaddafi was carried by hopes for unity, the rule of law and state building, but these hopes remain unfulfilled so far. In some ways the situation has even deteriorated. The government is de facto still in crisis, and has therefore limited attention to preparing much needed strategies to address key developmental problems. The weak institutional structures and the lack of planning and implementation capacity at all levels hampers the efforts of all international actors.

Following the revolution, the Libyans find themselves struggling to build a democratic state. The new government's competence and success will above all be judged by its performance in building effective state functions. As seen in many post conflict situations, the balance of power between the executive and the legislative is shifting towards the latter. Therefore, Prime Minister Zeidan will face difficulties in making far reaching decisions. Indecisiveness on important underlying socio-economic issues risks to de-stabilise the society as a whole.

As regards the constitution, it has still not been decided whether to elect or appoint the 60 members of the Constitutional Commission (20 from Tripolitania, 20 from Cyrenaica and 20 from the Fezzan region) which should draft the constitution. Political disagreement and a recent supreme court ruling has seriously delayed the constitutional process. In the absence of a new constitution, fundamental



state reform cannot take place, thereby also affecting including Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The absence of a constitution and a clear delineation of the ministries' responsibilities complicates and delays the drafting of relevant primary and secondary legislation, which ultimately has an effect on the design of a coherent and lasting Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy.

The war had a devastating effect on the security sector. The government is still conceptualising the process that would lead to a comprehensive SSR. A draft defence white paper has been prepared with international assistance but has not yet been approved by the Libyan authorities.

A system for inter-ministerial coordination on security issues has not yet been put in place. Although the office of the Prime Minister has begun to develop a coordination mechanism, it is still uncertain if it will have sufficient power to play this coordinating role vis-à-vis line ministries.

Ministries and agencies do not yet have the capability to perform their basic tasks. Furthermore, no state agency or institution has a clear vision regarding required staff levels and management.

New actors emerged during the war, such as the "freedom fighters", while law enforcement agencies and the armed forces had to deal with a massive exodus of staff whose loyalty rested with the previous regime. To date, an estimated 240 000 ex-fighters have been registered and expect to be rewarded for their participation in the fall of the previous regime, including through the reintegration into the security sector. Ex-fighters who played a decisive role in the war are estimated at around 20 000, whereas the other 220 000 represent people who joined the revolution at a very late stage, expecting some kind of special treatment. Some brigades have political ambitions and will not accept a technical disarmament programme, which will disallow them to influence the political process. Others may understand that there is little space for them in the new Libya and therefore seek to exploit the absence of effective rule of law to the benefit of their members.

In an attempt to put some sort of structure to the armed brigades, the government created the Supreme Security Council (SSC) and the Libya Shield Forces (LSF). These structures are loosely under the control of the government and - until early 2013 - on the payroll of the central government. In the absence of a functioning army and police force the Government had to rely on them to address crisis situations and restore security, e.g. in Kufra.

Some of the more powerful brigades are the Revolutionary Brigades Coalition, Misratan Union of Revolutionaries, Zintan and Tripoli. Although some were originally limited to their cities of origin, their support and area of operation have expanded to the entire country. Since the government exercises no effective control of the brigades, their organization and influence is only partly mapped.

A process for demobilisation and integration of militias is being implemented, with approximately 19.000 ex-fighters having agreed to be integrated into the Ministry of Interior (MOI) structures. A further 6.000 were integrated into the Border Guards and completed training in December 2012, but with no proper screening or selection.

At this point in time, the government does not hold the monopoly of the use of force in Libya, and only a determined Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) effort will have a chance of succeeding.

The Libyans are in the process of deciding on how to deal with past crimes and affiliations with the Gaddafi regime. The draft Political Isolation Law, which the National Congress seems to accept in principle, may end up disqualifying anyone associated with the regime of Gaddafi from holding public office in Libya - not just senior regime official, but potentially also the upper- and mid-level bureaucracy as well. A strict reading of the law would potentially also exclude current leaders like GNC chairman Magrief and PM Zeidan.

Security in Libya has to be seen in a regional context. The Libyans watch the situation in Mali and the wider Sahel region with great concern. The outflow from Gaddafi's large arsenals of weapons have undoubtedly fuelled regional destabilisation and with the international efforts in Mali and Niger dangerous elements risk flowing back into Libya's uncontrolled South.

The EU recognises the regional character of the security challenges in the Sahel region, which has inter alia motivated the recent CSDP engagements in Mali and Niger.

Some political attempts have been made by the Libyan government at signing agreements with Tunisia and Egypt on cross border related issues, but the agreements remain political intentions and

have not yet translated into effective cooperation.

An IBM strategy would not only facilitate internal coordination, but also effective coordination and cooperation with neighbouring countries leading ideally to the sharing intelligence, joint operations and coordination. This presupposes that the border control capabilities of the neighbouring countries have also reached a certain level of professionalism. This is clearly not yet the case, especially on the southern borders of Libya.

While Libyan oil reserves are doubtlessly an asset which should facilitate reconstruction and state building, their dependency on them has created a multitude of additional problems.

To appease the population and prevent social unrest, the government has continued the existing practice of adding people to the public sector payroll and increase subsidies. In this dependency society, patronage systems lead to wide spread corruption. Many public servants receive double or triple salaries without showing up at their workplace. There is poor work morale especially in the government sector. The education levels are low and falsification of university and similar certificates is common.

Due to a lack of planning and implementation capacity, only 40% of the national budget was spent, and almost entirely on salaries and subsidies. Much needed large scale investments in services such as infrastructure, health and education continue to be grossly neglected.

The subsidies are distorting the development of a market economy and create great incentives for smuggling. As an example, one litre of petrol costs less than EUR 0,1 – a lucrative business if sold in neighbouring countries at real market rate. As long as these price distortions are not tackled, smuggling will continue to be a lucrative activity.

On the other hand, in a CSDP context, a surplus on the government budget is unique and presents an opportunity. With proper support and technical assistance the Libyans will have sufficient financial resources for rebuilding their state and procuring essential equipment in the mid to long term.

## **1.2 General background**

Before the Libyan revolution, the implemented principles of the Gaddafi green book provided for “socialist direct democracy”. It was based on local committees that would then send representatives to regional and national committees, all ultimately feeding into the autocratic rule of the dictator. This decentralised and dividing set up, including for local government, matched with the ancestral patchwork of tribes. For large sections of the border, it provided for local de facto governance benefiting local interests.

In the last years of its existence, under the pressure of some European countries, the Gaddafi regime demonstrated some control over its maritime borders. A decrease in the flow of migrants leaving Libya by sea to enter Europe was registered. However, and more specifically in the south, the necessary investments in border infrastructure and equipment never occurred.

As a consequence, the services in charge of border management were not controlling but rather witnessing the flow of persons and goods. Centuries of trans-border livelihood was perpetuated through smuggling, trafficking and the levy of “taxes” for the benefit of ethnic groups often established on both sides of the border. In the aftermath of the revolution, these groups reverted to their communities and their smuggling business as their lifeline.

The contemporary trafficking to Europe transiting through Libya regards illegal immigration, drugs, and more recently counterfeited medicines. As state subsidies are maintained for essential goods, their “export” to neighbouring countries is still lucrative. The loss of weapons from Gaddafi’s former arsenal also fuels a thriving traffic of weapons and ammunition, contributing to the destabilisation of the wider Sahel region.

As Gaddafi forces were retreating, local armed elements replaced the collapsed security services at the border. More organised and regimented revolutionary brigades from northern towns were meanwhile deployed to southern Libya in an effort to stabilise the country and monitor conflicts between local competing ethnic groups along the borders. These revolutionary brigades were taken under the control of the MOD and constitute the LSF.

The MoD and the LSF tried then to take control of the armed local groups controlling the borders in

part by integrating them into a “Border Guard” (BG). This "regimenting" effort included also the "National Guard", a name taken after the Revolution by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, partly incorporated in the BG.

The new BG are currently managing to develop a proper screening and vetting system that will ensure more reliability of units and individuals.

This post-revolutionary situation, combined with the stove pipe arrangement of the remaining institutions on which Gaddafi based his ruling, leads to a very fragmented current picture of Libyan border management both from a governance and an institutional point of view.

That situation is rendered even more complex by the elements controlled by the SSC. Basing their legitimacy on their revolutionary past, they carry out unofficial policing activities and shadow official structures, including in the MOI, without reporting to the official government. Rather they monitor the activities of the governmental figures even through temporary detention for interview.

As most officials in the services have grown through the ranks during the Gaddafi era, the SSC enjoys more support from the population than the police.

### **1.2.1 Needs Assessment, fact finding mission and technical assessment mission**

From 1 March to 31 May 2012, an EU IBM Needs Assessment (IBMNA) mission was deployed to Libya, under the overall coordination of the United Nations (UN) as per the Paris agreement of July 2011.

Through this survey, the applicable laws for border management were found to be fragmented and not in compliance with international standards. Operators and commanders when interviewed were not aware of applicable law or its relevance.

Central authority over border security was identified as being weak with local military or local political councils exerting control within their area of influence. The command structure did not comprise intermediary levels (operational/regional) between the politico-strategic governance and the tactical units.

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These tactical units were stemming either from police, military, revolutionary brigades or local armed groups, with no pattern. Few criminal investigations as such were carried out. The entire communication system was reliant on mobile phones.

Against this backdrop, the Navy and its coastguard branch appeared to have some level of organisation, although with limited seagoing capabilities.

The customs had already started an encouraging effort to reconstruct its capability with the support of the international community, and cooperation was initiated with the border police at Tripoli airport.

After the drafting of the IBMNA, and for six months, the political situation in Libya was unstable. The continued turn over of governmental responsibilities did not allow the inception of CSDP strategic planning until November 2012, when a CMPD-led Fact Finding Mission (FFM) was deployed to Libya.

At the end of this FFM, a document<sup>1</sup> was produced by the CSDP team and their Libyan counterparts, listing the principles under which a future civilian CSDP Mission would operate, and foreseeing agreeable activities to address the needs identified.

In the Crisis Management Concept<sup>2</sup> adopted by the Member States, and in the subsequent CivCom advice, the security constraints are acknowledged as well as the necessity to strengthen the Libyan Border management capacities in the south. One of the subsequent strategic guidance issued for the purpose of operational planning is for the future Mission to, immediately after deployment, support the development of a Libyan IBM strategy whilst initiating, in Tripoli, training activities for border management units deployed in the south where, to date, the security situation does not allow for a continued Mission presence.

During the CPCC-led Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) conducted in March 2013, some of the findings of the IBMNA were updated.

The political will of the new Libyan government to implement IBM starts to materialise. In the Prime Minister's Office, the Decision Support Unit is in the process of establishing a series of

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex A of the Crisis Management Concept, ref.I

<sup>2</sup> See reference I

reform working groups, including Police, Justice, Defence and Border Management etc.

The heads and senior staff of the Border Crossing Points (MOI), Customs (MOF), BG (MOD), Naval Coast Guard (MOD) and Coastal Security Police (MOI) all plead for a common vision of collaborative intra-agency and inter-agency coordination. They refer to international agreements with neighbouring countries, joint training and harmonised procurement as necessary enablers.

However, all agencies are still facing the conceptual challenge of how to best translate vision into operational reality. The border management services have to further improve its capacity to perform institutionalised risk analysis mechanisms to support strategic planning and tactical/operational decision making, and to develop reliable systems for collecting statistical data on border and migration management. Common challenges are little cooperation, poor infrastructure, little available equipment and lack of specialised and leadership training. Most heads of services highlighted as well the need for training in English language and computer skills to allow operators to use technology and engage with foreign services or travellers whilst discharging their duties.

### **1.2.2 Border Police / Border Crossing Points (BCPs)/ Immigration**

The mandate of the border police is to address “illegal migration” and criminal investigations tackling trans-border crimes under the provisions of the Libyan penal code, as well as to operate at border crossing points under the provisions of the legislation regulating entry, residence and exit of foreign nationals recently reviewed. Its jurisdiction is to control individuals crossing at BCPs and to police the territory inland 50 kilometres away from the border line. BG officers arresting individuals on suspicions of trans-border crimes are said to handover these individuals to the border police.

The Libyan Border Control Administration, organised according to a "police law", not yet translated in English, is under the responsibility of the MOI, which has as dedicated Deputy Minister for Border and BCP Affairs. The land border and maritime border departments are reporting directly to the Deputy Minister.

According to estimates, the border police consists of some 4 000 officers.

25 BCPs are registered:

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- 9 air BCP (4 currently opened: Tripoli, Misratah, Benghazi, Sabha);
- 8 port BCP on the coastline (in general no public/regular traffic of passengers);
- 8 land BCP (to Tunisia: Ra's Ajdir, Ghadamis; to Algeria: Ghadamis, Ghat; to Niger: Al Qatron; to Chad: Al Qatron, As Sarrha; to Sudan: Al Awaynat; to Egypt: Awaynat, Umm Sa'ad).

Only 2 of the land BCPs are under the control of the MOI: Ra's Ajdir (Tunisia), Umm Sa'ad (Egypt) as well as the 3 airports in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misurata, whilst the other 12 BCPs are under control of militias or other tribal organisations.

### **1.2.3 Customs**

The mandate of the Libyan Customs Department is to protect the national borders, the citizen health and to collect customs revenues by performing related customs controls and fighting against smuggling, and illicit traffics. It has a national jurisdiction for drug related customs investigations. In this mandate, no reference to facilitation of legal trade is to be found.

Under the current applicable Customs code (law 10/2010), the customs officials are granted the power to perform customs controls and surveillance activities. They can stop and arrest the people breaching the customs law, seize the goods and perform the relevant checks to protect the surveillance area. However, the customs code is not in line to the international standards.

Legal provisions for the organisation of Customs exist.

The Libyan Directorate of the Customs falls under the responsibility of the MOF. It is organised at two levels, central and territorial, following a complex organisational chart. At central level there are 8 General Directorates and 3 Director Staff Offices. At local level there are 6 Territorial Directorates (Tripoli, Zuara, Bengasi, Sirte, Al Betnan and Fezzan).

The customs border controls as such fall under the competence of the General Directorate of "Fighting against smuggling and drugs". The Directorate is composed of three Central Directorates (Land and Air control, Maritime control, Transit control), 6 Support Departments and 14 Territorial Directorates.



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The total strength of the Libyan Customs is estimated at 6 300, around 1 900 of which are dedicated to the enforcement activities. The last recruitment of 1 400 officers (former revolutionaries) was aiming at increasing the border controls in the south of the country, but due to security reasons, they have been re-deployed in other customs offices.

The Libyan Customs are currently operating along the northern Libyan borders (Tripoli, Mitiga, Zawia, Khoms, Zuara, Ra's Adjir, Wazen, Ghadames, Bengasi, Brega, Kase Ahmed, Sirte, Ras Lanuf, Umm Sa'ad, Tobruk and Derna).

With the exception of the terminal completed, but still not operating, at the border with Egypt - Humsad - and of Ra's Adjir with Tunisia, all other land and maritime border points are, in terms of infrastructure, inadequate. Scanners for goods are currently present only in 4 customs border points (Tripoli airport, Tripoli port, Bengasi port and Ra's Adjir) and they are not of good quality. The MOF has allocated funds to buy new scanning machines for all Libyan customs BCPs and the procurement procedures have commenced. IT infrastructure and of detection tools (drugs, metal detectors etc) are lacking.

### **1.2.4 Border Guards**

The BG mandate is to secure the land border of Libya, the inland range of 50 kilometres away from the border line, the perimeter of the border crossing points and some sensitive infrastructure. The BG is a new body, never foreseen before in Libya; activities of their jurisdiction were previously carried out by the army and the police (patrolling department).

To date, criminal and customs laws do not empower BG units with any mandate. In case of interception of persons or goods, a hand over should take place to the competent authorities (MOI, Customs), currently often absent from the area of operations, due to security concerns.

The BG duties are carried out by long range patrolling and a network of observation posts. Some of these operations are conducted in agreement with neighbouring countries in order to carry out joint patrolling and sharing of information<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> As per the Gadames conference discussions held on 12 January 2013 between Libya, Tunisia and Algeria

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As all post-revolution Libyan armed forces, the BG will fall under a new Libyan regulatory framework, still to be adopted. The BG was initially meant to report to the MOI. As difficulties eroded and a zone of military operations was proclaimed in the south, the BG were to respond separately to the authority of the MoD. Subsequently the BG was placed under the direct command of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces who had succeeded previously in reining in the revolutionary brigades. To date the BG are a separate armed force alongside the navy, the air force and the army, with which a privileged cooperation exists.

The BG have their main HQ in Tripoli and are officially falling under 6 geographical commands: Al Jaghub, Kufrah, Marzuq, Awbari, Ghadamis, Al Assah, with an alleged strength of 23 battalions.

Some 4 irregular *katibas*<sup>4</sup> from Zintan are currently deployed between Ras'Adjir and Gadhams on a temporary basis. The total strength of this formations reaches an estimated total of 9 000 personnel. The integration of irregular troops is of concern as it appears that organisational charts do not always reflect the true situation and are not even relied upon by central headquarters.

To date, with domestic inter-tribal conflicts and perceived external threats along the borders, the BGs, with the support of the armed forces, are more involved in military stabilisation duties than in border security as such. The need for this approach is exacerbated by the presence of local armed groups not wanting to relinquish the control of some profitable borders. Moreover, in the southwest, the area policed by the BG is reported to suffer infiltration attempts by AQIM.

### 1.2.5 Navy and Maritime agencies

The four Libyan governmental agencies have overlapping maritime competencies along the almost 1 800 kilometre long Libyan coastline. They are the Naval Coast Guard (NCG) of the Libyan Navy (MOD), the Customs Maritime Unit (MOF), Coastal Police (MOI) and the Libyan Port and Maritime Transport Authorities (Ministry of Transport - MOT).

At present, the NCG is the only Libyan entity that has limited operational maritime border

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<sup>4</sup> Old Arabic word used to describe a military unit of different size. In the context of this CONOPS, it is used here in an attempt to differentiate the "*revolutionary brigades*", regimented and gathered during the Revolution, the "*armed elements*", representing private or limited community interests, and the "*katibas*", armed units that were already existing under Gaddafi, not directly under the command of the government, but a means of local

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surveillance and monitoring capability. Border control along the coastal belt is very limited and maritime and land elements are not coordinated.

There are eight maritime BCPs in Libya, including Tripoli which was the sole official port of entry for passengers, but is still closed to passenger traffic following the Revolution. Misrata has been established as a free trade zone. On the coastline, 80 sites permit the launching of small craft typical of those used for the carriage of undocumented migrants.

### *Navy and Naval Coast Guard*

The current personnel strength of the Navy and NCG is reported to be around 6 500 personnel.

Significant efforts are underway by the Libyan Navy and NCG to re-establish their operational capability through re-commissioning of damaged vessels, the procurement of new boats and air assets.

However, the Navy is relatively intact from the organisational standpoint and surprisingly resilient, even if new regulatory provisions are in the making, as for all armed forces. The senior leadership cadre appears to have a clear vision of the way forward. The Libyan Navy and NCG are implementing a three-phase plan which started to be implemented in 2012 and should be complete by 2016. Its purpose is to progressively extend capacities from territorial waters to international waters.

The main bases of the Navy and the Naval Coast Guard are in Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk which provide a relatively even coverage of the Libyan coastline.

The Libyan Navy is planning to establish two National Maritime Coordination Centres: one in Tripoli and another in Benghazi.

A project is underway to re-establish a coastal radar capability along the Libyan coastline. The Navy's coastal surveillance system will be capable of drawing on the data generated by the Libyan Port and Maritime Transport Authorities Vessel Traffic Management and Information System

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governance by the major tribes. All these realities often overlap.

(VTMIS). The data collected through the two planned maritime surveillance systems will be fed into the two National Maritime Coordination Centres and the various Port Control Centres.

*Libyan Customs Administration Maritime Unit (MOF)*

The maritime component of the Libyan Customs Administration falls within the General Department for Combating Smuggling and Drugs of the MOF. There are a further 6 geographically-based Regional Directorates, five of which have sea ports within their area of responsibility. Currently the number of personnel is drastically reduced to approximately 60.

The plan of the Customs Department is to deploy maritime assets in each major port. This requires the procurement of ten-fully equipped boats and an increase in personnel numbers to about 600.

*Libyan Port and Maritime Transport Authority (Ministry of Transport)*

The Libyan Port and Maritime Transport Authority (LPMTA) is responsible for the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) that is required to secure the Libyan ports facilities and maritime installations. It is also responsible for the management of traffic flows into and out of ports and coastal installations, notably those associated with the export of petroleum products.

*Coastal Police (MOI)*

The MOI conduct law enforcement operations up to 3 nautical miles off the baseline.

It has four patrol boats and a large assortment of smaller boats, most of which are in bad condition and inoperable. It also operates a maritime patrol aircraft and two maritime helicopters requiring maintenance.

### **1.2.6 Public finance and public procurement**

In 2012, only 40% of the public budget of Libya was spent.

The process and procedures for the management of public funds and procurement have to be strengthened, requiring enhanced oversight and transparency.

However, although some coordination is in place, fiscal accountability of procurement is not high on the administration's list of priorities.

### **1.2.7 Justice system**

The Ministry of Justice inter alia assists the legislative process and is responsible for the organisation of correctional facilities. There is a general lack of electronic processing and filing as well as a lack of English language skills. Qualified lawyers and prosecutors are scarce and not spread evenly across the territory. The Ministry, given its role in law drafting and in the penal process, is a crucial interlocutor of the Ministries of Defence and Interior when it comes to border security as important laws on migration, residence, work permits, property and cross border movement need to be revised and will play an important role in the overall legal framework for IBM.

### **1.2.8 Libyan Intelligence Service**

The Libyan intelligence services (civilian and military) have recently merged into a single directorate.

The current Director presented himself as being keen to overhaul the role completely, responsibility, working ethic and organisation of Libyan intelligence services compared to the previous regime's use of such services.

The core tasks will be that of information gathering and analysis to feed political decision-making. The relevance of intelligence products in IBM is fully recognised as being critical. Adherence to the rule of law is to be a core principle of the new service but requires a change in attitude and mindset.

There is readiness from the current Director to liaise with the future CSDP Mission also for Mission risk analysis purposes.

### 1.3 International community and third state engagement in Libya

In September 2011, in the margins of the Friends of Libya meeting in Paris, the UN, WB, IMF and the EU agreed on a division of labour in relation to the sectors where needs assessments would be carried out. The EU signed up for border management, media and civil society. The IMF and the WB would focus on public finance and economic recovery and UNSMIL would take the responsibility for the security sector (DDR and SSR) and the social sectors. The EU and the WB/IMF, in a joint effort with Libyan counterparts, carried out their assessments and issued reports during 2012.

The EU decided in mid-2012 - on the basis of the needs assessment and the EU's political commitment to Libya - to further explore the deployment of a Civilian CSDP mission in Libya. This was followed by a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in November 2012 to ensure the appropriate high level Libyan buy-in and interest in a CSDP mission. The FFM met with the PM, MFA, MOI, MOD, Customs and agreed on a set of conclusions at the political-strategic level, defining the broad lines of a CSDP mission. The Libyans made a strong request for an EU civilian mission focusing on support in the field of IBM and border security (reference J - annex A to the CMC).

On 12 February 2013, France hosted an International Ministerial Conference on Support to Libya in the Areas of Security, Justice and Rule of Law. Conference participants included EU, DK, FR, DE, IT, MT, ES, UK, USA, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, AU, AMU, LAS and UNSMIL. The Libyan Delegation confirmed the priorities for the security and rule of law sectors that they had presented at a senior officials meeting in London in December 2012. European Member States presented their bilateral projects in these sectors. No major announcements were made regarding possible new measures/mechanisms which could solve the obvious lack of coordination from the Libyan authorities. The UN was confirmed as responsible for overall international donor coordination and the EU in the lead for border management assistance.

The **UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)**, apart from its international coordination role, focuses, as mandated, on SSR and DDR. A successful DDR process of the ex-fighters will be of paramount importance for bringing security and stability to Libya, and will be a condition for the CSDP mission to build its efforts on. The UNSMIL mandate was renewed for 1 year in March

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

2013. Close liaison with UNSMIL is important due to the linkages of border security with the wider SSR and DDR processes. Coordination with UNSMIL, notably through the Mission leadership and a dedicated political/SSR adviser will be foreseen, as well as between the respective Headquarters in Brussels and in New York, at strategic level.

The US State Department has an extensive Export Control and related Border Security programme (EXBS) in which it primarily seeks to provide Libya with support on the justice sector, arms control and land border security. Strong engagement has already been achieved between Libyan and US border security experts, primarily through a number of border security and customs related training events in the US. Funding for a rapid expansion of this programme (initially estimated at \$20M) is still under consideration, owing to the security situation in Libya. US intentions will be clarified after summer 2013, when financial commitments are to be identified.

Because of current security restrictions imposed on US personnel in the aftermath of the Benghazi attack of September 2012, training has not yet taken place in Libya; in the meantime the US is mitigating for this constraint by using contracted personnel to deliver future courses in Libya and also by conducting training events in neighbouring countries such as Morocco.

Libyans view a particular strength of the US programme being land border tracking which takes place on the US New Mexico border since this desert area has many similarities to that of Libya's Southern region; technological know-how to long distance patrolling, and the focusing of US IBM responsibilities within one single department of State.

The US has indicated their interest in the CSDP mission, given the potential similarities in scope and activities. US counterparts indicate that they would look to the EU to take the lead before launching their own enhanced mission and fully recognise the need for close continued liaison between Washington and Brussels and in Libya to ensure effective in country coordination, including through regular staff level VTCs already established.

Activities by the **League of Arab States, the African Union and ECOWAS** have all been political thus far and no known support programmes have yet been designed or launched. The Libyans will have to develop a closer and more operational relationship with these organisations.

**Turkey** recently graduated 804 Libyan police officers in basic training in Ankara. 41 senior staff has been on two week training programmes, and specialized training is foreseen to start under the Partnership for Peace programme. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been signed for military cooperation and is pending final parliament approval.

**Jordan and Qatar** are planning, or have already delivered, some initial training and equipment in the security sector, although as far as is known such support has not been provided as a coordinated response to IBM issues.

**The UAE** has recently conducted 9 military training courses for 230 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the UAE on border security, technical training and computer skills. They have furthermore trained 16 trainers of which 8 will start delivering 3 courses in Libya once logistical arrangements are in place. They plan to conduct further training in the UAE, and eventually move trainers and training equipment to Libya. The military training provided will complement the training foreseen by the CSDP mission, and the activities will be coordinated with the UAE in Tripoli.

In terms of migration, the **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** are implementing two EU projects to a value of 5.6M€:

- a comprehensive approach to the effective management of mixed migration flows in Libya
- support to UNHCR activities in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

The **International Organisation for Migration (IOM)** has an extensive programme (21 M€) of activities to support migration issues in Libya and regionally. It is doing so through projects that are either ongoing or planned with the support of the EU, Italy, US, and through IOM internal funding. Focus is being given to the stranded migrants within Libya, primarily through developing a regionally assisted voluntary return and reintegration programme, and ensuring that the Libyan authorities recognise their legal and moral responsibilities towards all migrants. Synergies between IOM and CSDP training activities will be explored.

**The World Customs Organisation (WCO)** has commenced a modernisation project (75 M€) at the Ra's Adjir BCP with Tunisia and Libya. This seeks to upgrade facilities and procedures at the checkpoint to accepted international standards. The Mission could look to coordinate with the WCO



on this project as a possible model for further BCP training and development, particularly since a lack of Libyan capacity and security is currently preventing the Libyan customs agency from operating effectively in all but 5 of the known land BCPs.

The Western Mediterranean Forum, commonly referred to as the '5+5 Dialogue', is another regional body which seeks to secure closer cooperation between five EU MS and five Arab Maghreb nations<sup>5</sup>. As a trans-Mediterranean security initiative, the rationale of the 5+5 Dialogue is to secure closer cooperation between participants through political dialogue and economic cooperation and by encouraging more efficient management of resources as a means of enhancing regional interdependence and development. Given that security and migration issues have featured heavily in recent dialogue debate, the Mission will factor this and other relevant fora into account when developing a strategic IBM strategy.

## **1.4 EU Action in Libya**

### **1.4.1 CSDP activities**

Although Libya is not part of the EU Sahel strategy, most security issues faced by Libya are of a regional nature and therefore also relate to other CSDP engagements in the wider region such as EUCAP SAHEL Niger.

### **1.4.2 European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENPI)/Instrument for Stability (IFS)/Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)**

The EU has an ambitious reform package under implementation in Libya to a value of 87.7 M€, from the ENPI, IFS and DCI instruments. The programmes are structured under:

- Governance, Democracy and Institution Building;
- Security and Rule of Law;
- Democracy and Human Rights;
- Civil society and media;

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<sup>5</sup> Namely; France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia.

- Migration;
- Health;
- Education;
- Protection of displaced people and migrant detainee children;
- Economic Growth.

A number of projects are directly or indirectly related to the activities of the Mission and offer good complementarity towards the needs of the Libyan institutions.

**Crisis Response Capacity Building/Operational Centre (1.88 M€, IfS).** The programme should start in 2013 pending a finalisation of a MoU with Libya. This programme will strengthen operational capacity to identify and tackle organised crime networks engaged in trafficking in human beings, weapons, drugs and other commodities. The proposed measure will harness and secure improved inter-Ministerial coordination on crisis response by enhancing the connectivity and capacity of the Libyan government's own crisis response facility. Once a centre is up and running it could tie will into the different border units, and be a hub for coordination and information.

**Enhancing Local Risk Detection and Crime Investigation Capability (2.2 M€, IfS).** The EU will reinforce Libyan criminal investigation capacities by providing technical training and facilitating access to Interpol databases, implemented by INTERPOL, which began in September 2012 and seeks to help improve Libya's crime investigation and detection capability to better face current and future security threats. This initiative will perform a wide assessment of the threats posed to Libya by transnational organized crime and terrorism so as to support the Libyan government and police in identifying strategic enforcement objectives. A passport scanning facility was inaugurated in Tripoli airport in March 2013 and could serve alongside CSDP activities at the airport.

**Strengthening democracy, good governance and civilian culture in the security and justice sectors (10 M€, ENPI).** The programme will focus on justice and police reform and a flexible response facility could provide expertise and mentoring. The main objectives are:

- To reinforce operational working methodologies for justice and security actors in line with EU and international standards and promote public accountability and civil oversight mechanisms

over the security sector.

- To foster an effective transitional justice process.

The project will have activities alongside those of the CSDP mission, especially at the MOI. The implementing partner have been associated to the operational planning process, to ensure maximum synergy between the activities.

The **SEAHORSE Programme** (EU contribution 4.5 M€). The project is intended to increase the capacity of the authorities of the North African countries to tackle irregular migration and illicit trafficking by strengthening their maritime border surveillance systems. Specifically, the project aims to enhance the situational awareness on irregular migration flows and illicit trafficking taking place in the coastal regions and territorial waters. It also seeks to reinforce the reaction capacity to preventing and tackling these phenomena including search and rescue of stranded migrants or asylum seekers. Moreover, it implies the creation of a regional network between the relevant authorities of participating Member States and North African countries that, once set up, will be linked to EUROSUR (the European Border Surveillance System). The programme was approved by Commission Decision in December 2012.

The **SAHARAMED Programme** (10 M€ programme - implemented by the Italian MOI) began before the revolution and was suspended. It is intended to support management of migration flows on the southern border. In agreement with the European Commission it has been reactivated on the basis of a new action plan.

All the above projects are handled in theatre by the EU Delegation (EUDEL).

**FRONTEX** has the expertise, capabilities, training tools and operational patterns, which could potentially fit in with a Civilian Border Management mission in Libya. FRONTEX has already been closely involved in the strategic and operational planning for the CSDP mission, inter alia through participation in the FFM and the TAM as well as the drafting of the CONOPS Plus. The necessary liaison with FRONTEX could be ensured by one of the deployed border management experts to the CSDP Mission. FRONTEX is therefore exploring the possibility to support the Mission.

In the short term, FRONTEX could help support initiatives to foster EU interest and support to

immediate Libyan security needs through the provision of a liaison visit by senior Libyan counterparts to FRONTEX Headquarters.

### **1.4.3 Member States Bi-lateral activities**

Several EU countries have substantial bilateral cooperation programmes in Libya, especially in the SSR, RoL, governance and migration sectors. Some key projects which the mission will pay special attention to and be coordinated with are listed here:

**Italy** has privileged relations with Libya based on strong political, economic, and cultural ties. The Italian government is implementing a large number of projects in Libya including in the field of security. Some of its main IBM related engagements with the Libyans include

- Training of the security forces by the IT MOD (Carabinieri, army and navy) at strategic and technical level;
- Support to the police in investigation, documents, anti drug activities etc by the IT MOI;
- Support to border control and maritime security (IT Navy);
- Support to the Libyan Customs administration on legislation, intelligence, organisation, border controls and IT (Italian Customs Agency);
- Support to customs through “Mediterranean Initiative”, a project at regional level which includes the participation of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey by IT customs;
- Restoration of patrol boats;
- Management of migrants;
- Justice programme such as legal drafting, forensic expertise, judicial training and prison management;
- IED, minefield, manpads, air traffic control;
- Provision of experts to the EUDEL;
- Significant supply of equipment for police, army and navy;
- DDR.

**France** has developed an ambitious and comprehensive partnership with Libya and is implementing many projects in the field of security, notably in the IBM area, including:

- support the customs through training for Libyan customs officials and deployment fo a national advisor to the Libyan General Directorate for Customs;
- support to the Libyan Navy (national adviser placed in the Libyan Navy);
- training of Libyan officers (French army and navy);
- management of migrants (training on the fight against illegal immigration);
- support to maritime security and surveillance (annual exercise "Shahin" on maritime surveillance).

**Malta** enjoys close historical, political and economic ties with Libya due to the geographic proximity of the two countries. The illegal migration phenomenon that emerged in the past ten years across the Mediterranean littoral has led to a significant number of third country nationals landing in Malta during their attempted crossing from North Africa to mainland Europe, mostly following rescue at sea. Due to latter, Malta, through its Armed Forces engaged with the Libyan authorities before and after the revolution to assist the Libyan authorities to further develop their national capacity to fulfil its international obligations related to the safety of life at sea, particularly search and rescue at sea.

Malta also has comprehensive police training programmes in the pipeline aimed at improving border control, basic and advanced policing skills as well as to strengthen the criminal investigation capacity. Furthermore, a number of training opportunities on civil protection, disaster management and the judicial field are also being offered by the Maltese authorities.

**Security related activities by the Netherlands include support for demining and demining awareness and for reform of the prison sector. The latter project will assist in the development of a general vision and mission of the Libyan prison service with a specific focus on training prison staff. also the project will support the development and implementation of an education plan.**

The **United Kingdom** has advisors placed in key positions such as the ministry of defence and in the border guards. They further support the MoD in explosive ordnance disposal, demining, military training through an exchange programme and in the development of a joint operations unit. The MoI is supported by police advisors in the field of strategic and organisational leadership.

**Denmark** supports RoL, criminal justice and transition through a number of UNDP, UNSMIL and UNODC projects.

For further details, please see Annex 10 - **Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities.**

## **1.5 Security**

The continued absence of a strong central government is seemingly allowing militia to consolidate their grounds and become more brazen and independent of any form of government control. Added to this is the fact that there has been little progress made in recapturing the some 26 000 prisoners that were released from Libya's prisons during the revolution, a number of whom are now allegedly integrated into local militia.

The threat of terror is ever present and has been shown to be effective given a number of attacks against international targets (including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) one of the few international actors that are often accepted by even the most radical jihadists). The military offensive in Mali might well push hardened fighters back towards Libya taking advantage of the apparent power vacuum. The government's highest-profile security initiative has been to declare the south a closed military zone and to formally close the southern borders.

It should be taken into consideration that as the mission establishes itself and begins to be known publicly (already mentioned in January and March 2013 by local press) there might also be a backlash against its assets and personnel when those involved in the trafficking seek to hamper the establishment of viable and functioning border control mechanisms.

Security threats also include petty crime, opportunistic carjacking and kidnappings, revenge killings and assassinations, bombings, and inter-communal fighting. Also human rights and gender empowerment is of concern.

Following the Algeria terrorist attack, the Libyan authorities are reportedly reviewing security arrangements at Libyan oilfields. EU Member States are stepping up their own efforts in identifying their own nationals working on oil fields in Libya.

In this context, the latest risk assessment for the future Mission activities is assessed as 'CRITICAL'.

Annex 7 related to 'safety and security measures' provides a detailed assessment and mitigation measures, including the mission minimum security standards recommendations.

## **2 EU APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES OF CSDP SUPPORT**

### **2.1 EU Political and Strategic Objectives<sup>6</sup>**

The current lack of regional border security and attendant risks from illegal migrations, arms, drugs, health and other form of illicit smuggling and human trafficking in Libya are all serious threats to EU security interest because they can affect the internal security of EU countries and be a source of destabilisation in the southern neighbourhood, in particular Sahel countries.

The EU strategic objective is to contribute to the Libyan owned development of an IBM capacity that allows self-sustained Libyan management of its borders.

The Mission's overall objective is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of their borders in the short term and assist in developing a broader strategic IBM concept for the Libyan authorities.

### **2.2 Assumptions**

- Libyan political stability is uncertain. By operating at operational level and developing Libyan Institutions, the Mission will strengthen Libyan political resilience;
- The Libyan government confirms its commitment and preparedness to cooperate with the CSDP Mission and supports the development of a Libyan IBM strategy to deliver efficient border security;
- The Libyan authorities are committed to implement the IBM strategy.
- The limited absorption capacities of Libyan political and operational entities will allow a limited and focussed start of Mission activities. The Mission activities will then develop in

step with the progressive increase of Libyan absorption capacities;

- The DDR effort and the influx of former revolutionary fighters will not overwhelm the management capacity of the border services to such a point that these services will not be able to conduct their operations. The UN and the Mission will coordinate on this aspect ;
- A Status of Mission Agreement is concluded with Libya;
- The EU Member States will provide the necessary resources;
- The security situation allows the Mission to operate efficiently and to gradually expand geographically;
- Coordination of the International Community support for Libyan border management is facilitated by the Mission.

### **3 MISSION**

The Mission will be known as European Union **Integrated Border Management** Assistance Mission (EUBAM Libya) in Libya.

#### **3.1 Mission statement**

The Mission is to support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity for enhancing the security of their borders in the short term and assist in developing a broader IBM strategy for the Libyan authorities when the conditions are appropriate<sup>7</sup>.

### **4 OPERATIONS DESIGN**

#### **4.1 CivOpsCdr strategic analysis**

##### **4.1.1 IBM strategy as Libyan border management centre of gravity**

IBM is the developing centre of gravity of Libyan border management as it will progressively empower the Libyan authorities to govern their borders and develop their capabilities.

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<sup>6</sup> As identified in the CMC, ref I.

<sup>7</sup> See CMC, ref I.



For the purpose of this Mission, IBM is to be understood as the strategy bringing together and supporting all entities and services that mutually complement and re-enforce their activities and contribute, directly or indirectly, to the governance exerted by the Libyan authorities over their borders. The strategy comes with an implementation plan.

The strategy comes with an implementation plan.

Its more visible features are international BCPs, whether on land, at seaports or airports, where border security, immigration, customs, intelligence, public security and criminal investigation as well as medical, veterinary and phyto-sanitary services operate together, supported by common criminal intelligence gathering analysis and sharing processes. Nevertheless, IBM is critical for the whole border line.

It is based on cooperation and coordination taking place at three levels:

- Intra-service cooperation (within a service or a ministry);
- Inter-agency cooperation (between different ministers or border agencies);
- International cooperation.

It has:

- Critical requirements;
- Critical capabilities;
- Critical vulnerabilities.

### ***Critical requirements of IBM***

IBM requires political will, operational adhesion and the development of a set of principles and methodology which promotes and facilitates cooperation and mutual support between relevant entities. It requires a policy framework within which that cooperation occurs. It is not a structure but requires a structure.

### ***Critical capabilities of IBM***

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

The capability for the government to effectively govern the border management services down to tactical level.

The capability for the government to empower and enable the border management services through:

- a comprehensive, harmonised and consistent national legal framework of statutes, rules and regulations well embedded in a broader rule of law framework;
- the governmental sound management and allocation to the services of the necessary human, material and financial resources.

The capability for the IBM services to:

- contribute to securing borders
- control the movement of persons;
- control the movement of goods;
- protect public health and welfare;
- protect the environment;
- secure key infrastructures.

### ***Critical vulnerabilities of IBM in the Libyan context:***

- Competition between services;
- Uncontrolled elements at the border substituting themselves to official services and/or trafficking and smuggling;
- Near absence of infrastructure and technology for border surveillance, information gathering, analysing and sharing;
- Absence of command of professional skills;
- Corruption;
- Possible trans-border terrorist activities, inter alia as a consequence to the conflict in Mali .

### **4.1.2 Key operational considerations:**

Rule of law and Human Rights

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

After more than 40 years of dictatorial ruling overcome by a revolution, the general perception of the importance of human rights and Rule of Law among the services is weak. Gender considerations and freedom of religion or belief are increasingly challenged. In this context, the treatment of migrants is of particular concern.

**All Mission activities will consistently incorporate considerations for Rule of Law, human rights and gender and a particular attention will be paid to the issue of migrants.**

### Political and legal situation:

The process to draft and adopt a constitution for Libya has only started and may last for 18 months. In the meantime, it is expected that, whilst political debates will be thriving, little legal drafting will take place in the waiting for the new political and legal frameworks.

**Although it is necessary for the Mission to pro-actively engage at political level from the outset, the Mission must be designed so that it can operate and have effects even if little political progress is achieved in its remit for two years after its deployment.**

### Nature of the Mission mandate:

The Mission is given a strengthening mandate, which includes Mentoring, Monitoring, Advising (MMA), and Training. In this context the crucial element of effectiveness of the Mission is to ensure the active support of the Libyan authorities at all level through extensive consultation and cooperation. A real challenge is represented by the fragmentation of the Libyan reality.

**The effects of the CSDP Mission are conditioned by the capacity to secure the active support of the Libyan population and their authorities at all levels.**

### Wider EU :

As such, the Mission will support a comprehensive approach of the EU, taking into account the activities of all other EU Instruments as well as the activities of its Member States. It will create complementarities with CSDP engagements in the region where applicable. Without prejudice to

the chain of command, the Mission will receive local political guidance from the Head of Delegation and regional political guidance from the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Southern Mediterranean, as well as consult with the EUSR for the Sahel Region .

**The Mission will support and be part of the EU comprehensive approach.**

Moreover, the Mission will be able to draw lessons from the FRONTEX experience as well as from other border management missions such as, inter alia, EUBAM R. Moldova and Ukraine and EUBAM Rafah.

### Coordination

In theatre, the Mission will operate in a complex environment. The Mission must work coherently and in partnership not only with EU actors, including EUDEL, EUSR South Med and EU Member States, but also with other international organisations, regional organisations and Third States, such as UNSMIL, WCO, INTERPOL, UNHCR, IOM, the United States and UAE.

**Support to the Libyan authorities in coordinating initiatives on border management in Libya is crucial for the Mission in order to avoid duplication and ensure optimisation of resources.**

### Regional Dimension:

Having borders with 6 non EU countries as well as with a number of EU Member States, Libya has a pivotal geographical location in the region. Libya will have to engage with its neighbouring countries in order to maximise the strengthening of its border management in mutual cooperation.

**The Mission will need to include the necessary capacity to encourage and support related Libyan international cooperation.**

### Libyan identified requests

To date, the Libyan government has to cope with an immediate threat along its land border where border guards have the duty to secure thousands of kilometres of desert land border and the south-

west part has been declared as a military zone. The Libyan authorities have specifically requested that training should be designed and delivered for the officials operating in this zone.

**Together with engaging at political level to contribute to the design of a Libyan IBM strategy, the Mission will, from the outset, design and deliver training in Tripoli to address the needs of the units deployed to the land border, focusing in priority on the units deployed to the south border, taking into account the specific nature of long range border patrolling and the likelihood of these patrols to be exposed to attacks with firearms. Once the trained units are redeployed to the south, the Mission should conduct regular assessment missions to the south in order to take stock of the implementation of the training provided in Tripoli.**

In an effort to regiment and professionalise the BG, a training concept has been designed by their leadership. It is based on the progressive training of full battalions taken off their duties at the border, being trained and redeployed.

**The immediate Mission activities for the BG will adapt to the training concept developed by their leadership, complementing the training of entire battalions .**

The Libyan authorities have specifically requested assistance to develop a bespoke IBM strategy. Given the intricacies and stove piped organisation of the Libyan border management services, there is a need to guide the existing capacities to converge towards the implementation of an IBM structure. The use of pilot models on land, maritime and air borders, as vehicles for training and as the initial establishment of a culture of joint agency will allow for a later roll out to other, initially with the support of the Mission, and, ultimately, by the Libyans themselves. It will focus the efforts of the Mission on the performance of the Libyan capabilities and match the developing absorption capacity of the Libyan services.

**The Mission will develop pilot models for land, maritime and air BCPs, support the duplication of these models before monitoring the duplication by the Libyan authorities themselves.**

The Libyan authorities have also requested to provide support to develop their maritime border

capacities including through the re-establishment of the NCG maritime border operations and search and rescue (SAR) , the support to the maritime elements of the Coastal Police and of the Customs.

**The Mission will support the Libyan maritime border authorities in Tripoli to develop models that could replicated along the Libyan coastline and will identify synergies between the maritime border agencies.**

Border management cannot be effective and sustainable without an efficient justice system accessible to all. In the Libyan context, there are additional factors influencing this, including large border communities with unresolved citizenships as well as a lack of local governance.

**The Mission will include justice expertise to liaise with the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Local Government on relevant linkages between IBM, the wider Rule of Law and the decentralisation process.**

During the CMPD-led FFM in November 2012, the Libyan authorities underlined the lack of equipment and requested some specific assistance to identify the material to be purchased for border management as well as advice on sound accountability for public finance and procurement in this field.

**The Mission will include public finance and public procurement expertise.**

In this context, to ensure that the necessary equipment is available for training and to allow a swift beginning of the activities, the Mission might rely a small number of training projects including the purchase of limited equipment strictly necessary to deliver training.

**The Mission will carry out a limited number of projects, managed by a project capability.**

Security considerations constraining the area of operations:

At the time of drafting this analysis, the security situation for Westerners is worsening in Libya with Tripoli being identified as the only area where European Mission members could routinely and

safely operate, covered by necessary security arrangements.

The Mission will have to elaborate stringent but adaptable security measures, commencing its activities **initially** in Tripoli **and complemented** by **spot visits by the Mission, giving priority to the south** , as the security situation permits, **with a view to assessing the training delivered**. **The possibility of an extension of the Mission to include a permanent presence outside Tripoli is subject to the OPLAN being agreed by PSC and approved by the Council, taking into Libyan buy-in and the security situation**

**Any extension will also** influence the phasing and staffing of the Mission.

#### **4.1.3 Level of ambition:**

EUBAM Libya, taking into account the limited, developing and progressive absorption capacities of its Libyan counterparts, the geographical, cultural and political realities, as well as relevant projects carried out by other partners, will focus its activities on those crucial elements that will support and assist the Libyan authorities to create an IBM strategy and acquire the means to implement and sustain it without further CSDP assistance. These elements are identified under objectives and tasks (paragraph 4.4 below).

The main effort of the Mission will be to realise IBM at operational level within and between the services even if the relevant Libyan IBM interministerial political agreements and related legal provisions are completed at a later stage.

The Mission ambition is to contribute to the realisation of the critical enablers for the development of an IBM strategy and to support its implementation to the extent possible.

#### **4.2 CivOpsCdr intent and selected Course of Action**

In order to strengthen the Libyan authorities in their effort to secure their borders and establish efficient national and international cooperation, all activities of the Mission aiming, directly or indirectly, at contributing to the development of a bespoke Libyan IBM strategy, the CivOpsCdr intent is to:

- ensure the continuity of presence in country by deploying the proposed future HoM and his

core team, under the terms of the preparatory measures;<sup>8</sup>

- once the Council has adopted the Decision establishing EUBAM Libya, set up the Mission initially in Tripoli and, as security permits, expand activities to other accessible areas with a priority to the south with a view to establishing a permanent presence as appropriate;
- resort to force multipliers such as the deployment of a project management capability, the deployment of visiting experts and working experience secondments (WES) for Libyan officials and specialised training in EU Member States, as required;
- Initially, to initiate the design of a bespoke IBM strategy with engagement of respective operational services, and deliver in service training to address urgent gaps, thus supporting the Libyan authorities to enhance governmental control over the IBM services;
- secondly, deliver the relevant advice to materialise IBM enablers and deliver joint service training to contribute to the capacity surge, coordination and cooperation necessary to establish IBM.

The main effort of the Mission will be to realise IBM at operational level within and between the services even if the relevant Libyan IBM interministerial political agreements and related legal provisions are completed at a later stage. Although it is necessary for the Mission to pro-actively engage at political level from the outset, the Mission will be designed so that it can operate and have effects even if little political progress is achieved in its remit.

The Mission structure as described in para.5.4 is designed to achieve this aim by mirroring the Libyan border services structures and providing for horizontal advice regarding, inter alia, strategic, legal, public finance, human rights and gender considerations.

The Mission, whilst performing its tasks in full conformity with these principles, will promote EU policies on human rights and gender as well as the implementation of relevant UN Resolutions.

### **4.3 Desired End State of the Mission**

A Libyan-led IBM strategy compliant with international standards and best practices has been created and the Libyan authorities have the means to implement it without further CSDP assistance. Libya has engaged in a structured , efficient and collaborative partnership with the EU on border

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<sup>8</sup> See Annex 1 "Core team"



management issues.

#### 4.4 Mission Objectives and Tasks (see Annex 4, benchmarking)

All mission objectives and tasks will be implemented through MMA and training activities, in accordance with the principle of local ownership and in coordination with the international community, while keeping them consistent with the European comprehensive approach.

##### 4.4.1 Objective 1: To contribute to enhance the performance of integrated border management by the relevant Libyan authorities and agencies, in accordance with international best practices and standards.<sup>9</sup>

This objective will imply the following tasks:

Task 1.1: To support the Libyan IBM authorities and agencies to address their immediate needs to enhance border control, encompassing border surveillance and border checks.

Task 1.2: To support the Libyan authorities in designing and implementing models for IBM surveillance and BCPs.

Task 1.3: To support the Libyan authorities in **establishing maritime capabilities to assist Libya to fulfil their international maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) commitments in a manner commensurate with their international obligations and best practices.**

##### 4.4.2 Objective 2: To support the Libyan authorities in developing a national IBM strategy.

This objective will imply the following tasks:

Task 2.1: To support the establishment and functioning of a Libyan cross governmental coordination mechanism, both at political and operational level.

Task 2.2: To support the Libyan authorities in the continuous analysis of IBM gaps and needs.

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<sup>9</sup> Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in EC External Cooperation, European Commission, November 2009)

Task 2.3: To support the Libyan authorities to develop a Libyan approach for IBM (White Paper/Policies) fully respecting gender and human rights aspects, and embedded in a broader rule of law framework.

Task 2.4: To support the establishment and functioning of a Libyan-led donors coordination mechanism for IBM.

**4.4.3. Objective 3: To support the Libyan authorities to develop the necessary enablers to implement a sustainable IBM strategy.**

This objective will imply the following tasks:

Task 3.1.: To support the Libyan authorities in identifying the IBM legal requirements and promoting the adoption of a coherent and comprehensive national IBM legislative and regulatory framework.

Task 3.2.: To support the Libyan authorities in establishing the necessary cooperation with neighbouring countries, regional and international organisations, including through the adoption of the appropriate legal instruments and/or accession to relevant international Instruments.

Task 3.3.: To support the strengthening of the institutional culture and capacity of the IBM services for inter-agency coordination and cooperation, including through technical solutions.

Task 3.4.: To support the Libyan authorities in establishing IBM procedures.

Task 3.5.: To support the Libyan authorities in designing and implementing human resources and training policies.

Task 3.6.: To support the Libyan authorities in the development of communication and information exchange capabilities.

Task 3.7.: To support the Libyan authorities in the acquisition of necessary infrastructure and

equipment.

Task 3.8.: To support the Libyan authorities in the development of IBM Risk Analysis capabilities.

#### 4.5 Management of risks to Mission accomplishment

Annex 5 registers all mitigation measures that will be taken by the Mission in order to alleviate the effects of identified risks inherent to the activities carried out by the Mission.

### 5. EXECUTION

#### 5.1 Mission duration and area of operations

The initial duration of the mandate of EUBAM Libya is 2 years.

Its area of operations is Libya<sup>10</sup>, with specialised training organised in Europe as required and consideration given to possible liaison with neighbouring countries.

#### 5.2 Phases

##### 5.2.1 Phase 1, from adoption of the Council decision to the adoption of the OPLAN (From end of May 2013 to end of December 2013)

- During phase 1, prepared by the continued presence of CSDP experts in Libya since the TAM, the Mission will deploy itself and start the urgent activities that can be immediately delivered. **Reporting back on Libyan buy-in, Human Rights considerations related to the Mission activities and on the security situation during this crucial period will be a priority for the Mission.**

The Mission will be able to commence activities when:

- All necessary security measures are in place to allow Mission activities;

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- Mission personnel recruited through the first regular call for contribution have been deployed;
- The equipment necessary to support the initial Mission activities has been procured and delivered;
- Agreements on work procedures have been achieved with the Libyan counterparts in the ministries and the services.

Phase 1 will be divided in three sub-phases, initiating the completion of objectives and tasks, through the indicative activities identified below:

### **Sub-phase 1.1 till end June 2013**

Activities commencing during this sub-phase will have to rely on the limited capacities of the Mission headquarters staff, resources to be found in Tripoli and a very limited number of visiting experts. These activities will start to address a number of urgent requirements already identified by the Libyan authorities, the IBMNA and the CPCC-led TAM, whilst also developing working relationships and modus operandi between the Mission and the Libyan border authorities at operational level. Mission activities envisaged at this Stage include *inter-alia*:

- commencement of training in support of immigration and customs controls at Tripoli international airport;
- commencement of the delivery of technical English language training for front line immigration officials and naval coast guards;
- study visit to FRONTEX;
- Integrated Border Management (IBM) seminar for the Heads of Departments (operations, administration, training) of the services;
- delivery of initial advice on public finance and public procurement;
- delivery of initial advice on BG training;
- design SAR training for maritime border agencies.

### **Sub-phase 1.2 till October 2013**

Ramadan and the associated shortened working hours of Libyan institutions from 09 July to 08

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<sup>10</sup> See Annex 3, Area of Operation.

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August 2013 will create an operational pause and an opportunity for the Mission to absorb new staff, build up its headquarters capacity and its support structure, adjust to lessons learned during the initial stage and settle itself. However, in order to maintain momentum, operational activities will continue whenever it is practical to do so. Envisaged at this point is:

- a workshop on risk analysis with all services;
- development of naval coast guard training curricula;
- development of basic Border Guard training curricula for junior leadership and officer;
- contribution to the Border Guard patrolling training programme;
- development of a Customs training curriculum;
- commencement of an IBM pilot project at Tripoli international airport;
- initiate law enforcement operational training for maritime border agencies;
- provide advice to the Libyan authorities as regard the establishment of a maritime rescue coordination centre;
- public procurement advice;
- security permitting, exploratory trip to assess the south border management;
- continuation of English language training.

### **Sub-phase 1.3 till the end of December 2013**

By the end of November, the majority of Mission staff having deployed and the HQ being fully established\_ in addition to the activities conducted, momentum built and curricula and modus operandi worked out at the operational level\_ the Mission's longer term and more institutional support to Libyan border management will commence. During this sub-phase, implementation of the Border Guard basic, junior leader and officer curricula is foreseen to commence, along with Border Guard Long Range Patrol training. Longer term capacity building activities in support of all relevant services including NCG will also commence at this stage, or shortly after.

**The first six-monthly report will be presented no later than early November 2013 in view of informing the development of the draft OPLAN to be submitted early December 2013.**

### **SOMA**

The SOMA will be negotiated as a matter of priority by the competent EU services.

### **5.2.2 Phase 2**

Phase 2 starts with the adoption and implementation of the OPLAN which will take into account developments by then, including the possibility of geographical expansion of Mission activities. The Mission will further carry out the objectives and tasks identified in paragraph 4.4.

### **5.2.3 Mission Review**

A strategic review will be undertaken mid mandate.

### **5.3 Exit strategy<sup>11</sup>**

The drawdown of CSDP engagement is predicated on eventual Libyan ownership and an autonomous capacity in managing Libyan borders.

Following the completion of identified training, including a dedicated train the trainer package to ensure sustainability, the Mission could repatriate all training to Libyan authorities and possibly reduce to a purely advisory, monitoring and mentoring function, subject to the recommendations of the Mid-Term Mission Review and their approval by the Council. Refresher courses could also be envisaged in EU MS and/or in Libya under the eventual lead of the MS concerned and/or under the coordination of relevant EU agencies/bodies on a bilateral basis with Libya.

The drawdown of CSDP could be conducted in phases, gradually reducing the Mission footprint as Libyan capacity improves. This might see other EU actors/instruments engaging as the Mission draws down, where applicable. In this regard, actions aimed at sustaining the results of the Mission and financed by appropriate EU instruments and possibly conducted by the EUDEL in Tripoli would be considered.

To this effect, the Mission will consult with Commission, the EUSR, EUDEL and Member States early on in order to establish a well prepared phasing out process as an important element for a successful exit strategy. Similar consultations will take place with other relevant stakeholders such

as third States, regional and international organisations.

#### **5.4 Indicative Mission Structure**

The "Guidelines to design civilian CSDP mission-specific organisational structures", Council doc. 11833/12 of 26 June 2012, apply.

The Mission HQs in Tripoli will liaise with the ministries; institutions, regional headquarters and training centres involved in the IBM. The Mission will also operate a Project Capability according to the principles described in the above mentioned guidelines.

The indicative organisational chart of the Mission structure described below is provided in Annex 2, which also includes the description of Mission internal working groups with responsibility over functional IBM areas. The Mission will have a support element located in Brussels. It will assist the work of the Mission through close liaison with the CPCC, other elements of the European External Action Service, the European Commission and other actors in Brussels. The Brussels-based support element is composed of Mission members. Their conditions of employment or secondment shall be in accordance with the contractual obligations between the Head of Mission and the Commission. The staff will operate under the command of the Head of Mission.

The Head of Mission (HoM) will be deputised by a Deputy HoM (DHoM) and supported by a Chief of Staff (CoS) at MHQs level.

On behalf of the HoM, the DHoM will accomplish the tasks assigned to him/her by the HoM, on a permanent or *ad hoc* basis.

The mission will comprise up to 120 international staff.

Military expertise could provide specialist skills applicable to the specific Libyan context and geography.

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<sup>11</sup> See CMC, ref I , para. 77 and 78.

#### 5.4.1 Implementation elements

Compliance of Mission activities with both the Mission Mandate and the direction of the Head of Mission will be ensured by a **Head of Operations** (HoO) who will report to the HoM and be supported by the HoO Office.

**The Strategic IBM Adviser**, assisted by the IBM Office, reports to the HoM through HoO and will liaise with and advise the Libyan Prime Minister's Decision Support Office and any relevant structures and working groups established by the Libyan government to develop and lead national IBM policy, strategy and implementation. Through this role and through supervision and coordination of the Mission's IBM Working Groups (see para.5.5.1), the Strategic IBM Adviser will ensure coherence of Mission activities with Libyan IBM policy. The Strategic IBM Adviser will supervise:

- The **Senior Justice Adviser** (to liaise with the Ministries of Justice and Local Government);
- The **IBM Legal Team** headed by a **Senior IBM Legal Adviser** (to assist with the IBM legislation and regulatory framework, at national and international level);
- The **Senior Public Finance and Procurement Adviser** (to support the establishment of efficient procurement procedures and sound financial management within the institutions involved in the IBM);
- The **Risk Analysis Team** headed by a **Senior Risk Analysis Adviser** (to support the establishment of Libyan risk analysis capabilities, streamlining intra-service and inter-agency cooperation and coordination);

The **Border Guard (BG) Unit**, headed by the **Senior Border Guard Adviser**, reports to the HoM through HoO and supervises:

- The **BG Adviser for Operations** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Operations at the BG HQs);
- The **BG Adviser for Administration** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Administration and Finance at the BG HQs);



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- The **BG Adviser for Training** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Training at the BG HQs), who will supervise:
- The **BG Senior Training Expert** (to liaise with the Libyan BG Training Centre/s), who will be assisted by a pool of **BG Training Experts** as appropriate.

The **Naval Coastal Guard (NCG) Unit**, headed by the **Senior NCG Adviser**, reports to the HoM through HoO and s supervises:

- The **NCG Adviser for Operations** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Operations at the NCG HQs);
- The **NCG Adviser for Administration** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Administration and Finance at the NCG HQs);
- The **NCG Adviser for Training** (to liaise with the Libyan BG Chief of Training at the NCG HQs), who will supervise:
  - The **NCG Senior Training Expert** (to liaise with the Libyan NCG Training Centre/s), who will be assisted by a pool of **NCG Training Experts** as appropriate;

The **Border Policing and Immigration (BP&I) Unit**, headed by the **BP&I Senior Adviser**, reports to the HoM through HoO and s supervises:

- The **BP&I Adviser for Operations** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Police Operations at national level);
- The **BP&I Adviser for Coastal police** (to advise the Coastal police unit);
- The **Coordinator - Tripoli Airport IBM Pilot Project**;
- The **Coordinator - Tripoli Sea Port and Ra's Ajir land BCP IBM Pilot Projects** ;
- The **BP&I Adviser for Administration** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Police Administration and Finance at national level);
- The **BP&I Adviser for Training** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Police Training at national level), who will supervise:
  - The **BP&I Senior Training Expert** (to liaise with the Libyan Police Training Centre/s), who will be assisted by a pool of **BP&I Training Experts** as appropriate;

The **Customs (CUS) Unit**, headed by the **Senior CUS Adviser**, reports to the HoM through HoO and s supervises:

- The **CUS Adviser for Operations** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Operations at the CUS

HQs);

- The **CUS Maritime Adviser** (to advise the custom maritime unit)
- The **CUS Adviser for Administration** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Administration and Finance at the CUS HQs);
- The **CUS Adviser for Training** (to liaise with the Libyan Chief of Training at the CUS HQs), who will supervise:
  - The **CUS Senior Training Expert** (to liaise with the Libyan CUS Training Centre/s), who will be assisted by a pool of **CUS Training Experts** as appropriate.

#### 5.4.2 Mission HQ staff

On behalf of the HoM, the Chief of Staff (CoS), supported a CoS Office including Reporting Officers, will coordinate the work of the MHQs Staff, composed of:

- Operational staff functions:
  - The **Planning and Evaluation Department**, the Head of which reports to the HoM, replaces the CoS in case of absence and supervises a pool of experts, including a programme manager (the latter as coordinator of the mission's Project Capability);
  - The **Mission Analysis Capability (MAC)**, the Head of which will supervise a team of **Analysts**;
  - The **Security Department**, headed by the **Senior Mission Security Officer (SMSO)** who supervises a pool of **Mission Security Officers (MSOs)**.
- Advisory staff functions:
  - The **Political Department**;
  - The **Public Information Department**;
  - The **Legal Adviser**.
- Support staff functions:
  - The **Mission Support Department (MSD)**, the Head of which supervises:
    - The **Administrative Services Office**, the Head of which deputizes the Head MSD and supervises a pool of **Human Resources, Finance and Procurement officers**;
    - The **General Support Services Office**, the Head of which supervises **Logistics**,

**Transportation and CIS officers** as well as the **Medical Adviser**.

### **5.4.3 Visiting experts**

Visiting experts are included in the mission set up and will operate in accordance with the "Guidelines on the use of Visiting Experts in the context of civilian CSDP Missions" (doc 8551/12, dated 4 April 2012).

### **5.5 Coordination:**

Three levels of coordination will be addressed by the Mission:

- Internal coordination within EUBAM Libya and internal working groups;
- Coordination with other EU political, operational and tactical levels in theatre;
- External coordination with organisations and Third States operating in Libya and in the region.

#### **5.5.1. Internal co-ordination within the Mission**

Internal coordination aims at:

- ensuring that all Mission's planned activities adequately reflect the integrated nature of IBM and the abidance to the bespoke IBM development approach of the Mission;
- ensuring coherence and an integrated approach within each implementing elements.

To reach these objectives, the MHQ:

- will carry out the Mission's mandate and objectives and ensure that Mission members execute tasks in an harmonised, coordinated and unified way;
- will prepare an internal Mission plan, detailing tasks and activities for Mission members;
- will provide an accurate and up to date picture of activities and results through benchmarking and an internal reporting structure.

All implementing units will work directly with, and in support of, the Libyan border security and management agencies whilst the Strategic IBM Adviser is to ensure that their activities address

those issues and priorities agreed between the Mission and relevant Libyan structures and working groups.

Opportunities for horizontal integration, synergy, coordination and mutual support amongst the five units in the delivery of the Mission's operational activities are to be identified and exploited through the work of an IBM Strategy Working Group, chaired by the Strategic IBM Adviser. The IBM Strategy Working Group will be supported by a minimum of five other permanent Mission sub-working groups which will be a continuing feature of Mission management, will meet at least weekly and chairmen of which will report functionally to the Strategic IBM Adviser :

- The Land IBM sub-working group, chaired by the Senior BG Adviser;
- The Maritime IBM sub-working group, chaired by the Senior NCG Adviser;
- The Air IBM sub-working group, chaired by the Senior BP&I Adviser;
- The Public Finance IBM sub-working group, chaired by the Senior Public Finance and Procurement Adviser;
- The Risk Analysis IBM sub-working group, chaired by the Senior Risk Analysis Adviser.

Other thematic working groups of a permanent or ad-hoc character may be created.

### **5.5.2 EU Coordination**

Without prejudice to the chain of command, EUBAM Libya will receive local political guidance from the EUDEL in Tripoli, as well as regional political guidance from the EU Special Representative for the southern Mediterranean.

The Mission will promote coordination and co-operation among all stakeholders and in particular EU Member States, in the field of security and under the local political guidance of the head of Delegation. To this end, the HoM will liaise on a regular basis with EU Member States Heads of Mission throughout the mission area of responsibility.

EU coordination aims at identifying complementarities and benefits between the operations and activities of EUBAM Libya and EUCAP SAHEL Niger, as well as any existing and/or future CSDP mission operating in the region.

Ensuring that the activities of the Mission are supporting the implementation of the overall EU policy framework for the region, in line with the comprehensive approach. Where appropriate, the Mission will work in close cooperation with the implementing agencies of the Commission's projects.

### **5.5.3 External co-ordination**

External coordination aims at:

- Avoiding duplication of EUBAM Libya activities with other initiatives in Libya and the region;
- Building an effective community of supporting actors in the remit of the Mission mandate.

To reach these objectives, the MHQ will:

- Liaise with other relevant stakeholders, including UNSMIL;
- Prepare and maintain a coordination matrix;
- Organise regular meetings with contributors.

## **5.6 Identification of lessons**

The Mission is to contribute to lessons identification with a view to continuously further improving civilian CSDP. Document 15987/08 at Annex 12 refers.

## **6 COMMAND**

### **6.1 Command structure**

The Mission shall have a unified chain of command, as a crisis management operation.

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and of the HR, the political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission.

The Civilian C2 structure will be in line with the model described in the EU Civilian C2 Concept (doc 9919/07).

### **6.1.1 Chain of Command**

The CPCC Director is the Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpsCdr) for the Mission.

The CivOpsCdr will exercise command and control of the CSDP Mission at the strategic level under the political control and strategic direction of the PSC and, as such, shall issue instructions to HoM and provide him with advice and technical support.

The CivOpsCdr shall report to the Council through the HR.

The HoM will assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the CSDP Mission at the theatre level and, as such, shall issue instructions for the effective conduct of the Mission in theatre, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, following the instructions of the CivOpsCdr. He/she shall be directly responsible to the CivOpsCdr.

The HoM will exercise command and control over the personnel, from contributing States as assigned to him/her by the CivOpsCdr together with administrative and logistic responsibility including assets, resources and information put at the disposal of the Mission.

The HoM shall represent the Mission in the area of operations and shall coordinate, as appropriate, with other EU actors on the ground.

In case of absence, the HoM will be replaced by the DHoM. In case of absence of both, the HoM will appoint a senior Mission member to deputise.

The HoM can delegate in writing any power or function that is vested in him to any named staff member or to a staff member designated by title or position. No delegation can take place where the grant of the power or function to the HoM is vested in him in a sole or personal capacity.

Given the HoM's personal responsibility for the execution of the Mission budget, the head of the Mission support reports directly to her/him for financial matters, while keeping the CoS fully informed.

### **6.1.2 Transfer/Delegation of authority**

All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of contributing States or EU institutions.

National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel and teams to the CivOpsCdr.

Staff members will carry out their duties and act in the interest of the mission, and recognize to be responsible to the HoM for the tasks entrusted to them.

### **6.1.3 Discipline**

The HoM shall be responsible for disciplinary control over the personnel.

For seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be taken by the national or EU authority concerned. To this end, each contributing State should appoint a National Contingent Leader or National Contact Point (NCL or NCP) to represent each national contingent in the mission, responsible for contingent discipline. The Code of Conduct as detailed in Annex 6 will apply.

## **6.2 Reporting**

Accurate and timely Mission reporting is a prerequisite to properly assess both the Mission progressive achievements and the need for any required additional guidance and/or direction.

The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the CivOpsCdr and the HoM on issues within their areas of responsibility.

The reporting system will enhance the capability of the EU to follow and support the Mission in all its aspects. Reporting needs will be mainly dealt with through periodic reporting or in response to specific requests or situations. The reporting guidelines in doc. 7192/11 of 3 March 2011 will apply.

The mission will require 24/7 operational support coverage in the EEAS. To this effect, the Watch-Keeping Capability (WKC) will be activated in Brussels. The HoM is responsible for providing up to date contact details of mission personnel.

### **6.3 Technical guidance on CIS**

The CCPC will provide technical guidance and support, and will be the first point of contact for the mission. To this end, the EEAS will provide assistance and remote helpdesk for secure and non-secure strategic links to the mission during the working hours.

The Mission will rely upon a timely and reliable communications system, including a back up system, able to support its command and control structure. The system will link the Mission HQ to CPCC and will comprise a mixture of secure and standard telephone, radio and internet communications.

### **6.4 EEAS Security Office**

The HoM shall be assisted by a SMSO, who shall report to the HoM and also maintain a close relationship with the EEAS security office and the CPCC security coordinator.

## **7. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION STRATEGY**

EUBAM Libya will be supported by an information and communication strategy prepared by the Information Strategy Team and **agreed** by the PSC<sup>12</sup> **prior to the adoption of the Council Decision**. The information strategy will define the main objectives, the main themes to be developed and the audiences to which such themes or messages should be directed.

Public Information (PI) activities have an important role in presenting the mission and promoting its credibility in particular since the Mission will adopt a low key visibility. A coherent information strategy is needed to ensure that not only EUBAM Libya but also the EU's overall approach is well

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<sup>12</sup>. See "Guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activity" (doc. 13817/02).



understood. The use of social media is widespread in Libya and needs to be addressed.

The Libyans are still very grateful to the EU for the role some of its Member States played in the revolution, both militarily and politically. However, a recent survey carried out by the EU demonstrates that less than 50% of the Libyans know what the EU is.

At implementation level, the different EU actors (Member States, High Representative/Vice President, EEAS, EUSR, Heads of EU Delegations, HoM, other CSDP missions in the region, European Commission and their respective press and information officers/spokespersons), will conduct their information activities in accordance with their respective audiences and practices in line with the political guidance of the PSC. While EU actors carry out their respective information activities, increased coordination has to be ensured so that the messages delivered are coherent.

Close co-ordination between Brussels and the Mission will be an essential requirement to implement the information strategy. The information activities of EUBAM Libya will be closely coordinated with public information activities in Brussels (High Representative/Vice-President-Spokesperson/EEAS Press Office and relevant EC services).

## **8. DUTY OF CARE**

The CivOpsCdr has overall responsibility for the EU's duty of care and shall direct the HoM's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation for EUBAM LIBYA in coordination with the EEAS Security Directorate.

The HoM shall be responsible for the security of the operation and will, in consultation with the EEAS SD, develop a mission security plan in compliance with the minimum security operating standards applicable to the operation, in accordance with the EU's Policy on the Security of EU personnel deployed in an operational capacity under Title V of the TEU and its supporting documentation.

The protection of EUBAM Libya and its personnel is the responsibility of the Libyan government. security arrangements not in the effective control of those authorities will require active arrangements with other parties.

Further details on the Code of Conduct are to be found in Annex 6.

## **9. MISSION SUPPORT**

### **9.1 Legal aspects**

The Council Decision establishing the Mission defines the objectives, the scope and the general conditions for the implementation of the Mission.

A SOMA is to be concluded with Libya based on the EU Model SOMA, taking into account EUBAM Libya's requirements.

Pending the SOMA conclusion, the privileges and immunities should be preferably dealt with in a unilateral statement by Libya.

### **9.2 Mission support**

The Mission will require establishing mission support structures, policies and procedures in order to ensure appropriate management and control of all human, material and financial resources assigned to the mission.

Mission support is generally divided into the functions of Administrative Services and General Support Services. These are detailed in Mission Support Annex 8.

#### **9.2.1 Human Resources**

The employment regimes in EUBAM Libya are international seconded staff, international contracted staff and local contracted.

The international personnel of the mission are primarily seconded by EU Member States, according to the operational requirements. Subject to separate decisions by the PSC, third States may contribute to the mission.

While the seconded staff members remain under the full command of their Contributing States or EU Institutions, all staff members shall carry out their duties following the Mission chain of

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command and will act in the sole interest of the Mission. Staff members who find themselves in a situation of conflict of interest are expected to report this situation to their line managers independently from their duty towards the national authorities or EU Institutions.

Seconding States provide personnel meeting with the job-specific requirements of the mission.

Seconding States are responsible for the deployment, rotation and repatriation, individually or by units, of their personnel according to the deployment plan of the mission.

Contributing States bear the costs related to the personnel seconded by them except, in the case of EU Member States personnel, daily allowances as specified in doc.7291/2009 referenced in Annex 12, which will be paid out of the mission budget.

The HoM is able to contract international personnel where no qualified seconded personnel are available, as specified in doc.7221/11 referenced in Annex 12. The HoM is able to contract local personnel as required.

The Mission will use Visiting Experts according to the relevant Guidelines dated 2012.

Gender issues are implemented in line with EU policy, based on UNSCR 1325.

EUBAM Libya bears a High Risk Non-Family Mission status due to the present risk rating of the mission area as critical, according to the SIAC risk rating table. The Mission, until further notice, is a Strictly Non-Family Mission. As such, international seconded and contracted mission members shall at no time receive visits or be habitually accompanied by any family member in the mission area for the duration of their present tour of duty or contact. Consequently, any breach of this rule may lead to disciplinary actions including repatriation request and termination of the tour of duty or contract. Subject to improvements in the security situation and possible evolution of the SIAC risk rating, the Head of Mission may propose, in consultation with the EEAS Security Department, to the Civilian Operation Commander, to take measures to change the application of the High Risk Non-Family status.

Refer also to Annex 9 on Human Resources.

### **9.2.2 Communication and Information Systems**

The Mission will rely upon a timely and reliable communications system, including a back up system, able to support its command and control structure. The strategic level architecture for installing, operating and maintaining a reliable and secure network in support of the mission is based on a mix of satellite, land lines and various radios communications with data-handling capabilities provided through the in-house EU property and commercial sources.

Appropriate and technical systems will be set in place to ensure confidentiality.

### **9.2.3 Information Security**

The criteria for confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation must be met by secure CIS. The HoM will manage the policy of classification and release of documents within the Mission in accordance with the security principles and minimum standards established by EEAS.

Security of communications is essential. The HoM shall define procedures for classification of documents within the Mission in accordance with relevant EEAS regulations

Appropriate procedures and technical arrangements are in place to ensure the security of information. In theatre, the Mission Security Officer is responsible for Information Security according to EEAS Security Regulation.

The secure CIS supporting the Mission's command and control structure has to be accredited to meet agreed security requirements. The EEAS Security Accreditation Authority is the accreditation authority for the link between Brussels and the HQ. The HoM is the Mission Security Accreditation Authority for in- theatre network. The EEAS will provide the needed support and advice.

In addition, Security Agreements/Arrangements will be necessary in order to share EU classified information with non-EU countries, as appropriate, in accordance with the EEAS security regulations.

### **9.3 Internal control**

The HoM shall establish an internal control system complying with the standards set by the Commission and is responsible for the effectiveness and efficiency of these systems. Internal Control is broadly defined as a process intended to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of the mission's objectives.

Internal control is all the measures mission management and staff take to ensure that:

- Operational activities are effective and efficient;
- Legal and regulatory requirements are met;
- Financial and other management reporting are reliable, including the use of an accounting system that provides accurate, complete and reliable information in a timely manner;
- Assets and information are safeguarded.

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## 1. Principle and aim

In order to maintain a continued presence in Libya to prepare the activities and the establishment of the Mission by the end of May 2013<sup>13</sup>, a core team of 15 personnel will be deployed under the terms of the Preparatory measures.

An induction training course is organised in Brussels, starting on 8 April 2013. The core team led by the proposed future Head of Mission (HoM) will be deployed to Tripoli on 17 April 2013. It will take over the immediate pre-Mission activities from the CRTs who remained in Tripoli after the TAM and who are to be redeployed to Brussels on 24 April 2013.

Once the Council Decision for the Mission is adopted, the CivOpsCdr will confirm, individually to the Core team members, their integration to the Mission staff.

## 2. Composition

### 2.1 Operational positions:

1-Proposed future HoM

2-Deputy Head of Mission

3- Security Officer

4- Political Advisor / PPIO

5-IBM Strategic Advisor

6-Border Guard Advisor

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<sup>13</sup> The adoption of the Council Decision under articles 42 and 43 TEU is currently scheduled for the 21 May 2013.



7-Border Policing Advisor

8-Rue of Law/Human Rights/ Gender Advisor

9-Public Budget/Procurement Advisor

2.2 Mission support positions:

1- Head of Mission Support

2-Human resources

3- Finance

4-Procurement

5-Logistics

6-CIS

**3. Command and control:**

The CivOpsCdr will exercise command and control of the core team at the strategic level and, as such, shall issue instructions to the proposed future HoM and provide him with advice and technical support.

The proposed future HoM will assume responsibility and exercise command and control of the core team at the theatre level and, as such, shall issue instructions for the effective conduct of the activities, assuming its coordination and day-to-day management, following the instructions of the CivOpsCdr. He shall be directly responsible to the CivOpsCdr.

Until the launch of the Mission through a Council Decision, the CPCC Planning and Methodology Section will conduct the desk function in the CPCC for the Libya core team, in close coordination with the Operations Division. After the Council Decision, the desk function will be handed over to the CPCC Conduct of Operations Division.

All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of contributing States or EU institutions. National authorities shall transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel to the CivOpsCdr.

Staff members will carry out their duties and act in the interest of the Mission and report to the proposed future HoM for the tasks entrusted to them.

The D/HoM will deputise for the proposed future HoM and will be in charge of the coordination of core team activities. Once the Mission is established, the Chief of Staff will carry out this coordination role.

#### **4. Activities:**

Inter alia, the core team is:

- To proceed with the preparation of all necessary logistics, financial and administrative enablers with a view to a swift establishment of the Mission following the adoption of the Council Decision;
- To develop confidence building with the Libyan authorities at political and operational levels;
- To agree on work processes with the Libyan authorities in view of future Mission activities, more specifically the ones identified for phase 1.1;
- To prepare the Mission activities and training to be implemented after the establishment of the Mission;
- To continue gathering information and exchanging with the Libyan authorities and other relevant stakeholders in view of the development of the OPLAN, at a later stage, and related in Mission document;

- To support the identification and procurement of equipment by the Libyan authorities for Border Management;
- To liaise locally with EU Member States, other CSDP Heads of Mission in the region, international organisations and Third States with a view to help international coordination and develop synergies;
- To communicate pro-actively with relevant stakeholders on the mandate of the Mission, its foreseen course of actions and also to manage expectations;
- To pro-actively engage in public relations activities based on Brussels agreed “lines to take” that will be updated regularly if needed.


**5. Reporting:**

Prior to Council Decision adoption, the proposed future HoM will address a core team activity report to the CivOpsCdr, including achievements, challenges, way ahead and lessons identified. This report will be shared with the Member States.

**6. Assistance:**

A CPCC team possibly comprising planning, operations and Mission support expertise will visit Tripoli at an adequate period to provide trouble shooting assistance to the proposed future HoM .

ANNEX 2 - MISSION ORGANISATIONAL CHART



ANNEXE 3 - AREA OF OPERATIONS



Map No. 3787 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS February 2012

Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
<b>Objective 1.: To contribute to enhance the performance of integrated border management by the relevant Libyan authorities and agencies, in accordance with international best practices and standards.</b>	Existence of arrangements and practice for inter-agency cooperation at BCPs	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	There is lack of consistent legal framework for inter-agency co-ordination, neither intra-service co-ordination is regulated. Indeed, this was a characteristic of the former Gaddafi regime, which ruled over a system that was deliberately kept fragmented. Nonetheless, there is a practice of co-operation – mainly on a case by case basis and informal – mostly based on personal relationships rather than on standard operating procedures
<u>Task 1.1.: To support the Libyan IBM authorities and agencies to address their immediate needs to enhance border control, encompassing border surveillance and border checks.</u>	Length of the Libyan land border under the effective control of the Libyan authorities.	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	Most southern land border in Libya, particularly in the southwest, is not under full governmental control. The grave situation linked to infiltrations by Islamic extremists and the conflict in Mali led the Libyan authorities to put the entire Fezzan Region under military rule. All land BCPs on the Southern border are not operated at the moment and the control of movements of people and goods is practically inexistent. Only 2 land BCPs are open and manned by government authorities in the

		<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
				<p>North (1 along the border with Tunisia and 1 with Egypt).</p> <p>The Border Guards are responsible for land border surveillance and the security around BCPs. They are not in condition to conduct their duties effectively, also due to lack of adequate means and capabilities.</p> <p>The Border Guard is an armed force formally established after the revolution with poor infrastructure and equipment and formed of police officers from the former regime alongside thwwars (revolutionary units). Their global strength has not been defined yet and the recruitment is linked to the wider SSR effort.</p>
	<p><b>Task 1.2.:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in designing and implementing models for IBM surveillance and BCPs.</u></p>	<p>Status of development of pilot projects for maritime border surveillance and sea port BCPs</p>	<p>Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework, including the ISPS</p>	<p>The organisation of Border Crossing Points is not in line with international standards. There are currently no maritime Border Crossing Points open for passengers and all the ports are not implementing the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code). Most of Libya's nine maritime Border Crossing Points (BCPs) are closed.</p>

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
		Code (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	Generating maritime awareness along the Libyan coastline represents a major challenge for the various Libyan authorities. Currently the Libyan Navy and its Naval Coast Guard are the only Libyan authorities that have a limited operational capability to conduct maritime border management. Maritime surveillance along the Libyan coast is non-existent but there are project and contracts that have been signed and are about to be implemented
	<b><u>Task 1.3.: To support the Libyan authorities in establishing maritime capabilities to assist Libya to fulfil their international maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) commitments in a manner commensurate</u></b>	Number of dedicated SAR teams established and number of SAR operations conducted by the Libyan Naval Coastal Guard	NCG statistics, open sources, International aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IMO/ICAO, edition 1998)
			There are no dedicated SAR teams established within the NCG. There are no reliable Libyan statistics available from previous periods. During the first quarter of 2013, some such operations have been conducted within the very limited Libyan means and capabilities. However, a proper SAR system needs to be set up both in terms of capabilities and procedures.



	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
<u>with their international obligations and best practices.</u>			
<b>Objective 2.: To support the Libyan authorities in developing a national IBM strategy.</b>	Libya's participation to international agreements on IBM related issues	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	Among other covenants, Libya adheres to the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law; on Human Rights; against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; on the fight against terrorism.  Libya is not part of the Refugee Convention of 1951 neither adheres to the International Criminal Court
<b>Task 2.1.: <u>To support the establishment and functioning of a Libyan cross-governmental coordination mechanism.</u></b>	Level of development and implementation of a Libyan cross-governmental mechanism for IBM	TAM findings	The Libyan Government has decided to set up a number of inter-ministerial committees to address strategic areas of public governance.  The Prime Minister's office is currently working on the Terms of Reference for the set up and functioning of the Libyan cross-

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
<u>both at political and operational level</u>			governmental mechanism for IBM.
<b>Task 2.2.:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in the continuous analysis of IBM gaps and needs</u>	Ability of Libyan institutions to collect and process IBM related operational data	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	Due to the lack of well defined institutional competences and capacities, including a proper legal framework and related standard operating procedures, there is no structured capacity to collect and process IBM related data.  Additionally, there is lack of communications and IT infrastructure (e.g. database), equipment, and IT literacy among public officials is almost non-existent.
<b>Task 2.3.:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities to develop a Libyan approach for IBM (White Paper/Policies) fully respecting gender and human rights aspects.</u>	Governmental agreement on a Libyan approach to IBM	TAM findings	A chapter on IBM has been included in the draft Defence White Paper prepared in collaboration between Libyan authorities and UNSMIL.  There is a common understanding that a comprehensive and dedicated analysis on the status and requirements of a Libyan approach to IBM is a precondition to guide the build up of an IBM system sustainable and effective in the medium/long term.

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
<u>embedded in a broader rule of law framework</u>			
<b>Task 2.4.:</b> <u>To support the establishment and functioning of a Libyan-led donors coordination mechanism for IBM</u>	Level of implementation of the action points taken through the Libya-led donor coordination mechanism	Paris agreements of 2011, FFM and TAM findings	The UN provides a coordinating framework to international activities in Libya, while the EU leads on the integrated border management sector.  On the Libyan side, a central role for donor coordination is played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the envisaged cross-governmental coordination mechanism under the auspices of the office of the Prime Minister is also expected to become a major actor to this respect.
<b>Objective 3.:</b> <i>To support the Libyan authorities to develop the necessary enablers to implement a sustainable IBM strategy.</i>	Level of development of the necessary intra-service coordination for border policing.	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM	There is no or negligible intra-service coordination.  Police does not have its own General Director nor HQs and this command function is currently exercised at the level of the Ministry.  Many elements and units (mainly locally based or made of revolutionary forces) conduct law enforcement activities, in the absence of a consolidated institutional policing framework.

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
		findings)	In this context, also specialized border policing activities do not follow a national policy being left to local practices.
<b>Task 3.1.</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in identifying the IBM legal requirements and promoting the adoption of a coherent and comprehensive national IBM legislative and regulatory framework.</u>	Progress in adopting coherent and comprehensive IBM legislative framework.	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)	The current national legal framework is fragmented and not sufficiently suited to ensure the correct implementation of border management activities in Libya. Against this critical requirement, a substantial precondition is the success of the ongoing process to draft and adopt the Libyan Constitution.
<b>Task 3.2.</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in establishing the necessary cooperation with neighbouring countries, regional and international organisations, including</u>	Results of governmental initiatives with neighbouring countries on mutual support for border crossing management	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM	There are already various Memoranda of Understanding or bilateral agreements, however, their validity and the contents still needs to be verified: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• On 8 January 2013 a conference among the Prime Ministers of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria took place at Gadamesh on common border security issues.</li> <li>• There is a readmission agreement with Niger</li> <li>• There is an agreement of regulated flux of migrants with Egypt</li> </ul>

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
	<u>through the adoption of the appropriate legal instruments and/or accession to international Instruments.</u>	findings)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There are local tribal arrangements amongst the Toubous for the control of the border between Libya and Sudan</li> </ul>
	<b>Task 3.3.</b> <u>To support the strengthening of the institutional culture and capacity of the IBM services for inter-agency coordination and cooperation, including through technical solutions.</u>	Exercises being planned or to be conducted on IBM	EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings, CSDP mission periodic reports
	<b>Task 3.4.</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in establishing IBM procedures.</u>	Level of development of standard operating procedures	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory
			No Joint IBM exercises are being conducted, neither a capacity is there to conceive and plan them.
			There is lack of standard operating procedures at both intra-service and inter-agency level. This is mainly a consequence of a legacy of lack of clarity on the distribution of competences amongst the different IBM authorities and agencies, alongside an

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
		framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings) Inter-service technical agreements.	effort to build and consolidate institutional organizations within the wider SSR effort
	<b>Task 3.5</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in designing and implementing human resources and training policies.</u>	Progress in developing standard training programmes, designed to meet recruitment requirements and conducted by local training centres	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)  At the moment, training programmes are essentially oriented to capacitate the human resources that are present in the different IBM agencies.  As institutional ToR will progressively be defined, training programmes will have to address basic knowledge and skills for operatives as well as middle and upper management in a structured manner, including through joint training opportunities
	<b>Task 3.6:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in the</u>	Effectiveness of the reporting system in	Interviews, direct observation,  A reporting system exists although reflecting the degree of fragmentation that the different IBM agencies are subject to.

	<b>Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)</b>	<b>Means of Verification (MV)</b>	<b>Baseline (BL)</b>
	<u>development of communication and information exchange capabilities.</u>	Libyan IBM agencies	research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)
	<b>Task 3.7:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in the acquisition of necessary infrastructure and equipment.</u>	Status of Libyan IBM agencies in managing their budget and procurement	Interviews, direct observation, research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)
	<b>Task 3.8.:</b> <u>To support the Libyan authorities in the</u>	Level of establishment of a	Interviews, direct observation,
			The level of alphabetization is low but still satisfactory among lower ranks, while high in the management. The lack of a middle management across IBM agencies also represents a limiting factor in the fluidity and accuracy of reporting lines. Communications mainly rely on fax machines
			In general, public institutions in Libya have robust financial resources due to the oil production that has almost resumed pre-revolution levels. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity in the financial legal framework, associated to limited planning resources and capabilities against the challenge of building a modern state from the scratch, the possibility to spend these financial resources is seriously hampered. Almost all public expenditures are limited to pay salaries, with little or no capital investments
			There is no structured risk analysis capacity at the moment in Libya. Current assets and processes in Libyan IBM related

	Objectively Verifiable Indicator (OVI)	Means of Verification (MV)	Baseline (BL)
<p><u>development of IBM Risk Analysis capabilities.</u></p>	<p>Risk Analysis Capability in each Service involved in Border Management as well as an overarching one at national level.</p>	<p>research and study of the regulatory framework (see EU IBMNA Report, FFM and TAM findings)</p>	<p>agencies do not allow for the development of coherent and long term policies against critical threats, resulting more in a reactive rather than proactive institutional attitude. In practice, the overall risk analysis capacity is provided by an over-dimensioned central agency. Capacity and assets need to be re-balanced according to a clear distribution of competences among the different IBM related authorities and agencies</p>



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**ANNEX 5 - MANAGEMENT OF RISKS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

Nature	Consequence for	Severity (on the mission)	Probability	Risk management and mitigation measures
Lack of political agreement reached on a Libyan IBM strategy.	Sustainability Mentoring Advising Training	High	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Continuous engagement with government in order to secure their involvement.</li> <li>– Assistance in creating a border management coordination structure to consolidate cross-governmental agreement.</li> <li>– Engagement at Head of Services level to reinforce operational coordination and cooperation and create IBM through a bottom up approach.</li> <li>– Proactive public relation, media and social network communication.</li> </ul>
Lack of support from Heads of operational services to implement IBM and resistance to develop inter-services cooperation.	Sustainability Monitoring Mentoring Advising Training	High	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Engagement of Mission experts at operational levels in a bottom up approach;</li> <li>– Organisation of joint training under full Mission ownership to gain trust;</li> <li>– Continued liaison with government to obtain Libyan political leverage.</li> </ul>

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**ANNEX 5 - MANAGEMENT OF RISKS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

Nature	Consequence for	Severity (on the mission)	Probability	Risk management and mitigation measures
Discrepancies between a highly supportive leadership and a reluctant implementation level, translating into little tactical effects of political and Head of services decisions.	Sustainability Monitoring Training	High	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Continued engagement with Regional commanders through central levels;</li> <li>– Ability to deploy, security permitting, an assessment, monitoring and on the job training team to areas out of Tripoli to develop Mission credibility;</li> <li>– Continued engagement with Head of Services and local government to obtain leverage;</li> <li>– Reach out to tactical leadership through workshops and training sessions organised in Tripoli.</li> </ul>
The SSC continue to play a role in security sector delivery although not a “constitutional” institution.	Sustainability Advising	Medium	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engagement with the SSC through government officials;</li> <li>• Work level engagement with SSC staff in official buildings, where they are present and shadowing official structures ;</li> <li>• Engagement with MP of the parliamentary committees where SSC is legitimately represented;</li> <li>• Proactive support of the Mission to the DDR process.</li> </ul>

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**ANNEX 5 - MANAGEMENT OF RISKS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

<b>Nature</b>	<b>Consequence for</b>	<b>Severity (on the mission)</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Risk management and mitigation measures</b>
The DDR process swamps IBM services with former revolutionaries lacking initial basic training.	Sustainability Training	Medium	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support the Libyan services in developing a dedicated in service training for initial basic skills delivered by Libyan trainers;</li> <li>• Support the Head of services in designing the integration and deployment schemes;</li> <li>• Support the development of a mid-term dedicated human resources strategy for individuals including progressive vetting, individual trainings, selection schemes and individual re-deployment based on performance.</li> </ul>
The governance / DDR process stalls and some borders are maintained under the control of independent armed groups.	Sustainability Monitoring Mentoring	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engagement with key stakeholders of the International Community developing alternative livelihood to develop focused projects;</li> <li>• Engagement with Libyan authorities to develop employment opportunities and integration incentives after vetting, central training, and possible re-deployment.</li> </ul>

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**ANNEX 5 - MANAGEMENT OF RISKS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

<b>Sources</b>	<b>Consequence for</b>	<b>Severity (on the mission)</b>	<b>Probability</b>	<b>Risk management and mitigation measures</b>
Unavailability of the required equipment to deliver training.	Training	High.	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Projects designed to procure some urgent crucial training equipment.</li> <li>• Mission public finance and procurement experts will support Libyan acquisitions.</li> <li>• Coordination with the international donors for Mission training to be harmonised with donations.</li> </ul>
Trainees not at the minimum required level of skills and knowledge to take advantage of the training courses.	Training	High	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training to be designed with a realistic assessment of local capacities;</li> <li>• Support of the Mission to the Libyan services to implement a sound human resource and training strategy including individual professional development follow up and assessment.</li> <li>• Selection and vetting process to be agreed with the Libyan authorities.</li> <li>• Basic skills review will be organised to improve the pre-course knowledge levels.</li> </ul>
Lack of trainers and/or advisers.	Training Expertise	High	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maximum use of already deployed Mission experts;</li> <li>• Re-arrangement of curricula during the period of the mandate in order to cover all needs.</li> <li>• Force generation and call for contributions sent to Member States in a timely manner.</li> <li>• Use of visiting experts.</li> </ul>
Impossibility to undertake activities in the South due to the security situation	Training MMA	Medium	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• trainees come to trainers</li> <li>• train-the-trainers programmes</li> </ul>

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**ANNEX 5 - MANAGEMENT OF RISKS TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT**

Too high expectations	EU credibility	High	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• close dialogue with Libyan authorities on Mission aims and tasks</li><li>• prudent projection of benchmarks, agreed where appropriate with the Libyans</li><li>• pro-active PPI on Mission activities</li></ul>
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# RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

## ANNEX 6 CODE OF CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE

### 1. PRINCIPLES

- 1.1 The following principles are based on the document of the Council of the European Union, 8373/05 (18 May 2005).
- 1.2 Staff members come from different cultures and legal systems and represent varying levels of training and experience. Mission' staff members have served in many different professions within their home countries. Nonetheless, in pursuance of their mission, staff members are to apply the same standards of personal and professional behaviour. The mission and all staff members will comply with the Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Operations, particularly in relation to the tenets of mainstreaming of human rights and gender. The maintenance of the highest personal and professional standards is crucial in order to create and maintain confidence and trust in the EU.
- 1.3 It is imperative that all staff members are fully aware not only of their rights and obligations but also of the appropriate standards of behaviour that are expected of them and that they understand the reasons for such standards in the discharge of their duties. It is the responsibility of supervisors and line managers at all levels to ensure that these values and standards are accorded high priority, are fully explained to all staff members and are applied in a consistent manner. Unacceptable behaviour will be met by prompt and decisive action. Supervisors and line managers should consider it their special responsibility to lead by example and discharge in full their duty of care.
- 1.4 The purpose of these standards of behaviour is to provide guidance to all staff members as to the standard of behaviour expected from them.
- 1.5 It is the supervisors' responsibility to maintain appropriate standards of behaviour among staff members. and to ensure the appropriate education and guidance to staff members as to the required standards. It is a function of leadership to respect and protect the rights and interests of subordinates as well of those with whom they interact.

# RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

## ANNEX 6 CODE OF CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE

- 1.6 The present standards of behaviour are complementary to legal obligations of staff members before the international law and the law of the state of their origin. In order to ensure that these standards of behaviour are upheld, adherence to principles such as impartiality, integrity, gender equality, courage, discipline, loyalty and respect for human rights and diversity is essential. Personnel should at all times exercise patience, tolerance, tact, diplomacy, good judgement and common sense. Personnel shall conduct themselves in an acceptable manner both on and off duty.
- 1.7 Staff members should adhere to the present standards in order to ensure appropriate behaviour in their relations with the local population but also in order to contribute to the moral cohesion of the Mission. The clear demonstration of personal integrity will help establish the credibility and authority of the Mission and it is essential to the establishment of trust with the local population.

The impartial and objective pursuit of the Mission's mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential for preserving the legitimacy of the operation and in maintaining, where appropriate, the consent and cooperation of all parties involved.

- 1.8 The following standards of conduct are based on European and international best practices for justice, police and civilian professionals and reflect the attitudes and behaviour expected of all staff members. These standards of conduct are to be considered as a written order applicable to all staff members. Failure to adhere to any of the following sections constitutes grounds for the initiation of disciplinary process that may result in disciplinary measures. This is independent of possible criminal procedures.

## 2. GENERAL BEHAVIOUR REQUIREMENTS

Missions' staff members will conduct themselves professionally, will respect the law in force and will adhere to all Mission-specific rules and regulations. In addition to the responsible performance of their assigned duties, staff members shall maintain civil, dignified and respectful behaviour when interacting with other staff members, or with the

general public.

**2.1 Discriminatory conduct**

Staff members – representing a diversity of men and women of different nationalities, ethnic groups, religions and cultural backgrounds – will show respect towards all other staff members,. No behaviour that can be construed as offensive, oppressive, abusive, discriminatory, or that which is likely to cause offence or humiliation will be tolerated.

All people must be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of gender, age, ethnic origin, religion or belief, sexual orientation, disability, social or economic status or political and philosophical views or any other grounds. Condescending, derogatory and discriminatory remarks or gestures will not be tolerated.

**2.2 Use of foul or obscene language or gestures**

At no time will any staff member use foul, obscene, vulgar or otherwise offensive speech or gestures that could be considered to be abusive to any other Mission staff, , or to any member of the public. Staff members will at all times conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the high level of professionalism expected of staff members.

**2.3 Assault or physical abuse and violence**

Except in cases of self-defence or in case of necessity, no staff member will become a participant in any physically combative situations whether it is with staff members or members of the general public.

**2.4 Sexual harassment**

It is incumbent upon all staff members to conduct themselves with decency and decorum at all times and for their conduct to be above reproach. It is imperative that any sexual relationship that



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may develop among staff members or between a staff member and a member of the general public is with mutual consent. No interaction that could be construed by either party as sexual harassment can be tolerated.

Sexual harassment for the purposes of this document includes any unwelcome sexual advance, act of physical intimacy, request for sexual favours or other lewd verbal or physical conduct. It also includes the display or distribution of pornographic material at the work place, and other acts or conduct including spoken words, gestures, or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material that is unwelcome and could reasonably be regarded as sexually, or otherwise on the gender ground, offensive, humiliating or intimidating. Sexual harassment includes harassment of a woman by a man, of a man by a woman, and same sex harassment. A single incident may constitute sexual harassment.

### 2.5 **Harassment**

Harassment is different from sexual harassment as it is not necessarily based on gender. Unlike bullying, a single incident can be harassment and many forms of behaviour are included.

Harassment, for the purposes of this document, is: Any act or conduct including spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material if the action or conduct is unwelcome to the employee and could reasonably be regarded as offensive, humiliating or intimidating.

### 2.6 **Bullying**

Bullying, for the purposes of this document is repeated inappropriate behaviour, direct or indirect whether verbal, physical or otherwise, conducted by one or more persons against another, or others, at the place of work and / or in the course of employment, or at work-related social or business occasions, which could reasonably be regarded as undermining the individual's right to dignity at work. An isolated incident of the behaviour described in this definition may be an affront to dignity at work but, as a once-off incident, is not considered to be bullying.

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### 3. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REQUIREMENTS

The following regulations provide general guidance for the professional conduct of Mission' staff members.

#### 3.1 Failure to Obey

In order to ensure that the Mission mandate is implemented as required, each staff member must obey all lawful orders s/he receives from supervisors.

#### 3.2 Failure to Supervise Staff Members

A failure to supervise staff members properly amounts to a violation of professional standards by staff members with supervisory functions. In order to ensure that all line managers fulfil their role and responsibilities as supervisors and managers, it is necessary for them to be responsible and accountable for the actions of staff members under their command as far as the work situation is concerned.

The personal conduct of supervisors has a direct effect on that of their subordinates. Therefore, they are to ensure that their own professional and personal behaviour is of the highest standard in order to inspire the same in their subordinates. In addition, they are to ensure that the required standards of behaviour are known and adhered to by their staff members.

#### 3.3 Job Requirements

Staff members shall carry out promptly and completely all lawful orders, instructions, directives and required duties, and shall not knowingly neglect any duties assigned to them. Staff members shall appropriately account for any monies or property assigned to them in their official capacities and shall maintain all such allocations in good order.

#### 3.4 Truth and Accuracy in Reporting

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Staff members shall ensure that any report or statement made by them is accurate and comprehensive to the extent possible. No staff member shall knowingly make any false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any official record or document.

### **3.5 Alteration or Destruction of Official Reports**

No staff member shall, at any time, without proper authorization, destroy, damage or alter any official paper or electronic document.

### **3.6 Disclosure of Information**

No staff member shall at any time disclose any information that falls under professional secrecy obtained during the course of his or her employment with the Mission.

This includes, but is not limited to, the identities of individuals, political information, operating procedures or any other information that may cause prejudice to the security of individuals, or that may cause public danger, disorder or crime or may adversely affect national security.

Staff members are expected to maintain the highest ethical standards and to consider that the duty of care towards individuals continues post-assignment.

The same standards apply in respect of the protection of the reputation and image of the EU and the Mission. However, it is the right and obligation of staff members to report through the appropriate chain of command any cases of malpractice, corruption and incompetence.

Statements by staff members to the press, newspaper, radio or television or any other media are not permitted unless proper authorisation from the Head of Mission is obtained through the appropriate chain of command. A failure to comply with this article will be considered a major breach of regulations.

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Staff members will exercise considerable restraint and be aware of security implications when creating personal blogs or similar items which contain personal, operational or photographic material which can jeopardise their own security, that of their colleagues' or that of the Mission.

In terms of disclosure or non disclosure of information the following shall apply:

Except as part of official duties, staff/mission members are required to seek prior approval of the Head of Mission for performance of any one of the following acts, if such act relates to the purpose, activities or interests of the Mission or security of staff members or involves the use of information known to them by reason of their official duties:

- Issue statements to the press, radio or other media of public information;
- Accept speaking engagements;
- Take part in film, theatre, radio or television productions or presentations;
- Submit articles, publish books or other material for publication; or
- Disclose, duplicate or transfer any information for uses other than those specified by the Head of Mission or EU institutions;
- Publish or disclose any Mission related information in public domains including but not limited to internet, newspapers, radio and TV.

### 3.7 **Improper Use of Authority**

No staff member will use or attempt to use, his or her authority in such a manner as to gain special favours or benefits. Staff members are not allowed to accept or offer any gift, gratuity, fee, favour or favour in kind either to or from the local population. Neither will any staff member respond to any member of the public in a manner that may be construed as abusive, offensive or oppressive. Staff Members will treat their subordinates fairly and impartially and shall not engage in the practice of favouritism or preferential treatment. Staff members will ensure that all lawful debts incurred by them are satisfied, and they shall never attempt to utilise the name of the Mission and the status accorded to it in order to default on or to reduce such debts.

**3.8 Maintenance of Mission Property**

Staff members shall maintain all Mission property entrusted to them in good order and shall immediately report any damage, breakage or loss of such property through the appropriate channels. Staff members shall not utilise Mission assets for personal use unless expressly authorised in writing through the proper chain of command.

Any damaged, destroyed or lost / missing Mission property must be reported immediately.

**3.9 Use of Vehicles**

A staff member found to be in violation of any provision relating to the use of Mission vehicles may be considered to be in breach of the present standards of conduct.

**3.10 Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol**

It is considered to be a breach of this Code of Conduct for a Mission member to drive a Mission vehicle after having consumed or while under the influence of alcoholic or intoxicating beverages or to be in an intoxicated state while driving.

**3.11 Use of Mission Networks**

The Mission communications equipment and network (including phones, radios, internet, email and all other communications equipment and facilities) is being provided to the Mission staff members for the performance of their official duties. The misuse of the network and equipment by way of communicating, transmitting or storing offensive, pornographic or discriminatory material will be considered a violation of these procedures.

It is not considered appropriate to store private documents in the Mission network system.

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### 3.12 Dress Code

Staff members should consider themselves as representatives of their respective governments as well as of the European Union itself, and are perceived as such by the general public. Therefore, they are expected to adhere to standards of dress and appearance which are in keeping with decency and decorum and they are expected to present the correct personal image at all times, taking into consideration local customs and traditions. Staff members, while on duty, should dress in accordance with the nature of their tasks.

Supervisors at each level shall ensure proper attire and / or appearance of staff members and may require the staff members to change it, if it distracts the attention of other staff members from their work, or otherwise violates what can be considered as decent and proper. Repeated violations of this policy may result in disciplinary action.

In addition, due to the specific context in Libya, dress code should take into account cultural and religious sensitivities.

### 3.13 Absence from Duty

Staff members shall not, without proper authorisation or notification, be absent from duty or leave any assigned duty. Illness, medical emergency or any other unusual circumstance preventing a staff member from reporting for duty must be conveyed to the staff member's superiors as soon as possible. In addition, staff members will ensure that any scheduled leave or absence is documented in accordance with the relevant Mission regulations.

### 3.14 False Claims or Benefits

Staff members shall not knowingly misrepresent or make a false certification or declaration in connection with any claim, benefit or investigation. This includes failure to disclose a fact that may be relevant for a claim or investigation.

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### 3.15 Acceptance of Gratuities

In order to maintain the level of neutrality integral to the Mission, staff members must refrain from accepting gifts or gratuities from members of the local community or others. While it is not intended that staff should disregard gestures of human kindness, it is not appropriate, and will be considered unacceptable, for staff members to accept items of value without prior approval from the Head of Mission. The power of approval can be delegated by the Head of Mission.

### 3.16 Conflicts of Interest

Staff members shall not engage in any activity that may give rise to a conflict of interest while they are serving with the mission, and shall be obliged to declare such an interest where such a conflict arises in the discharge of their duties. Conflicts of interest may arise where the mission member has access to resources which may be of inappropriate material benefit or inappropriate public or private benefit to others, including the staff member him or herself. Such conflicts of interest can also arise where the mission member is in a position to advise on, disclose, disburse or issue inside information, monies, assets, tenders, or procurement orders, – or anything else – whereby the mission member has privileged access to resources and is in a position to permit unauthorised and inappropriate advantages to people or businesses with whom he or she has inappropriate links, or ties, including him or herself. It is considered a breach of the Code of Conduct to allow undue advantage to any interested parties, businesses or persons without going through the proper channels for such matters. Such conflicts of interest may benefit the mission member him or herself, his or her family, friends, professional colleagues, personal acquaintances, and his or her fellow nationals. Mission members shall not seek or solicit any favours or gratuities be they in the form of goods, services, monies, or facilities, while discharging their duties, and are expected to report any offers of same to the DHOM which have been made to them while acting in an official capacity. While serving with the mission, staff members shall discharge their duties solely in the interests of the mission.

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### 4. PROHIBITED ATTITUDES

#### 4.1 Consumption of Alcohol

Alcohol import and consumption is prohibited by the Libyan authorities, and this should be respected by staff members.

#### 4.2 Illegal use of Narcotics or Drugs

Staff members will not at any time consume, cultivate, distribute, possess, purchase or sell any illegal drug or narcotic, including cannabis, or any of its derivatives.

#### 4.3 Sexual Services

Attending or soliciting sexual services from places of prostitution or from trafficked persons is strictly forbidden. No staff member shall in any place within the Mission area procure the services of a trafficked person or attend any properties or establishments known for or suspected of promoting prostitution or the trafficking in human beings, including children (persons under 18 years of age).

Staff members are not allowed to procure, profit from, or facilitate prostitution or trafficking of human beings, or have any kind of relationship, professional or otherwise with anyone who promotes or facilitates, or who could be suspected of promoting or facilitating, prostitution or trafficking in human beings.

#### 4.4 Relationships with Local Population

It is imperative that staff members remain objective and independent in the performance of their duties. The development of any type of personal relationship with those members of the community that may come into contact with staff member on a professional basis can damage the impartiality and objectivity and must be handled with extreme caution and discretion.



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The Mission does not encourage the development of any relationship of a romantic or sexually intimate nature with persons from Libya. The mores and behaviour appropriate in the home country of a staff member may not be accepted or tolerated by persons in the Mission area.

Staff members will respect local authorities, local laws, their local culture, traditions, customs and practices unless they contradict international humanitarian Law or human rights. They will treat the inhabitants of Libya with respect, courtesy and consideration, taking into consideration the views of the inhabitants, including women and children, in conflict resolution efforts and post-conflict reconstruction.

The issues related to children affected by armed conflict should be addressed in line with EU policy, based on UNSC 1612 Resolution.

### 4.5. Professional or commercial activity outside of Mission activities

Staff members are not allowed to practice for personal profit any professional or commercial activity in Libya outside of Mission activities.

## 5. INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

A proven involvement in serious criminal activity constitutes grounds for immediate repatriation. In this respect, the following crimes and/or attempted crimes constitute serious criminal activity:

- (a) Fraud
- (b) Theft
- (c) Robbery
- (d) Burglary
- (e) Rape and sexual harassment
- (f) Child Abuse
- (g) Trafficking in Human Beings
- (h) Arson
- (i) Assault

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- (j) Murder
- (k) Use, sale, cultivation, possession or distribution of narcotics or drugs
- (l) Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition or explosive
- (m) Corruption
- (n) Organised crime

Criminal activity includes, but is not limited to, above-mentioned acts.

### 6. ACTING AS AN ACCESSORY TO A DISCIPLINARY OFFENCE

Any staff member found to be an accessory to any violation shall be considered as a principal and shall be subject to investigation.

### 7. REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT

#### Reporting of Violations

It is the right and obligation of all staff members to report cases of malpractice, misconduct, incompetence and criminal activity.

All alleged breaches of the SOPs and other applicable rules and regulations must be reported, normally through the Mission chain of command to the Head of Mission, if the source of information is a staff members, the report must be submitted in a written form.

In case a staff member discovers information about another staff member that may have serious implications for the Mission, or that may constitute a breach of Law or a breach of Mission regulations, SOPs or the present Code of Conduct and Discipline, he / she will not disclose that information to any other person other than his or her direct supervisor or a member of the Mission hierarchy that is entitled to deal with the case in question.

Any member of the Mission has the right, and obligation, to make a complaint in writing to the Head of Mission in the event of an alleged breach of SOPs, or any alleged case of misconduct, malpractice, or incompetence.

**8. DISCIPLINE**

**8.1 General**

A Mission staff member found to be in violation of any part of the Mission standards of conduct will be dealt with in accordance with the Mission Disciplinary Procedures. Disciplinary action may be taken following the findings and recommendations of the investigative process.

**8.2 Authority**

- 8.2.1 The Head of Mission is responsible for disciplinary control over all personnel.
- 8.2.2 For all seconded personnel, disciplinary action shall be of the responsibility of the relevant Contributing State or EU authority. The respective Contributing State is represented within the Mission by the respective National Contact Point/ National Contingent Leader (NCP/NCL). If there is NCP/NCL designed for a seconded staff member, the DHOM shall seek the guidance from the CPCC in order to identify the respective national authority.
- 8.2.3 For contracted staff members, both international and local, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the Head of Mission.
- 8.2.4 All staff members must adhere to the present Code of Conduct, the Standing Operating Procedures in place and all other directives, contractual obligations and orders. The Mission has to account for their conduct at all times whether on or off duty.
- 8.2.5 Mission personnel are expected to cooperate fully during potential internal investigations and inquiries. Any interference or obstruction by staff members during the disciplinary process is considered to be a breach of the Code of Conduct.
- 8.2.6 The Head of Mission may, at his or her discretion, suspend a staff member under

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"disciplinary proceedings". The period of suspension will be determined by the Head of Mission and may be extended until the determination of appeal proceedings if the Head of Mission deems it necessary.

While suspended, the staff member shall not enter his or her office or any other Mission premises without the prior consent of the Head of Mission. The suspended staff member shall not drive or enter any Mission vehicle unless given prior consent by Head of Mission. The suspension shall not, however, affect any other rights or obligations emanating from the secondment or employment of the suspended staff member unless otherwise decided by the Head of Mission.

No staff member foreseen in the chain of internal investigations will be involved in any investigation if there is a conflict of interest, or if the staff member concerned belongs to the same national contingent. This does not include pre-investigation and official notifications made during investigations.

- 8.2.7 Neither NCP/NCL nor National Embassies will be involved in any investigation as a conflict of interest may arise. This does not include information being sent to the NCP/NCL.

### **8.3 General objective of internal investigations procedures**

- 8.3.1 The purpose of internal investigations and inquiries is to objectively determine and report the facts surrounding an incident in question, to enable the appropriate disciplinary authority to make an informed decision about discipline.

### **8.4 Preliminary Investigation**

- 8.4.1 In case of a reported or detected alleged breach of the Mission Code of Conduct, SOPs and other directives and orders, the Head of Mission<sup>14</sup> instructs the Internal Investigations Unit

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<sup>14</sup> All references to the Head of Mission in section 8.4 and 8.5 are extensive to the Deputy Head of Mission in case of delegation of powers, unless specifically stated otherwise.

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(IIU) to conduct a preliminary investigation or appoints an Investigating Officer (IO).  
The National Contact Point / Contingent leader should be informed accordingly.

- 8.4.2 The IIU/IO shall make an analysis of the incident that allegedly occurred, identify the staff involved and record accounts of the complainant(s), witness(es) and victim(s). The consequences for those involved and an assessment of how the incident has affected the image of the Mission must also be included in this analysis.
- 8.4.3 The IO may find that further information is required to conclude the Preliminary Investigation Report (PIR). The incriminated staff member's line manager may be requested to expediently submit a confidential Statement of Facts (SoF) with regard to the allegation.
- 8.4.4 This PIR must be forwarded within ten (10) days to the Head of Mission with verification of the case and indication of the alleged breach. The Head of Mission decides within three (3) days if the case is to be closed or further investigated.
- 8.4.5 No disciplinary case involving staff members will be closed without the approval of the Head of Mission.
- 8.4.6 In case of HoM's decision not to investigate, the complainant shall be notified verbally and at his/her request receive a reasoned written answer. The complainant has the right to interject an appeal within 5 (five) work days from the notification of this decision. This appeal must be directed to the Head of Mission who will judge on the merits of the appeal and can order either a continuation of the investigation or its final closure.
- 8.4.7 This decision is final, without prejudice to legal means.

### 8.5 **Investigation procedure**

- 8.5.1 If the reported activity constitutes a breach of Code of Conduct and Discipline, SOPs and

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other directives and orders, the Head of Mission will instruct the IIU/IO to conduct a thorough investigation.

- 8.5.2 The IIU/IO is responsible for informing immediately in writing (Notice of Allegations: NoA) to the incriminated staff member informing him/her of which OPLAN or SOP article or other regulations he/she has allegedly violated with a copy to his or her line manager and the relevant national authority, if applicable.
- 8.5.3 The IIU/IO is responsible for carrying out investigations in a proper and expeditious way. The investigation shall be accurate, objective, encompassing and impartial as well as respect the presumption of innocence. The allegations regarding a possible breach of conduct will be regarded as such. In order to ensure smooth proceedings, after completing a thorough investigation, IIU/IO may request a final statement from the person concerned. The staff member in question is entitled to make the final decision on whether to provide such a statement. The final statement shall be given to the IIU/IO within three (3) working days of the request.
- 8.5.4 All findings will be included in a Final Investigation Report (FIR).
- 8.5.5 The IIU/IO is under an obligation to inform the Head of Mission of the progress made in the investigation.
- 8.5.6 Upon completion of the investigation the IIU/IO will submit the FIR, along with the whole case file, to the Head of Mission. This should happen no later than twenty (20) days after the opening of the investigation. In case of special circumstances the Head of Mission may grant an extension of this period commensurate with the circumstances at hand but no longer than 40 days.
- 8.5.7 If the allegations are not substantiated, the Head of Mission will close the case and accordingly the staff member concerned in writing.. A copy of this notification will be sent to the staff member's line manager and the relevant National Authority, if applicable.

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8.5.8 In case of a decision to close a case, this decision shall be immediately communicated to the complainant who has the right to launch an appeal within 5 (five) work days from the notification of this decision. This appeal must be directed to the Head of Mission who will consider on the merits of the appeal and can order either a continuation of the investigation or its final closure. This decision is final, without prejudice to legal means.

### **8.6 Rights and obligations of staff members under investigation**

8.6.1 Staff members under investigation as mentioned under 8.5 have to be informed in writing of the specific allegation(s) made against them.

8.6.2 All communications shall be conducted in the mission' working language. The IIU/IO shall ensure that concerned Mission member understands the detailed nature and cause of the allegations made against him / her.

8.6.3 A staff member subject to investigation are entitled to legal advice and representation during interviews by the IIU/IO or the Disciplinary Board. The legal advice can be sought internally or privately. Expenses for private legal counsel are the responsibility of the staff member concerned.

8.6.4 Staff member(s) under investigation will be encouraged to answer questions during the investigation and submit all documentation requested by the IIU/IO. However, they are not obliged to incriminate themselves and the decision whether to comply with such a request by the IIU/IO is at their own discretion.

8.6.5 A staff member under investigation may provide a written or an oral statement. In the latter case, the investigator will issue a summary of the statement to be signed by both the concerned mission member and the investigator. Any complaint and observation about the conduct of the interview should be recorded at the end of the interview.

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8.6.6 Staff members involved in internal discipline investigations must treat information and documentation that is pertinent to the enquiry with strict confidentiality in order to protect the privacy of all those involved. The IIU/IO shall, in particular, respect the confidentiality linked to on-going or completed judicial proceedings.

8.6.7 All staff members shall cooperate with the IIU/IO if so required. Requests for information and documentation should be dealt with expeditiously. Any deliberate delay likely to be detrimental to the investigation will be considered a separate violation of the present Code of Conduct.

### 8.7 **Disciplinary actions**

8.7.1 If the allegations are substantiated and upon reception of the FIR the Head of Mission will designate a Disciplinary Board (DB) consisting of a Chairperson, a member, the Legal Adviser and a secretary as a non-voting member. The persons who can sit as voting members on the DB shall be senior to the incriminated staff member, when possible.

8.7.2 Voting member of the DB should not belong to the same National Contingent than staff members concerned. Voting member of DB should be free from any conflict of interest. Each voting member of the DB will review all reports pertaining to the investigation before the DB submits a decision. The decision should contain a statement of reasons.

8.7.3 The staff member under investigation may decide whether or not to answer questions or submit documentation requested by the DB.

8.7.4 The DB may call upon any staff member to testify during its proceedings.

8.7.5 Each DB member must keep all information received or given to him or her in the course of the investigation strictly confidential in order to protect the privacy and security of all people linked to the investigation (accused, witnesses, victim, etc.).



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- 8.7.6 The DB will arrive at a decision based on a simple majority vote and will provide a written report of this decision to the Head of Mission without delay.
- 8.7.7 The DB will decide within five (5) days on the appropriate recommended disciplinary measures or dismissal of allegations and this decision, together with a copy of the FIR, shall be sent to the accused staff member and to the complainant/victim. This copy should not contain any professional privileged information, information which could endanger the security of the Mission or any Contributing State, or the personal safety of individuals including protected witnesses. A disciplinary procedure solely based upon the declarations of a protected witness will guarantee the procedural rights of the concerned staff member. A recommended disciplinary measure may not be based either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements. The period of appeal starts from the moment of this notification.
- 8.7.8 At the conclusion of the DB, all documents received by the DB will be returned to the IIU/IO.
- 8.7.9 After the expiration of the right to appeal, the Head of Mission will communicate the disciplinary decision, including the recommended disciplinary measures, to the relevant National or EU Authority. This Authority shall make its decision on the disciplinary action and shall notify the Head of Mission on the content of its decision.
- 8.7.10 In the case of non-seconded local and international staff members, the decision of the DB will contain disciplinary measures to be implemented by the Head of Mission him- or herself.

### **8.8 Appeal Procedures**

- 8.8.1 Staff members concerned have the right of appeal against any decision recommending disciplinary action, within five (5) work days from the official notification.
- 8.8.2 In case of appeal, it is the responsibility of the Head of Mission to review the file and to alter, or confirm, the decision of the DB.

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8.8.3 The Head of Mission will decide on the appropriate recommended disciplinary measures and this decision shall be final and shall be sent to the relevant National or EU Authority, through CPCC..

8.8.4 Line managers and National Contingent Leaders / National Point of Contact are informed of the decision of the DB and final disciplinary decision by the Head of Mission.

### **8.9 Recommended Forms of Discipline**

8.9.1 As mentioned above, the recommendations for disciplinary action will be given in a written form by the Head of Mission, and addressed to the respective National or EU Authority, if applicable. These recommended actions will include one of the following forms of discipline:

- verbal warning and counselling;
- written warning by the National or EU Authority or his / her designate, with copy to the Deputy Head of Mission;
- reassignment of duties;
- removal from position of command;
- redeployment to a different location;
- recommendation for repatriation to the National or EU Authority.
- recommendation for termination of contract, in the case of contracted staff members;
- in cases where rules on the use of Mission vehicles or laws on traffic safety are violated, recommended actions may include additionally a fixed term ban on driving Mission vehicles.

8.9.2 All decisions imposing / recommending a sanction shall be duly recorded in the staff member's personal file. This record may justify a denial for extension of the Tour of Duty or contract.

8.9.3 In circumstances when the Head of Mission is not satisfied with the content of the National or EU Authority disciplinary action, the case will be routed through the EEAS (Civilian

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Planning and Conduct Capability) to the relevant national or EU authorities.

8.9.4 These disciplinary measures are without prejudice to any possible judicial action, if the nature of the breach carries such implications.

### 8.10 Records

The (H)IIU/IO must:

- follow the proceedings of all pending cases and report to the Deputy Head of Mission if there are any delays;
- keep a sealed record of all cases, findings and decisions taken, including decisions to close the case or to reverse a decision of the DB;
- be responsible for informing the Human Resources in order to update the staff members files and database records with regard to discipline measures imposed/recommended on staff members.

### 8.11 Right-of-Access Principles

8.11.1 The staff members concerned have equal right of access to material produced during the process (investigation and disciplinary procedure).

8.11.2 The Disciplinary Board and the Head of Mission have a right of access to material produced during the process. The Legal Office has right of access to relevant material, if legal advice is requested.

8.11.3 Other right of access for disciplinary process material can be granted by the Head of Mission, on a case-by-case basis.

### 8.12 Specific procedure regarding serious criminal acts (not misconduct issues)

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- 8.12.1 All criminal investigations regarding staff members shall be conducted by the competent authorities of the Contributing States or – in the case of local staff – the competent authorities, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law.
- 8.12.2 In the case of serious criminal acts committed by a staff member, the procedure policy is as follows:
- this policy formally recognises that a staff member, on the basis of a decision made by his or her National Authority in the case of seconded staff members, may be made subject to preliminary protective measures of precaution, for the purpose of investigation in circumstances when the staff member is alleged to have committed a criminal act;
  - The Mission shall assist the competent authorities in implementing preliminary protective measures. This assistance may be based solely on a request submitted by the competent authorities. The decision concerning the assistance to be provided by the Mission rests with the Head of Mission and will be determined on a case-by-case basis;
  - in cases where the Mission is appropriately requested to assist the competent authorities in this respect, preliminary protective measures, which must remain within the scope of the relevant national legislation, may include only the following limited precautionary actions:
    - protective removal of a suspected staff member from the scene of crime in order to prevent her/him from destroying possible evidence;
    - protective removal of a suspected staff member from the scene of crime in order to prevent her/him from injuring her or himself;
    - protective seizure of the belongings of a suspected staff member, if allegedly used to commit a crime.
- 8.12.3 Should a criminal act be committed, the staff member concerned is not shielded from any temporary procedural remedy prescribed by the competent authorities.
- 8.11.4 In the course of such a procedure, the staff member concerned shall be afforded the same

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rights as any person facing such circumstances applicable under his or her national law.

8.11.5 Upon being placed under preliminary protective measures, the continuance of these measures is solely subject to the determination of the competent authorities as to whether or not to prosecute the offending staff member.

8.11.6 Internal disciplinary measures will not be initiated until the competent authorities have made a determination as to whether to prosecute.

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**1. METHODOLOGY**

Based on information currently received about the order of deployment, the EEAS Security Directorate (EEAS SD) together with the CPCC Missions Security Coordinator (CPCC-MSD) conducted a general review of the existing threats/risks that might affect the security and safety of mission personnel. Based on that review, it has defined the general mitigating measures that will be required to reduce those risks to an acceptable operational level.

To review the risks, it was taken into account the EU SIAC risk assessment (updated risks assessments are going to be done on a regular basis according to the current situation), conducted open source research, consulted with security-related personnel from Member State/third country embassies, private security professionals and with the security operatives of other international crisis management actors in the area including UN agencies.

**2. RISK ASSESSMENT**

See latest SIAC risk assessment.

The main threats identified across the region are as follows :

**2.1 Terrorism.**

The country has witnessed an increase in Islamist militancy, albeit from a low base. Although the operating environment that existed for militant groups was extremely limited during Gaddafi's regime, the now-weak provision of centralised security has presented a fertile environment for militancy to prosper, particularly in the north-east, which has been aided by the proliferation of weapons.

Several attacks or attempted attacks have taken place on the convoys or infrastructure of foreign interests, including aid organisations and diplomatic missions, in Benghazi and Tripoli in the past months, apparently carried out mainly by Salafist groups.

With the exception of the US consulate incident, attacks have been unsophisticated and the threat to

foreign nationals is mitigated by the limited capability of the perpetrators. A sustained campaign – particularly involving mass-casualty incidents – is unlikely. However, if a more structured provision of law and order does not swiftly follow the country's political transition, there will be ample opportunity for an expansion of militant operations, aided by porous borders allowing transnational movement of extremists.

While political violence generally focuses on symbols of the state, the apparent attractiveness of foreign interests as targets illustrates the potential impact on expatriates if this trend continues.

## **2.2 Kidnapping**

Kidnapping by militant groups operating in North Africa represents a risk to foreigners. Border areas with Chad, Niger and Sudan have traditionally been the most hazardous in this regard, due to the prevalence of armed groups using abduction as a tactic. Nevertheless, the kidnapping of foreigners remains low. Most abductions affect local nationals for the purposes of political posturing. Continuing levels of insecurity are likely to ensure that the existing kidnapping threat persists.

## **2.3 Crime**

Authorities do not maintain comprehensive crime statistics for individual neighborhoods in Tripoli, so it is difficult to obtain an accurate assessment of the general crime level. While official statistics are often inaccurate and difficult to assess, crime levels in Tripoli have significantly increased. Easy access to weapons, primarily looted from pre-revolutionary government stockpiles, contributes to crime rates, and local militias and criminals exploit the absence of effective security structures.

Residential burglary and theft are also common crime. Burglars often carry edged weapons, both as tools for entry and as a deterrent against uncooperative victims. An increasing number of criminal assailants use weapons, including firearms.

Armed highway robberies in both urban and rural areas have increased.

Carjacking is also one of the main threats. A favorite tactic of carjackers is to stop vehicles and victims under the guise of a militia or security checkpoint. The victims are then separated from their

vehicles, often at gunpoint.

Celebratory gunfire is a safety risk to travelers. Hundreds of injuries and a number of fatalities have resulted from rounds falling from the sky. While the government has made efforts, including public education campaigns, to reduce celebratory gunfire, it continues to be a significant public safety issue.

Sexual harassment of women, property crime, and petty street crime are the most common problems faced by Westerners.

## **2.4 Social Unrest**

As the country moves ahead with its political transition, political issues have become an increasing trigger for activism. Additionally, socio-economic issues or demands for improved security can lead to demonstrations. Protests have the propensity to turn violent, as a result of the proliferation of weapons.

Communal or tribal disputes are also a source of social unrest, often severe. Clashes between rival communities frequently entail the use of heavy weapons left over from the war, meaning that a small dispute can seriously escalate with little warning. Often, such issues are triggered by disagreements over the control of valuable smuggling routes; as such, locations close to the country's porous borders may be more prone to these outbreaks

## **2.5 Road Traffic Accident**

Traffic accidents constitute the most common safety threat. Police do not routinely enforce traffic laws, and drivers are often reckless and inattentive. Many rural roads are unpaved and lack sufficient lighting for nighttime driving. Major urban highways merge into single-lane roadways outside of city limits and are more dangerous at night and in bad weather.

Traffic signals and checkpoints appear frequently, and traffic often stops abruptly. It is not uncommon for drivers to drive through red lights or swerve across multiple lanes of traffic in order to make turns. Traffic accidents are the leading cause of accidental death. Traffic accidents often



attract large crowds of onlookers who can become violent or angry.

Pedestrians may "challenge" traffic by stepping out into busy streets without warning. Traffic law stipulates mandatory detention for any driver who hits a pedestrian.

Even 'legitimate' checkpoints are not centrally controlled by the Ministry of Interior, adding to the overall confused security environment and reinforcing the effectiveness of this criminal tactic.

Roadside assistance is extremely limited.

## **2.6 Environmental**

There are occasional floods in winter (November to March). Dust or sand storms can affect the country, periodically making driving more hazardous.

## **2.7 Fire**

The likelihood of fire is important. The fire brigade's response is poor.

## **2.8 Espionage**

It must be assumed that there will be considerable interest taken in the activities of the HoM and his mission staff by regional agencies.

## **2.9 Health, welfare and wellbeing**

Health and medical provisions are addressed in a separate annex. Nevertheless the HoM must take into account the welfare and wellbeing of his/her staff by ensuring that the most appropriate counselling and trauma risk management provisions are in place across all areas of operation.

## **3. RECOMMENDATIONS/REQUIREMENTS**

### **3.1 Malicious Acts Insurance**

The HoM shall ensure that all international members of the mission will have a High-Risk (malicious acts) insurance regardless of the secondment of origin. The High-Risk insurance will be charged to the CFSP budget.

### **3.2 Immunity of staff**

3.2.1 The necessary arrangements will be put in place concerning privileges and immunities for the mission and its personnel. If in contravention of these arrangements, there is evidence to suggest that any mission personnel, whether EU or locally-recruited, has been arrested or detained by the authorities, the HoM shall report the incident to the EU Watchkeeper and the diplomatic mission of the person concerned, and will immediately contact the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the respective country, as appropriate, to request all relevant information about the arrest or detention, including the legal grounds for the arrest or detention, including any charges against the person concerned.

3.2.2 No statements concerning the incident should be made to the news media unless previously cleared by the CivOpCdr and the High Representative.

3.2.3 EUBAM Libya is a "strictly non-family" mission.

### **3.3 Firearm Policy**

EUBAM Libya is a non armed mission.

### **3.4 Training, security briefings and personal security**

3.4.1 EUBAM Libya personnel will undergo mandatory security training, or equivalent national training, defined by the EEAS SD before their entry into function in order to understand and comply with the policy and procedures as set out in the Field Security Handbook. The training will entail:

- Preparation training
- Functional training
- Specialised training
- Driver training and
- Tests, drills and exercises

3.4.2 Before deployment to EUBAM Libya, all personnel will be required to certify on the EEAS e-HEST programme and to the extent that any staff may be operating in what is considered to be a HIGH/CRITICAL risk environment undergo a five-day hostile environment training course which will contain modules on first aid measures, especially those related to treatment of firearms trauma and the use of the mandatory vehicle and office first aid kits.

3.4.3 All incoming personnel will also be required to attend an area specific security briefing organised by the SMSO or his/her Deputy.

3.4.4 The Senior Mission Security Officer (SMSO) will define EUBAM Libya curfew practices if and as required. He/she will consult on a regular basis with security personnel of other crisis management actors in the area of operations, to ensure continued good practice with regard to curfews.

3.4.5 The HoM or his/her appointed deputy will ensure that personnel comply with the MSOS. The HoM will take the appropriate disciplinary action of any acts of non-compliance that jeopardise the safety and security of other mission members of third parties.

3.4.6 The SMSO will maintain a record of incidents of non-compliance and communicate these to CPCC and EEAS SD.

### **3.5 Senior Mission Security Officer (SMSO), Deputy Mission Security Officer (DMSO) and Mission Security Office structure**

3.5.1 Due to the potential risks involved, EUBAM Libya will require the implementation of a

dedicated professional security structure. Therefore, a Senior Mission Security Officer (SMSO) must be appointed. The SMSO must report directly to the HoM, or appointed deputy, and have a security issue/incident reporting duty to CPCC and EEAS SD. To that effect the SMSO will maintain a close functional relationship with the CPCC-MSO and the EEAS SD on all protective security related matters. **He/She should participate in the Senior Management meetings.**

- 3.5.2 The SMSO will conduct the general management of all mission security aspects i.e. drawing up, completing and keeping up-to-date the mission security plan, organising the travel/movement authorisation process, ensuring effective and secure communications, the protection of EU classified information etc, taking into account the local conditions.
- 3.5.3 The mission must also appoint a Deputy Senior Mission Security Officer (DSMSO) Security Officers who will, under the authority of the Senior Mission Security Officer, be responsible for the day-to-day management of all security aspects of the respective mission elements.
- 3.5.4 Additionally, due to the complexity of the environment, it is recommended that the Security Office of the Mission is composed by 2 Mission Security Officers, 2 Security Analysts, 1 Security Trainer and 1 Information Security Officer.

### **3.6 Security Management Team**

3.6.1 While EU policy to that effect stipulates that the HoM has overall responsibility to ensure the security of mission personnel, assets, resources and information, it is recommended - as is good practice with other international crisis management actors - that he constitutes a Security Management Team (SMT) to advise him on all security-related matters.

3.6.2 Ideally such a SMT would include:

- The HoM;
- The appointed deputy to HoM;

- Any mission personnel which by training, background or experience can contribute to the team;
- The SMSO and/or DMSO;
- The Mission Security Officers where appropriate;
- A medical officer;
- Mission personnel familiar with local conditions and the local language(s); and
- Mission personnel with a legal background.

3.6.3 The HoM would be expected to adjust the composition of the SMT in relation to the particular nature of an emergency or security incident.

### **3.7 Mission Security, Evacuation and Medical Emergency Management**

3.7.1 Prior to the deployment of personnel, the HoM will ensure that arrangements for the security of the mission members, including emergency and evacuation plans are in place.

A mission security plan including:

- Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan;
- MEDEVAC plan;
- Communications plan;
- Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs"); and
- Contingency plans

must be developed.

3.7.2. The HoM will be responsible for ensuring EUBAM Libya has critical incident and emergency response plans and medical emergency plans. These plans will include an actionable warden system and an emergency supplies plan.

3.7.3 Tactical Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) by fixed or rotary wing aircraft in the event of having to conduct a MEDEVAC from the theatre to a (to be identified) level 3 medical facility, or further on to a destination in the EU. For all mission members, a common

MEDEVAC/repatriation insurance will be contracted guaranteeing 24/7 qualified co-ordination of a MEDEVAC and the availability of an appropriate aero-medical evacuation asset at the next appropriate airport.

3.7.4 The HoM will develop a medical emergency plan.

3.7.5 It will have to be ensured that all staff can be covered by evacuation and security plans and means in case of an emergency.

3.7.6 The HoM will ensure that the number of staff and authorised visitors never exceeds the mission's disaster response, evacuation and medical emergency capabilities.

**3.8 Minimum Security Operating Standards (MSOS) and Mission-Specific MSOS (MS-SOS)**

3.8.1 The prevailing security situation is such that the safety and security of EUBAM Libya personnel can be affected by its volatility. The HoM will therefore ensure that the mission specific security plan and MS-SOS cater for maximum flexibility and swift adjustment, at all locations, to incidents and/or emerging circumstances.

3.8.2 The SMSO - under the responsibility of the HoM - will be further responsible for defining a mission-specific security plan covering all components of the EUBAM Libya and to further develop the existing MSOS into MS-SOS governing the safety and security of mission personnel, assets, resources and information. The current security-related standard operating procedures in place at possible mission locations, will serve as a basis to finalise a mission security plan which is in compliance with the generic MSOS. Where generic MSOS requirements cannot be met because of particular circumstances, the HoM will notify this to the CPCC and EEAS SD and will define compensating measures in consultation with his/her SMT.

3.8.3 The MSOS will, amongst other things, include the minimum requirements and standards with regard to communication, office and residential security, personnel security, transport

security.

- 3.8.4 The MS-SOS will include the requirement for appropriate vehicles with effective off road capability and personal protection equipment as well as satellite telecommunication; a fully equipped communications room and an embedded medical capability.
- 3.8.5 EUBAM Libya MSOS, Mission Residential Security Standards (MRSS) as well as MS-SOS will be defined in the OPLAN.

### **3.9 Physical security of offices and residential accommodation**

- 3.9.1 The selection of offices and accommodations or other premises for the EUBAM Libya will be scrutinised with regard to security aspects taking into account the risks identified in the specific location.
- 3.9.2 Because of the security situation in the theatre of operation as well as the living conditions, it is recommended that, where practicable and operationally feasible, EUBAM Libya personnel live in secure residential compounds. All accommodations must comply with the Minimum Residential Security Standards as defined by the Field Security Handbook, and must be approved by the SMSO and his staff and validated by the EEAS SD. If necessary, appropriate security upgrades may be necessary, the cost implications of which are foreseen in the budget.
- 3.9.3 Offices should have the stand-off distances and access protection required in accordance with the MSOS developed by the EEAS SD. The same should apply for training venues, where applicable and operationally feasible. All the above, and prior to any final decision, require the validation of the EEAS SD.

### **3.10 Transport Security and Safety**

- 3.10.1 Statistical data from other international crisis management actors provides indications that road accidents constitute a risk factor and are a significant cause of injury or death to

personnel deployed.

3.10.2 The MS-SOS will define the minimum safety and first aid kits requirements for EUBAM Libya vehicles. Removable EU marking should be available.

3.10.3 The HoM will institute an auditable written travel authorisation process for all travel related to the EUBAM Libya, which may be suitably delegated. Before authorising travel, all practical measures to ensure that travel is safe will be taken, and there should be consultation with the SMSO on the prevailing security situation when in doubt. The EEAS SD recommends that the HoM appoints the SMSO to manage the travel authorisation process. Currently, only Tripoli has been assessed.

In the event of eventual activities outside Tripoli, and prior to any such movements, the mission should carry out a security risk assessment which will submit to the EEAS SD via CPCC-MSO for validation.

3.10.4 All travel to/from the mission and within the mission area must be approved by the HoM or the individual appointed to that effect.

### **3.11 Communication**

3.11.1 EUBAM Libya offices will need - for personal safety and security reasons as much as for operational reasons - to be able to be called up at any time to communicate/report/inquire as to positions, verify estimated times of departure/arrival and report on incidents and incident management/resolution or other matters affecting their security in the area of operations.

3.11.2 To that effect the mission will have to be equipped and manned in order to operate (24/7 when necessary) an emergency communication system which includes mobile phones, satellite communication, facsimile, VHF equipment enabling them to communicate with the staff conducting mission related travel to allow 100 per cent personnel tracking and emergency communication at all times. Where possible, synergies can be sought with the other actors operating Emergency Communication Networks (i.e. the UN)



3.11.3 Additionally, there is a requirement for encrypted mobile phones allowing for secure communications with Brussels HQ on security issues or incidents affecting the various EUBAM Libya components.

3.11.4 The CIS needs of EUBAM Libya are being reviewed by a CIS specialist, taking into account the security requirements which have been reflected in the budgetary projections for security-related equipment. Appropriate measures will have to be taken to protect any secure CIS in accordance with the EEAS Security Regulations.

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**EUBAM Libya MINIMUM SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS**

**I. Minimum security recommendations for the short term**

In view of the deployment of the mission, the following specific security recommendations should be taken into consideration for the deployment of the Mission in short term.

1. All staff members deployed to EUBAM Libya, will be accommodated in designated hotels for the first 2 to maximum 3 months of the missions launch. The hotels currently approved in Tripoli by EEAS SD are: Corinthia and Radisson SAS.
2. EUBAM Libya will operate from the same hotels until a proper office space and accommodation is identified and secured, unless an alternative temporarily solution is identified assessed and validated by CPCC-MSD and EEAS SD.
3. Each member of EUBAM Libya, upon deployment, will be provided by a VHF handheld radio and a local SIM card.
4. All movement of EUBAM Libya members inside Tripoli city will be assured by a Private Security provider who will use a combination of soft and hard skin vehicles, with local driver. Self drive should only be considered in case of emergency. The Security provider will have a team of Close Protection Officers (CPOs) in order to accompany mission members to sensitive locations whenever required, as well as to intervene in case of emergency..
5. A 24/7 Watchkeeping capability will also be provided by the same security provider.

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## ANNEX 7 - SAFETY AND SECURITY

6. All movement after dark will be carried out only in armoured vehicles. Single movement should be avoided as much as possible and feasible.
  
7. During the TAM, only Tripoli city has been assessed. Therefore, any movement outside Tripoli requires the validation of the CPCC-MSC and EEAS SD.  
To that regard, the mission should provide CPCC with a detailed security assessment taking into due account the recommendations of the local authorities, which should include the security recommendations proposed by the mission to mitigate against the risks.  
It is recommended that such movements be only carried out in armoured vehicles (2 mission members per vehicle, local driver and 1 CPO) and escorted by local law enforcement agencies.  
  
During the TAM, only the Customs Training facility has been assessed and is considered as a possible training venue, taking into account that certain security measures should be put in place by both the mission and the local authorities. However, EUBAM Libya should identify other training venues. These venues and prior to any delivery of training, should be validated by the CPC-MSC and EEAS SD. To that regard, the mission should provide CPCC with a detailed security assessment which should include the security recommendations proposed by the mission to mitigate against the risks.
  
8. A temporary evacuation plan needs to be in place for the deployment of EUBAM Libya with the help of member states in the vicinity.
  
9. The Mission should follow the curfew hours of the EU Delegation and other International Organisations.
  
10. The SMSO and his deputy of EUBAM Libya could be allowed to self drive if required.
  
11. EEAS should enable the exchange of encrypted information from the mission area to HQ and vice versa during the deployment of EUBAM Libya.
  
12. All Mission members should undergo a Hostile Environment training.

**II. Minimum security recommendations for the medium term**

In addition to the above mentioned recommendations, the following should be taken into account:

1. Mission members will onwards be accommodated in residential compounds (houses with perimeter wall) in vicinity of the Headquarters location. All accommodations should be properly guarded by a private security provider, lightened and have a secure room. A generator is also mandatory. Whenever required additional security upgrades should be put in place as per the recommendations of the SMSO. Accommodations should have protected parking space.
2. The future HQ building of EUBAM Libya should have a perimeter wall and adequate standoff distance from other neighbouring buildings. It should have adequate parking space for the mission's fleet and will require guarding that will be provided by a private security company. Further security upgrades will be put in place as per the recommendations of the SMSO. Prior to any final commitment by the mission, the proposed office space must be validated by the EEAS SD.
3. The mission should procure both soft skin and B6 armoured vehicles as foreseen in the budget.
4. Is not recommended for mission members to self drive and therefore adequate number of drivers should be recruited.
5. All vehicles should be equipped with a tracking system.
6. The Private Security provider should have a Quick Response Team with Close Protection Officers for emergency intervention and also accompany staff members to sensitive locations. A 24/7 Watchkeeping capability should be also included.

# RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

## ANNEX 7 - SAFETY AND SECURITY

7. Mission members should get trained in driving armoured vehicles for emergency cases.
  8. **Considerations should be given to the identification of additional modalities for the protection of Mission personnel.**
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Functions related to Mission Support are divided into two main branches:

- Administrative Services;
- General Support Services.

## **1. Administrative Services**

Administrative services include finance, procurement and human resources as well as the management of mission personnel training requirements.

The mission will establish mission support structures, policies and procedures in order to ensure appropriate management and control of all human, material and financial resources assigned to the mission and in accordance with standard civilian CSDP administration policies and instructions of the CivOpsCdr.

These are without prejudice to the contractual obligations of the HoM towards the European Commission.

Should the mission mandate be extended, the mission reorganized, down-sized or closed down, administration-related planning will be undertaken.

The HoM is responsible for establishing the administration structures of the mission, consistent with the Council Decision and its Budgetary Impact Statement (BIS), ensuring that they are adequately staffed and provided with the necessary means to ensure the appropriate management of resources.

The structures related to mission administration report to the Head of Mission Support.

The Head of Mission Support is the HoM's primary advisor on Mission administration and he/she reports directly to the HoM on financial matters.

**1.1 Financial management**

The financing of the mission is based on funds from the General Budget of the European Communities and contributions as appropriate from Contributing States.

The European Commission contracts the HoM as Special Advisor and entrusts him/her with the implementation of the Mission budget as detailed *in the standard special advisor contract*.

The HoM will be responsible for the implementation of the mission budget in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures and, in particular, the Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) n° 1605/2002 and its Rules of Application, governing the General Budget of the European Communities ("hereinafter the Financial Regulation").

According to Article 58(1) c of the Financial Regulation, the budget is managed in indirect centralised management mode and the HoM appointed by the Council Decision will be the person entrusted with the implementation of this specific action.

The Mission Support Department under the supervision of the HoMS will assist the HoM in the planning and execution of the Mission budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management and the rules laid down in the contract between the HoM and the Commission.

The main task of the Finance Unit will be to assist the HoM in his duties and responsibilities according to the Financial Regulations and his/her contract concluded with the European Commission.

The Finance Unit is in particular responsible for the budgeting cycle starting with the supplying analysis and data for the establishment of the budget, the monitoring of budget implementation, the proposal of reallocations, regular, interim and final reporting.

The Finance Unit is responsible for the implementation of procedures for appropriations, accounts, verifications, payments, payrolls, petty cash, claims, recoveries and other financial functions in a multicurrency system in accordance with the contractual provisions between the HoM and the Commission.

The Finance Unit acts as the focal point for the preparation, execution and follow-up of the external

audits.

The Finance Unit will assist the HoM in the implementation of a risk management system.

## **1.2 Procurement**

The Mission is responsible for the acquisition of all the material means (equipment, supplies and services) necessary to the implementation of the mission's mandate.

The Mission, through the Procurement Unit, will be in charge of launching and managing the procurement procedures according to the applicable rules referred to in the Financial Regulations and its rules of application.

Procurement procedures will be launched and managed in accordance with the principles of transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination.

A procurement plan is established at the start of the mission to structure and schedule the procurement actions, and regularly updated. The procurement unit has overall oversight of all purchases.

## **1.3 Human Resources**

Human Resources Unit is responsible for the management and co-ordination of all human resources related issues including implementation of policies and procedures. The Human Resources Unit is responsible for staffing the Mission with international and local personnel notwithstanding their working status.

Human Resources Unit is responsible for the Mission deployment plan, including preparation and management of selection and deployment of personnel, drafting letters of appointment, contracts, reassignments, redeployments, termination, keeping work attendance records, preparing payrolls, keeping duty rosters, and all other relevant personnel related issues.



Human Resources Unit advises in the development of the training for personnel, proposes measures for the implementation of the existing personnel, administration rules for the operations, and the deployment of all human resources.

For further detail, see Annex 9.

## **2. General Support Services**

General Support Services (GSS) includes general logistics and facilities management, transport management, CIS as well as Health and Medical Support.

GSS under the HOMS supervision:

- Identifies the mission material needs;
- Makes a proposal of the means and resources required to adequately cover these needs;
- Provides the technical expertise to adequately define the required goods and services for procurement purposes;
- Assesses local market capability in respect of technical requirements;
- Manages the means and resources procured.

### **2.1 Logistic Support**

Logistics includes the management and control of all assets within the mission. The logistical support should be carried out in a timely and cost effective manner and should strive to provide full operability for all components of the mission.

Logistical cooperation and coordination with other relevant national and international actors in the country is established from the outset of the mission.

Logistics Unit is responsible for the identification of the material requirements for the Mission (equipment and consumables, services and premises), proposing appropriate means to cover these needs as well as the management of the means once procured. Mission assets are administrated and

controlled by Logistics.

Asset Management includes the supply of material and equipment, warehousing and inventory control, and also the disposal of materials as and when required.

Logistics Unit will keep an updated inventory list of every asset in the Mission at all times, and is responsible for regular internal inventory audits. For the purpose of tracking all transfers, movements and for identification purpose, all assets will be labelled with bar codes and inventory numbers.

Logistics liaise with the procurement unit by providing details for the tender files (drafting technical specifications, terms of reference, etc), being part of evaluation, panels and undertaking other activities of equivalent nature.

All goods delivered will be received centrally and managed and followed, where required, by coordinated and timely distribution to respective units of the mission.

Where possible, the Mission will be supplied through local vendors in order to reduce costs and to optimise logistical stocks. However, the Mission will maintain a small stock of operationally essential equipment and material.

In principle, all mission personnel, through controlled distribution, will be responsible for the efficient use of all equipment. Any defects in the equipment or loss of equipment must be reported immediately and could be subject of investigation. The regulations for the use of all equipment and the procedure for reporting defect or loss will be done in accordance with the SOPs.

The Mission will endeavour to establish and maintain a minimum logistic footprint, a structured and manned logistic body, with suitable facilities and with a transport capacity adapted to its needs.

Facilities Management shall provide EUBAM Libya staff with facilities to use as office space, residential accommodation, services, etc. in line with EU standards. These facilities are normally provided by means of lease/rental of the premises/offices.

Facilities management is responsible for the management of all buildings within the mission (office, residential accommodation, warehouse, etc.) which includes, but is not limited to, maintenance, repair, renovation/alteration, cleaning service, maintain and up keep of all green areas and pathways, provision and maintenance of utilities (water, electricity and sewerage). They will plan and update space allocation for all premises within the mission and periodically update the list of premises, drawings and layout plans for all premises.

Situations concerning safety and security at the workplace are of utmost importance and maintenance, repairs and alterations should always be planned with this in mind.

In case that existing permanent buildings are not of sufficient space to support EUBAM Libya needs, facilities may be built from containers or other temporary means.

SOP on the use of residential accommodation will be drafted. Staff may need to contribute financially to residential accommodation units provided by the Mission.

## **2.2 Transportation**

Under the HoM's supervision, the Transportation Unit is responsible for providing a sufficient number of roadworthy vehicles that shall at all times meet the Mission requirements for daily operations and for emergency, taking into consideration all weather and road conditions in Libya.

It is also responsible to ensure, through SOPs and other means such as regular reminders, guidelines and training, that vehicles shall be operated and maintained in strict accordance with appropriate rules and regulations, including those related to security and any local or state laws, now in effect or hereafter enacted, except in cases of emergency involving the protection of life and/or property.

All vehicles operated on roadways must at all times comply with any lawful signs and mechanical or electrical signals and other directions issued by the authorised personnel.

The principles regarding transportation management are as follows:

- Mission staff will be provided with sufficient transportation support that is necessary to perform their tasks;

- Allocation of vehicles will be decided based upon and according to EUBAM Libya's policy and CPCC/FPI recommendations, in order to fulfill all operational needs of the Mission;
- For general use, a strict limited centralised stock (MTO pool and Mission Reserve) will be maintained for operationally essential items;
- Vehicles required for emergency evacuation purposes will be regularly maintained and fuel levels checked.

The maintenance of the vehicles (servicing maintenance, spare parts, repairs, break down service) will be facilitated by licensed workshops, under contracts or agreements established based on the procurement rules of EU. Minor maintenance may be done at the Mission level.

The refueling system will be provided by local companies under the close supervision of the Transport Office, in order to secure sufficient fuel quality and supply at all times.

A trip ticket system for each vehicle of the Mission will be organised in order to monitor fuel consumption and record private use of vehicles, the Transport Office will monitor the same.

SOPs regarding the use - including the private use - of Mission vehicles will supplement this Annex.

### **2.3 Health and Medical Support**

The CivOpsCdr will have the overall responsibility for the EU's duty of care for the safety, health and wellbeing of EU deployed personnel.

The HoM will be responsible for ensuring adequate medical support to the mission. Given the time related constraints for the provision of health and medical care, adequate and timely medical planning is required to ensure a medical support structure capable of providing Health and Medical Support that meets European standards as close as possible, the overall result of medical treatment being equivalent to each Member States' national standard.

All mission members are expected to arrive in the mission area physically, dentally and mentally fit and should have all immunisation completed in accordance with national regulations. The

responsibility for the physical (including dental and mental) fitness and the immunisation lies with the sending Member State or, as appropriate, with the individual (e.g. international contracted personnel).

Special emphasis will be put on preventive medicine. During the pre-deployment phase, the implementation of preventive medical precautions is the responsibility of the sending Member State and/or individual.

Once personnel arrive in theatre and a medical certificate stating the individual's status is provided to the Mission, all health related responsibilities will shift to the Head of Mission.

Furthermore, the mission is to ensure appropriate arrangements for the organisation and co-ordination of patient transport by ambulance, AIRMEDEVAC and (medical) repatriation, as they are indispensable to robust medical support.

International mission personnel (except those from Contributing Third States) are covered by high risk insurance under a policy taken out by the Mission.

A detailed medical plan and further arrangements will be elaborated in SOPs that the medical staff will draft.

## **2.4 Communication and Information Systems**

### **2.4.1 General background**

Libya, and particularly its capital city Tripoli, has a topography which does not present any specific difficulties towards Communications and Information Systems (CIS) except for the long distance communications due to the large surface of Libya (1 760 000 km<sup>2</sup>) if the mission was to be extended country wide.

In Libya, every modern communication possibilities exist including landlines infrastructure, satellite links and GSM coverage (with 3G). ADSL connections, VSAT and WIMAX links are used in different locations for in-country communications and access to internet. The mission would likely require back-up services from Europe or an alternate local provider. IRIDIUM satellite phone coverage is good, THURAYA is not recommended. GSM communications are available through three different networks but all three are from only one main Governmental owned provider; the availability is assessed as medium which make it necessary to use at least two networks per GSM. An emergency radio VHF network shall be installed; access to the EUDEL network is possible but

subject to a mutual agreement and the equipment will need to be of compatible brand.

Tripoli is to be the Mission Headquarters and therefore this location will hold all CIS backbone equipment to support all staff members as necessary. There are no foreseen difficulties to implement a simple but robust CIS solution in this location.

#### **2.4.2 Mission**

Design of a CIS structure, deploy, operate and maintain a reliable and secure link in support of EUBAM Libya, down to the mission HQ and allow the use of an EU RESTRICTED (or EU CONFIDENTIAL if applicable) information exchange between CPCC and Mission HQ in Tripoli.

The CIS structure provides internal communication and external links to EU and non-EU actors in the area of operations, and in particular for cooperation/coordination purposes between the mission and the EUDEL in Tripoli.

Design of a CIS architecture, procure, operate and improve communications and information systems in accordance with and to support the CONOPS.

The CIS architecture mainly relies on its C2 structure, the IT network, the fix and mobile telephone networks and the radio HF/VHF communications. The VHF radio network will be used as a back up for internal communication and staff security purposes.

The CIS architecture overview is in line with the model described in the "Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management" (st9919/07, RESTREINT UE, of 23 May 2007), and will be more detailed in the OPLAN. It will be based on the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) to be defined by HoM as well as the following assumptions:

- In-theatre communication needs will be met primarily through the use of at least two commercial mobile networks, a number of fixed phone lines and a security radio network, backed up by satellite phones.
- The use of SECTRA secure voice capability over land lines and/or GSM shall be made available between EEAS/CPCC and HoM at EU RESTRICTED level and possibly up to EU CONFIDENTIAL.

- The provision of secure room, a shredder and a safe to host all technical equipment is the responsibility of the HoM. The room is secured according to the specifications provided by the Security Office and its access is limited to designated EU Staff with the appropriate clearance and need to know.
- Non secure data Internet operation service, GSM equipment and access to local telephone system are contracted on the local market. The Mission staff has access to local PSTN network.
- To facilitate the internal and external exchange of non-secure data (information sharing) a local area network with E-mail and internet web browsing shall be available.
- Stand alone desktops are used for data storage and one stand alone desktop shall be made available for the ACID encryption software at EU RESTRICTED level if this means is implemented.
- The radio network is used to ensure emergency response and where necessary to meet the requirements of an evacuation plan. All staff is to be equipped with handheld radios.
- Appropriate procedures and technical arrangements shall be established with international community elements in theatre for coordination in case of emergency situation.

### **2.4.3 Execution**

#### **HoM's intent:**

External Information Exchange Requirements:

Internal Information Exchange Requirements:

Internal Communications Requirements.

#### **Limitations**

Due to the heavy cost imposed by the Ministry of Communications to use frequencies in general and in satellite bands in particular, recourse to VSAT communications should be chosen as a last recourse.

#### **Concept of Operation**

Establish a safe and robust CIS architecture in order to support the mission in all aspects and using

the basic solutions in equipment and networks available in theatre.

**Tasks.**

- Deliverables.
- Communications Reports.
- Priority of circuit restoration.
- Frequency management.

**INFOSEC**

Secure links shall be provided in order to exchange classified information up to EU RESTRICTED (or EU CONFIDENTIAL if applicable) between Brussels and the Mission, through the use of data communications and possibly through secure voice and VTC.

The provision of above mentioned services and related assets is the responsibility of the European External Action Service. The provision of the link from the HQ to EEAS, including its maintenance, is the responsibility of the HoM.

**2.4.4 Financial aspects**

The CIS capital and running costs for the mission in theatre are based on the mission budget. This implies that:

- The communication costs are covered by the Mission, including the cost of the strategic link to Brussels.
- The end lines communication and interconnectivity in Brussels is the responsibility of the EEAS IT department.
- The provision of the links, including its maintenance, from the HQ to all mission elements and for in-theatre cooperation/coordination is the responsibility of the HoM.
- Information Technology (IT) equipment can be procured through the EU Warehouse in Berlin or possibly from the local market depending on availability and possible limitations.
- Consumables for printers, radios, faxes, stationery could be purchased from the wide market depending upon local market limitations.



**2.4.5 Information Security**

The criteria for confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation must be met by secure CIS. The HoM will manage the policy of classification and release of documents within the Mission in accordance with the security principles and minimum standards established by EEAS.

Appropriate procedures and technical arrangements are in place to ensure the security of information. In theatre, the Mission Security Officer is responsible for Information Security according to EEAS Security Regulation.

The secure CIS supporting the Mission's command and control structure has to be accredited to meet agreed security requirements. The EEAS SAA is the accreditation authority for the link between Brussels and the HQ. The HoM is the Mission Security Accreditation Authority for in-theatre network. The EEAS will provide the needed support and advice.

In addition, Security Agreements will be necessary in order to share EU classified information with non-EU countries, as appropriate, in accordance with the EEAS security regulations.

**2.4.6 Information management**

Security of communications is essential. The HoM shall define procedures for classification of documents within the Mission in accordance with relevant EEAS regulations.

**HUMAN RESOURCES**

**1. GENERAL**

The HoM retains the final authority to appoint personnel and the overall responsibility to deploy them, both international and local. The deployment plan is based on detailed job descriptions that are communicated to all Contributing States, as well as advertised in the official website.

In the light of the principle of non-discrimination and of professional merit, only those candidates that adequately satisfy the criteria set out in the relevant job descriptions are selected for the Mission. The decision of non-selection of candidates should be properly justified and Seconding States and EU Institutions informed accordingly. Furthermore, EUBAM Libya strives for an improved gender balance in CSDP operations at all levels in conformity with UNSCR 1325. Seconding States and European Institutions are encouraged to take this into account when offering contributions. National balance is another principle to be taken into account in the case of equivalent education and professional experience between candidates.

While the seconded staff remains under the authority of their Sending States, all staff members shall carry out their duties following the Mission chain of command and shall act in the sole interest of the Mission. Staff members who find themselves in a situation of conflict of interests are expected to report this situation to their Mission line managers independently from their duty towards the national authorities. Staff members must at all times comply to the Mission “Code of Conduct and Discipline”.

The rules set out here below are those that apply to international staff only. Working conditions for local staff shall be regulated by the local social and labour legislation. Employment contracts for local staff shall be subject to applicable local legislation including an arbitration clause. The HoM shall sign all local staff contracts, of which the corresponding job descriptions as well as all Mission SOPs form an integral part. The level of remuneration shall be based on the rules applicable for local staff working for the EUDEL in the same country.

Further to the rules laid out in the present Annex, the European Commission may amend the rules

and regulations for both international contracted and local staff.

## **2. RECRUITMENT**

The HoM retains the final authority to appoint and the overall responsibility to deploy personnel. The deployment plan is attached in the CONOPS of the Mission. Detailed job descriptions for all positions are communicated to all Contributing States, as well as advertised in the website of the Mission and other relevant websites in connection with Calls for Contributions.

In order to ensure proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions so that the Mission's tasks are accomplished in a manner consistent with the EU objectives and principles, generally accepted standards of human resources management should be adhered to by Missions.

Although responsibility for selection procedures lies principally with the HoM, it is the responsibility of the CPCC to provide advice, instructions and support as well as to monitor the proper execution of the procedures and to exercise quality control.

One of the main objectives for the Human Resources in the Mission is to achieve full operational capacity as soon as possible and to maintain the staffing at this level throughout the Mission duration.

All Contributing States' and EU Institutions' nominations for seconded positions are centrally processed, first through CPCC and then by the Human Resources of the Mission. Notifications of appointment are made through the same chain.

Deployment criteria include:

- Mission requirements;
- The individual staff member's experience, skills and professional qualifications;
- Reasonable cognizance of national and gender balance;
- Priority to be given to candidates for secondment regime.

Deployment conditions for international contracted staff are further detailed in the contract, EC Communication and instruction notes issued by the EC on the basis of the Communication.

The objectives of the Mission recruitment procedures include:

- to ensure a fair and transparent competition for all posts within the Mission;
- to ensure the selection of the candidates on the basis of relevant competence and expertise, on the broadest possible geographical basis and gender balance;
- to clearly establish the roles and responsibilities of every actor involved in the process;
- to ensure a smooth recruitment, avoiding interruption in the filling of posts.

### **3. CALLS FOR CONTRIBUTION**

Calls for Contributions (CfC) is a mechanism for force generation by advertising and requesting applications for Mission posts. It is used during all phases of the Mission and all posts need to be advertised through CfCs.

The Human Resources in the Mission prepares the CfC in close consultation EEAS/CPCC which bears the final decision. EEAS/CPCC launches it to the Seconding States and EU Institutions. It is also published on the official Mission website. All CfCs shall include equal opportunity statements.

The deadlines for submissions by MS are set to at least three weeks in order to allow for timely response and pre-mission training.

### **4. SELECTION PROCESS**

#### **4.1 Applications**

All applications are considered if they meet the eligibility requirements. Applications are received from both seconded and contracted applicants. Applications of seconded candidates should be submitted only through the respected national authorities in order to be properly registered.

#### **4.2 Selection Procedures**

Selection procedures should ensure a fair, transparent and accountable recruitment for all posts, both seconded and contracted. Confidentiality and personal data protection should be strictly respected throughout the procedure, e.g. only the Mission HR and the Selection Panel members as well as HoM should have access to application information.

Only those candidates that adequately satisfy the criteria set out in the relevant job descriptions will be selected for Missions.

Contributing States and European Institutions are encouraged to take this into account when offering contributions. National balance is another principle to be taken into account in the case of equivalent education and professional experience between candidates.

#### **4.3 Selection criteria**

- Candidates should be selected on the basis of relevant competence and experience, on the broadest possible geographical basis, respecting the principle of nondiscrimination and striving for gender balance.
- Preference should be given to seconded candidates and only in case no adequately qualified seconded candidates can be identified the HoM can contract international staff directly under his/her responsibility, taking into account procedure established in the relevant EU documents.
- Selections, together with justification for each case should be submitted for CPCC approval prior to informing candidates. Special attention should be given to mission specific dispositions for Contributing State contracted personnel. Due to their nature and tasks, some posts, for instance in security and CIS, require a security clearance at "EU Secret" level and no equivalent is accepted. This should be clearly indicated also in the respective job description.

- Recruitment of couples, siblings and blood relatives can be allowed provided that they would act independently in their area of work, i.e. do not work in a hierarchical relationship; do not work in the same unit; and do not have otherwise close professional relationship / significant impact in each other's area of work; and are not in the selection committee of each other. In case that an applicant has a family member as referred above deployed with the Mission, CPCC should be consulted and involved in the selection process.

#### **4.4 Selection Panels**

- Selection panels should be established for all advertised posts as soon as the CfC has been published.
- Panels should have an odd number of members (preferably 3) and should include a member, preferably a line manager from the service/component in question, a member from HR or from Administration. At least one of the members should be of management level.
- When participating, CPCC chairs the selection panel.
- For administrative posts and key personnel including senior management posts, CPCC must participate and chair the panel. For Mission Security posts the EEAS Security Department must participate and the CPCC Mission's Security Coordinator (MSC) must chair the panel.
- For press and public information related posts (e.g. Press and Public Information Officer) the Office of the High Representative's Spokesperson must participate in the panel.
- Members of the panels should declare in writing in the record of the Selection Panel, situations of conflict of interests, notably in case of family or personal relationships with any of the candidates; when this conflict could affect the impartiality of the selection procedure such as the cases mentioned above, the member in question should be replaced.

- The HoM retains final decision on the recruitment and therefore he / she should not be member of the panels but for a very limited number of cases to be identified in consultation with the CPCC.

In preparation for the selections, the Mission should draft an interview plan to be sent to CPCC approval before the end of the deadline for applications.

#### **4.5 Application Screening**

All applications for a given post should be evaluated by the same panel.

After screening the applications for compliance with the requirements of the CfC, the panel draws up a short list of the best candidates in order to be interviewed. Motivation for the non-selections and the short listing must be recorded in the Record of the Selection Panel. **A human resources officer will be part of the panel.**

#### **4.6 Interviews**

- Short listed candidates should be interviewed by the same panel. Selection without interviews, i.e. selection only based on applications should be exceptional and only for justified cases to be decided in consultation with the CPCC; Key personnel should always be interviewed.
- Interviews should normally be by phone or Video-Telephone Conference (VTC). For key personal these may be personal. Whenever possible, candidates should be interviewed in a same manner. In case candidates are interviewed in a different manner for the same post this should not create a bias in favour or against candidates.
- The performance and qualities of the candidate as regards the selection criteria must be noted according to a standard evaluation grid .
- It is suggested that the Selection Panel prepares a list of interview questions for posts under selection. The interviews are recommended to last c.a. 30 – 45 minutes.
- The panel may use also other selection tools such as language tests, knowledge based tests and skills tests with the special attention paid to objectiveness concerning both possible candidates in the mission and outside the mission.

From among the candidates that demonstrated compliance with the CfC requirements, panels should make a selection recommendation with eventual comments to the HoM indicating also a preference order in case the best candidate does not accept the appointment or is withdrawn. Justification for the recommendations must be recorded in the Selection Form.

#### **4.7 Selection and Reporting**

- Based on the panel recommendation the HoM should take final decision. In case of deviation from the recommendation of the panel a written justification from the HoM should be attached to the Record of the Selection Panel and in the selection results (letter signed by the HoM to be sent to CPCC).
- All documents related to the selection procedure, notably the Evaluation Grids and Records of the Selection Panel should be kept in the Mission and be available for consultation by CPCC if needed and if a complaint raises. Application forms of non-selected candidates should not be kept after the completion of the procedure in order to protect personal data.
- Missions are requested, while respecting adequate qualifications, to seek to fill all vacancies in the CfC, including by matching non-selected candidates to related alternative posts when no candidates or no adequately qualified candidates exist.  
Thus non-selected candidates for a certain position should be considered for other positions if they indicated that option in the application form. If during an open CfC a non senior management post becomes vacant and a post with the same job description has been advertised in that CfC the Mission may decide to fill the new vacant post from the pool of applicants prior to closing the CfC.
- At the end of the selections the Mission needs to send the selection results signed by the HoM to CPCC together with a fully filled Application Table (including information about the number of received, interviewed, selected and non-selected seconded and contracted candidates, reasons for non-selections - as well as national and gender balance).
- CPCC is responsible for all contacts with Contributing States, notably extension requests, selection and non-selection letters.



- No deployment letters for any post should be sent before either the complete applications and Selection Report or at least the respective Selections Form is sent to CPCC. The Mission can contact directly contracted candidates after this process.
- Possible complaints from Contributing States regarding the seconded candidates are addressed to the CPCC.
- Possible complaints by contracted candidates must be addressed to the HoM who, after reviewing the selection documents will take the final decision. If CPCC participates in the selection panel it should be consulted in advance.

#### **4.8 Decision – Information to Candidate to contracted international position**

In the case of contracted international staff, the successful candidate is notified directly (after approval by the Commission as required by the Special Adviser Contract between the HoM and the Commission) and given seven working days from the date of notification to accept the offer of employment.

If the successful candidate does not accept the offer of employment, the position is considered vacant and included in the next call for contributions, unless other candidates from the same selection are available on the list of recommended applicants by the selection panel.

Unsuccessful contracted candidates who have been interviewed are informed, individually by e-mail of the decision regarding their application or the result of their interview.

#### **4.9 Availability of Selected Candidates**

When applicable, the release of the selected candidates from the relevant seconding States is requested. If, in spite of the commitment, the release date is not compatible with the operational needs linked to the start date mentioned on the Call for Contributions, the post would be offered to the next best candidate of the closed CfC, or, failing that, be considered vacant and included in the next CfC, after appropriate consultations with the relevant Member States.

**4.10 Appointment of staff**

For Seconded staff: The secondment is implemented by an exchange of letters between the EEAS (CPCC) and the Permanent Representative/Representation to the EU of the Contributing States concerned. For International contracted staff: subject to the receipt by the Mission of all relevant documents, including evidence of their previous employment and educational qualifications as well as a security clearance certificate and the results of the medical check, the selected candidate is invited to sign the appropriate Mission contract, after the Commission's approval of draft contract.

Employment contracts with international contracted staff can only be concluded upon prior written approval of the Commission which also determines grading and corresponding remuneration of selected applicants. As regards local staff, the Commission is competent to verify whether the classification is accurate and to require any eventual corrections, if necessary with retroactive effect. In the case where the Head of Mission decides to sign the contract before the full completion of the security clearance process, the contract is terminated if the clearance cannot be issued within a reasonable period.

**5. DEPLOYMENT**

Contributing States, in liaison with the CPCC acting in conjunction with the Mission, are responsible for ensuring the satisfactory deployment of mission personnel into theatre and extraction during the mission draw-down and closure phases.

CPCC sends the relevant Sending State a selection letter together with a deployment form. Through this deployment form the Sending States are requested to confirm acceptance of the offer, the duration of the deployment as well as to provide the arrival dates and other necessary deployment details to CPCC with a copy to the Mission. They are also requested to give confirmation on medical fitness and necessary vaccinations for the Mission, security clearance driving license and e-Hest training.

International contracted civilian experts are responsible for making their own deployment travel arrangements details as instructed by the Mission's HR; the details must be transmitted to the

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Mission in a timely manner, prior to arrival of the contracted personnel in theatre.

Decisions for appointments and/or redeployments within the mission are the responsibility of the HoM.

The recommended tour of duty for seconded staff is of 12 months duration. For certain specific functions, the tour of duty may be shorter for operational/logistical reasons.

For security reasons, the private accommodation of the international members of EUBAM Libya can be restricted to areas and locations designated by the HoM.

### 6. ADMISSION

New arrivals are in-processed by Mission Administration and issued with Identification Cards. Sending States ensure that seconded personnel fully meet the criteria of the mission for minimum professional experience, medical and security clearance as well as driving and language abilities.

Security clearance: The international Mission members must be in possession of a valid security clearance at the appropriate level in keeping with their duties, issued by their respective National Security Authorities. Specific provisions for local staff will be elaborated as appropriate.

Medical clearance: Mission Members must be certified by the competent national Medical Authorities as being fully able to perform their duties, prior to their deployment to the Mission Area. All staff members must have taken all necessary vaccinations required for the Mission Area prior to their deployment to the Mission and should carry a proof of that.

Driving: Mission members must be in possession of a valid national driving license (category B or equivalent). Seconded staff members failing to demonstrate an appropriate standard of driver proficiency are referred to their National Contingent Leader for remedial action.

Contracted staff failing to meet appropriate driving standards is considered to be in breach of their contract.

Language: Mission Members should possess full working fluency in written and oral English language. In EUBAM Libya the possession of Arabic language is highly recommended and considered an advantage.

Training: The Contributing countries are expected to provide pre-mission training to their seconded personnel before deployment. For EUBAM Libya the Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) or its equivalent is necessary as a pre-requirement to join the Mission.

The whole personnel will receive special CSDP Mission Libya induction training upon their deployment to the Mission area.

## **7. REDEPLOYMENTS AND EXTENSIONS**

Redeployments, in principle, are not allowed and EUBAM Libya personnel are expected to remain in their positions for the complete duration of their tour of duty/contract.

As per the Guidelines for Improving Force Generation (7221/11), Mission requests for temporary internal re-deployments need to be processed through CPCC, which must ensure prior consent to the concerned Member States and the concerned person. All other re-deployments have to pass through a Call for Contribution. In relation to seconded staff, these requests are made for operational reasons and in accordance to the transfer of authority of operational control (OPCON) over the concerned staff granted by the Seconding States. In relation to contracted staff, temporary internal re-deployment can be authorized by the HoM based on operational requirements. Further instructions are provided in the Standard Operating procedure (SOP). In any case, the possibility for the HoM to nominate somebody from the Mission to an interim post which needs urgently to be filled on a temporary basis is the exception.

Extension, rotation and replacement of personnel is ultimately ensured by Mission Administration and confirmed by the HoM or delegate. Extensions are subject to specific rules laid down hereinafter and shall be considered on case-by-case basis. Exceptional withdrawal of personnel may embrace professional, personal, disciplinary and medical situations.

These principles are also applicable to international contracted staff members as appropriate.

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Extension of the secondment of the International Seconded Staff is possible under the following conditions:

- at the internal level within the Mission, the seconded staff member in question is responsible for initiating a request for an extension of the secondment at least three calendar months prior to the end of the ongoing secondment. The request should include reasons for the extension and the benefits for the mission yielded by the extension;
- the request shall be submitted through the respective Line Manager (LM) who will submit an evaluation report. In the case of a negative review further supporting notes must be submitted detailing the reasons why.
- if the LM recommends the extension, he/she will submit it to the Chief of Human Resources for his confirmation. The latter submits the request to the HoM for a final decision. The HoM has ultimate authority either to approve or disapprove the request.

The respective LM, National Contingent Leader (NCL)/ National Point of Contact (NPC) and the seconded staff member in question shall be informed of the approval/disapproval of the HoM. If the HoM's final decision is positive, the HoM shall submit his Formal Request through the CPCC to the respective Contributing State.

The respective National Authority of the Contributing State shall take the final decision regarding the extension of the secondment. This final decision shall be brought to the attention of the HoM through CPCC.

If the LM does not recommend the extension and the Mission Member launches an appeal, an advisory board comprising of the DHoM and the Head of Mission Support will consult separately with the seconded mission staff member and the LM in question. Subsequently, the advisory board shall submit its recommendation to the HoM for his final approval. If the HoM confirms the extension, the process follows the procedure outlined above. If the HoM does not confirm the extension of the secondment, the post will be offered in the next Call for Contributions.

### 8. REPATRIATION AND TERMINATION OF CONTRACT/TOUR OF DUTY

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An international staff member's contract/tour of duty may be terminated before its appointed term:

- upon his or her own request;
- upon a request by the sending State;
- for disciplinary reasons according to the code of conduct;
- for failure to meet basic Mission requirements;
- because of Mission restructuring and/or downsizing;
- on medical grounds, as certified by a competent physician and for seconded personnel, approved by sending State;
- if facts come to light which, if known before, would have precluded the secondment or contracting (such as a proven instance of dishonesty during the recruitment process or the withholding of essential information).

A decision of the HoM is necessary in each case.

In the cases detailed in chapter VIII a), d) and e) set out above a one-month notice period applies. In all other cases, the termination can be immediate, subject to the decision of the HoM, after appropriate consultations with the relevant authorities of the concerned Member State.

In the case of seconded personnel, all costs associated with such repatriation and the arrival of a replacement to complete the tour of duty, if applicable, are at the expense of the Sending State. In the case of international contracted personnel, the repatriation costs are at the expense of the individual concerned with the exception of those cases detailed in e), and f) above. In case of termination of contract upon a person's personal request as foreseen in VIII. a), the mission shall pay expenses only after not less than 6 full months of service.

An international officer/staff member may be repatriated on compassionate grounds upon his request through the chain of command. All costs incurred through compassionate repatriation are borne by the sending State or, where contracted, the mission shall cover all costs incurred upon receipt of supporting documentation.

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The HoM has the right to suspend a staff member from his or her duties pending repatriation for disciplinary reasons. Once suspended from duty, a staff member may not under any circumstances take part in any action or function on behalf of the Mission. In the case of seconded personnel, it will be the responsibility of the sending State to repatriate that person. All costs associated with his/her travel home will be at the expense of the sending State.

### **9. END OF MISSION PROCEDURES**

Mission members ending their contracts/tour of duty commence check-out procedures three working days prior to their departure. The checkout procedures are finalized by the Mission administrative services, to which outgoing personnel submits their completed checkout forms.

End of mission report: All Mission members are to submit a final report to their respective chain of command prior to their check out procedure. This report should outline the activity and the results achieved, as well as remaining work, the contact details and points of contact, as appropriate.

Hand-over: Before leaving the service, the staff member shall if requested by the HoM / his duly authorized delegate or by the LM, devote the time necessary to briefing a replacement and hand over to him/her or to any other person specified by the HoM / his aforesaid delegate or by the LM all items, equipment, vehicles, supplies, documents and information needed to carry out his/her duties.

Rotation System. The Mission shall guarantee that every post within the structure of the Mission function continuously. The Mission will inform participating States through the CPCC of personnel requirements three months in advance for the scheduled rotations in order to ensure that the selection and timely deployment of suitable Mission members is conducted efficiently and effectively.

Deployment planning takes into account any existing vacancies, giving due recognition to the completion of normal tours of duty, repatriations and the requirement to flexibly manage the organizational needs of the Mission.

**10. ASSESSMENTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

All Mission members will be subject to a regular Performance Evaluation Reports (PER). The report should include an assessment of the performance in post but also an evaluation of the potential for promotion and appointment to future missions.

Every Mission member will be subject to a PER prior to leaving the Mission. Furthermore, upon completion of a minimum of three (3) months in the Mission area every Mission member can request a performance evaluation by their immediate line manager, in order to assess his or her effectiveness.

The mission member will have the opportunity to express himself/herself before the performance evaluation and the evaluation report are issued. Detailed reasons must be given in writing in case a Mission member is not recommended for future missions.

The Mission member will receive a copy of his or her PERs. In the case of seconded staff, a second copy is forwarded to their relevant National Authorities. The original is always retained in their personal file in the Mission.

**11. DUTY HOURS**

Monthly and weekly duty rosters will indicate the estimation of working hours of the mission members. The line managers have the discretion to amend/adjust normal hours if mission operational requirements dictate, with the agreement of the HoM. Line managers will determine the most efficient and effective methods of personnel deployment, including departments / staff required to work shifts.

Line managers are responsible for the elaboration and maintenance of daily rosters, which should include the following information:

- a. establishment of working/duty, duty trip or leave situations of the respective personnel for the following month;
- b. sick leave situations;



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c. any remarks, if necessary.

Changes to the initial monthly roster should be communicated to HR as soon as possible.

Regular working schedule includes 44 hours per week, distributed in six days.

These details will be regulated by relevant HoM's instructions.

In the event of special or unusual mission requirements or unforeseen shortages in personnel, mission staff may be directed by their respective chain of command to work irregular or longer hours than normally scheduled.

All mission members are considered to be on standby mode 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, excluding only periods of dully authorized absences. Thus, they must be reachable at all times when in the Mission Area. No payment is made for overtime for international staff.

Security reasons govern the need for reliable means of communication. This requirement does not only apply to Mission Members in key positions and/or assigned for special tasks but to all Mission Members.

### **12. ANNUAL LEAVE (AL), COMPENSATORY TIME OFF (CTO) AND UNPAID LEAVE (UPL)**

The Leave and Compensatory Time Off regulations outlined below are intended to enable all Mission members to set a realistic work pace that can be sustained over any length of time during the Mission while, at the same time, meeting the recreational needs of Mission members. Line managers shall oversee the preparation of a projected leave schedule to ensure that all staff are given the opportunity to utilize leave entitlements.

The Human Resources unit is responsible for ensuring that leave records are meticulously documented and maintained and that staffing levels remain adequate at all times in order to ensure that operational requirements are met. The effective strength of units shall at no time be below 60% of the established strength unless otherwise approved by the HoM.

The granting of compensatory time off remains subordinate to operational requirements.

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### Categories of leave and applicable policies:

- a) **Annual Leave (AL)** – 2.5 days of AL are earned per completed month of service, counting from the date of arrival. AL may be taken separately or in conjunction with other types of leave.
- b) **Compensatory Time Off (CTO)** – 2,5 days of CTO are earned per completed month of service, counting from the arrival date. CTO is considered to cover:
  - all overtime duty performed for operational reasons;
  - all standby available duty (on-call duty)
  - work during weekends/days off.
- c) **Rest Leave Day (RLD)** - 1 day of RLD is earned per completed month of service in a high/critical risk environment.
- c) The combined AL and CTO earned during the last month of the contract is calculated as follows:
  - if the incomplete month is more than 6 days, 1 AL day;
  - if the incomplete month is more than 13 days, 2 AL days;
  - if the incomplete month is more than 20 days, 2 AL and 1 CTO day;
  - 2.5 AL and 2.5 CTO days are only earned on the completion of a full month of service.
- d) AL, CTO and RLD may be taken separately or in conjunction with other types of leave, with the limitation that no more than 23 (twenty three) calendar days, including weekend periods and Mission holidays, are spent out of work in one stretch. In exceptional circumstances a Mission member can take more than 23 calendar days off, subject to the approval by the HoM or delegate.

Mission members are entitled to **1 travel day/month** to be used for travel in conjunction with leave outside the Mission area and only applicable when the trip lasts 12 hours or more.

**Mission Public Holidays (maximum ten per year)** cannot be taken in advance. The missions Public Holidays to be granted to the mission members are at least the following:

- New Year

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- Easter Day
- Europe Day
- Local Religious Holidays
- All Saints Day
- Christmas Day

Additional religious and host country Public Holidays can be considered by the Mission and decided by the HoM.

Mission Members requested for operational reasons to work on given Public Holidays will be compensated by a day off to be used during the subsequent leave period. The use of Public Holidays as working days should be a very exceptional situation, subject to approval by the Head of Mission and, as there is no concept for compensation for half a day or hours, this overtime work should cover a full working day.

Exchange of shifts between Mission members to allow extended “time off” will not be permitted.

The minimum compulsory working days between two periods of leave is 10 days.

The days of AL / CTO / RLD earned during the last month in the mission and after the entitlement date (start date of the mission) will be calculated by thirties to the next full number. In case of decimals, less than half is 0 and more than half is 1.

For the Mission’s planning purposes Leave requests can be made up to two months in advance in writing and by submitting a CTO/AL request form to the Line Manager. The Line Manager must not submit this to the HoM for certification earlier than 20 calendar days prior to the scheduled AL or less than 72 hours before the start of the intended leave.

A staff member who has a compelling and valid reason to do so may request a period of unpaid leave. This request must be duly justified by a written memorandum and can only be granted upon approval by the line manager and the HoM. In no case the UPL may exceed the duration of one calendar month per year. Mission health insurance continues during UPL, but no AL or CTO shall be earned during such a period. All Mission holidays and weekends falling within a UPL period are

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considered forfeited. No salary or per diem shall be paid during unpaid leave periods.

AL/CTO may be spent inside or outside the mission area. International staff members are required to provide their contact details at their destination while on AL/CTO.

AL and CTO can only be taken as full days. Weekends and Mission Holidays are not counted as AL days. The working days for spending AL, CTO and RLD are either Sunday to Thursday or Monday to Friday. Mission week-ends and Mission Holidays will not be counted as Leave days.

No payment can be granted for unused AL/CTO at the end of the contract/tour of duty.

In the interest of staff health balance, the line managers are responsible for proper leave planning and staff members are encouraged not to accumulate more than 16 AL/CTO days.

In exceptional circumstances and subject to the approval of the HoM or designate, AL/CTO days can be taken in advance, to a limit of 7 days, provided that the remaining contract/tour of duty duration would allow to accruing the requested advance leave. In case the termination of the contract/tour of duty, takes place before these days are earned, these are discounted from the last payment.

As an exception to the above rule, the AL/CTO of the last two months in the mission can be taken in advance from the moment that the staff member's official end of mission date is known. No AL/CTO is allowed in the three working days prior to the day of departure.

In the case of termination of the contract by the Mission or resignation by the employee, all unused Annual Leave should be taken and no payment is allowed in lieu.

The rules related to the leave policy are subject to a dedicated SOP.

### **13. COMPASSIONATE / EMERGENCY LEAVE**

Requests for compassionate/emergency leave should be appropriately certified and may only be

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granted under serious circumstances, such as:

- attendance of the funeral of a close family belonging to one of the below categories: parent, grand-parent, child, spouse or life partner, sibling, or another relative who was the sole surviving family member of the staff member;
- critical or life threatening illness or injury of one of the above mentioned family members; or
- the staff member's own wedding and civilian registered partnership.

Staff members are required to submit relevant documents along with a request for compassionate/emergency leave for approval by the HoM, who holds final decision.

The cases referred to above may entitle a staff member to 5 days of compassionate/ emergency leave. Compassionate/emergency leave may also be taken in conjunction with earned CTO/AL. The rule of maximum 23 days of absence from duty at one time can be waived under the above circumstances.

### 14. SPECIAL LEAVE

Special Leave can be requested to cover absence from the Mission area up to a maximum of 10 days per 12 months tour of duty/contract, on serious professional or legal grounds that are beyond the control of the staff member involved.

The sending State must notify the Mission through CPCC of the request for a Mission member to take Special Leave (such as court hearings, promotion boards, compulsory training courses etc).

Authorisation for special leave submitted by international contracted staff should provide supporting documents which clearly justifies the grounds for requesting special leave based on the documents provided, the HoM will validate the authorisation for special leave. This validation is a technical verification in order to ensure that sufficient days are left on quota of days for special leave.

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During special leave seconded staff are not paid allowances and contracted staff salary and allowances by the Mission.

#### **15. SICK LEAVE**

Sick leave in Mission area that is not certified by a physician may be taken for a period of three days at a time. The total of uncertified sick leave days cannot exceed six working days during a twelve month period. There is no provision for uncertified sick leave outside the Mission area.

If sick leave is taken for a period in excess of three days, a qualified physician must certify the medical situation in an appropriate form stating the nature of the sickness and the probable duration of the expected time away from work. All medical information should be handled as confidential and should only be for the use of the Medical Section, and the Head of Mission, as required by the principle of the mission's Duty of Care and as governed by the current legislation governing processing and releasing of Medical Information. The Line Manager, Human Resources Office or the NCL/NPC will receive only administrative information.

The line manager must be informed of any period of sick leave taken by a Mission member as soon as possible, but not later than within 24 hrs. The line managers must notify the Human Resources Office of all cases of sick leave via the appropriate forms. (Sick Leave Report Form) They must also ensure that the Human Resources Office is immediately informed of the staff member's return to work.

If, while on AL / CTO, etc, other than special or unpaid leave, the staff member falls ill, he/she must contact the mission at the onset of the illness and send copy of a medical certificate with the following information as scanned attachment by email or by fax within 48 hours:

- starting date and the end date (if possible) of the illness;
- the exact address of the place where he/she is staying during the illness and the means of contacting him/her;
- exact name, address and means of contacting the treating doctor.

The staff members should also send the original medical certificate as soon as possible. Only if the aforementioned conditions are met, the leave days may be reaccredited to the staff member

concerned.

It is the responsibility of each line manager to identify and report patterns of sickness which cause concern about the welfare or suitability of a Mission member under his or her authority for Mission life, and/or which impede the operational effectiveness of the Mission. Line managers are advised to communicate with the individual in question to ascertain the reasons for persistent levels of sickness or absence.

For seconded staff, the Sending State is informed of all periods of sickness exceeding 7 days, or patterns of sickness which cause concern or impede operational effectiveness of the Mission. Excessive sickness levels may result, if necessary, in a recommendation to repatriate the staff member.

During Sick Leave seconded staff is paid allowances by the Mission. The absence of more than 20 consecutive days of a seconded staff member may lead to a request, through the EEAS (CPCC), to the Contributing State to consider the repatriation from the Mission Area of the staff member. If, in case of a seconded staff member, the national legislation of the Contributing State provides longer sick entitlement than above, the seconded staff member may be granted unpaid leave following the sick leave entitlement without prejudice to the possibility for the recommendation for repatriation.

Concerning international contracted staff no entitlement shall accrue in respect of a period of absence on grounds of sickness beyond the first 30 calendar days per one year period of contract. The absence of more than 45 days per year of an international contracted staff member may lead to a decision by the HoM to terminate the employment contract of that staff member.

## **16. MATERNITY LEAVE**

In case of pregnancy, and in order to be granted Maternity Leave (ML) the international staff member submits all relevant medical certificates, indicating the anticipated date of birth. ML may be given for the last 4 weeks prior to the anticipated date of birth unless differently recommended/prescribed by her doctor. Following the date of birth an international staff member is entitled to twelve weeks of ML. If the prenatal period has been shorter than 4 weeks, the postnatal period shall be extended correspondingly.

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AL and CTO continues to accrue during the ML period.

A pregnant international staff member shall be entitled to take time off up to one working day per appointment, if necessary, without loss of pay, in order to attend prenatal examinations, if such examinations have to take place during working hours. Personal circumstances shall, as far as possible, be taken into account.

Maternity leave may also be taken in conjunction with earned CTO/AL.

Subsequent to the completion of the Maternity Leave, the staff member in question is entitled to sufficient time off from duty for nursing her child during normal working hours.

The staff member is entitled to full pay during ML.

If, in case of a seconded staff member, the national legislation of the Seconding State provides longer ML entitlement than the above, the seconded staff member may be granted unpaid leave following the ML entitlement for the remaining period of the maternity leave according to the national legislation. If the period of unpaid leave would exceed the unpaid leave entitlement the HoM may request repatriation of the seconded staff member. The same rule applies to international contracted staff members. However, if the period of unpaid leave would exceed the unpaid leave entitlement the HoM may terminate the employment contract of the concerned staff member.

In any case the duration of maternity leave beyond the ML entitlement cannot have an effect of automatic extension of tour of duty /contract.

#### **17. PATERNITY LEAVE**

The international staff member is entitled to 5 (five) days of Paternity Leave (PL) after his spouse or partner delivers a child.

Staff is required to submit relevant documents along with the request for PL, through the chain of



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command for approval by the HoM or his delegated authority.

PL may also be taken in conjunction with earned CTO/AL.

In case of a child adoption, both male and female staff members are entitled to PL, under the same conditions as set out above.

If, in case of a seconded staff member, the national legislation of the Seconding State provides longer PL entitlement than the above, the seconded staff member may be granted unpaid leave following the PL entitlement for the remaining period of the paternity leave according to the national legislation. If the period of unpaid leave would exceed the unpaid leave entitlement the HoM may request repatriation of the seconded staff member. The same rule applies to international contracted staff members. Again, if the period of unpaid leave would exceed the unpaid leave entitlement the HoM may terminate the employment contract of the concerned staff member.

In any case the duration of paternity leave beyond the PL entitlement cannot have an effect of automatic extension of tour of duty /contract.

#### **18. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION**

In accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 and added to by Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the council of 18 December 2000, the Mission shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all mission members, in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

#### **19. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF NATIONAL CONTINGENT LEADER(S)**

The National Contingent Leader/National Point of Contact (NCL/NPC) is appointed by his National Government.

The NCL/NPC, in his capacity as contingent Leader, is not considered to be within the Chain of

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Command of EUBAM Libya.

The NCL/NPC is considered the national representative of his contingent and, as such, may be requested by the HoM / or delegate / to liaise with his national authorities, when appropriate, on issues pertaining to the betterment of the mission.

The NCL/NPC is not entitled to use members from his contingent that are on duty to assist him/her in performing Contingent Leaders' duties. The NCL should be allowed to be assisted by non mission members, as appropriate, in order to fulfil his duties.

The NCL/NPC must ensure that during his absence from the Mission area, all responsibilities are performed by an Acting NCL.

The NCL/NPC shall not conduct investigations of disciplinary issues concerning members of their contingents, but the National Contingent leader should be informed in case of a reported or detected alleged breach of the Mission Code of Conduct.

When a Mission Personnel terminates the mission without completing the checkout procedures, the respective NCL/NPC is responsible for ensuring that the checkout is completed on his behalf.

The NCL/NPC is responsible of organizing all activities related to his / her National Day.

The NCL/NPC shall be granted one day per month to conduct official contingent business in the Mission Area. The date chosen should not normally be immediately before or after a period of CTO or Annual Leave.

The NCL/NPC wishing to utilize such an official contingent business day (not applicable to the organization of National Contingent Meetings) shall forward a written request to his/her immediate supervisor, minimum of one week prior to the date he/she wishes to use to conduct contingent business. Upon approval, this written request shall then be forwarded to the HR for official entry into the appropriate database.

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All National Contingents of the Mission are allowed to organize National Contingent Meeting every two months. The official request has to be sent to the HoM for his approval. National Contingent Meetings can be held only during a weekend or normal weekly Mission off days in the mission area. All expenses shall be covered by the respective National Contingent.

The regular National Contingent Meetings are recognized as 'Contingent Meeting' days for the participating members. The travel and program arrangements related to 'Contingent Meeting' days are not subject of any overtime request, neither the attendance can generate request for the award of the Day Off .

### **20. PARADES AND OTHER MEDAL EVENTS**

The High Representative has established the CSDP Service Medal as award for all civilian and military personnel who have participated in an EU-led crisis-management operation and served in the area of operation at least 30 days continuously.

However a period of qualifying service shall not be required for:

- Posthumous award before qualifying has been completed;
- Service-incurred injuries and evacuation, before qualifying service has been completed.

Exceptions may be made by the HR, on the recommendation of the Civilian Operation Commander or the Head of Mission, for the award of the Medal to personnel actually deployed in the area of operation, who are regarded as particularly deserving cases and who would otherwise fall outside the criteria.

In accordance with the aforesaid, the HoM shall be in charge of authorizing the Medal Parade, as a rule, twice a year.

All National Contingents of the Mission are allowed to organize National Contingent Meeting every two months. The official request has to be sent to the HoM for his approval. National Contingent Meetings can be held only on Saturdays in the mission area. All expenses shall be covered by the respective National Contingent.

The regular National Contingent Meetings are recognized as ‘Contingent Meeting’ days for the participating members. The travel and program arrangements related to ‘Contingent Meeting’ days are not subject of any overtime request.

## **21. LOCAL STAFF**

The Head of EUBAM Libya shall employ local staff through an employment contract subject to respective social and labour law applicable at the place of employment and in accordance with the requirements of the Commission Communication of 30 November 2009 (C(2009/9502) on Specific Rules for Special Adviser of the Commission entrusted with the implementation of operational CFSP actions.

Without prejudice to the local social and labour law, EUBAM Libya shall follow the Framework Rules laying down the Specific Conditions of Employment of Local Staff serving with the European Delegation in the respective host countries, in particular for the following:

- conditions of engagement;
- rights and obligations;
- working conditions;
- classification in group and step;
- remuneration;
- advancement;
- annual and special leave;
- termination of contract;
- social security insurance comprising accident, sickness and pensions as well as liability aspects;
- provisions related to a clause regarding liability of the person to be employed;
- disciplinary measures;
- Settlement of disputes.

Any dispute between the Head of Mission and Local Staff shall be submitted to an arbitration board

under the conditions defined in an arbitration clause in the contract.

Conditions of services for local staff will be regulated by specific implementing rules in accordance with the local social and labour laws.

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Demining	AT	-	0,2		2012	
disarmement	BE		0,1			Contribution to Manpads Project
Nuclear Research Centre Tadjoura, (NRCT)	DE	GRS, (Ass. for Facility and Reactor Security)				a) Physical protection of NRCT, b) Storage of irradiated nuclear fuel elements, c) Staff training LBY Nuclear Authority
Locating Radioactive Substances (RS)	DE	IAEA, Office of Nuclear Security, ONS	0,555			a) Border Control Assistance b)Monitoring civil use of RS (hospitals/industries) (out of 5 mil. allocated for IAEO)
Humanitarian demining - demining and ordnance disposal	DE	DEMIRA e.V.	0,5			ongoing project, increase of 200.000 \$ planned for 2012
Creation of a Libyan authority for demining and the location and safekeeping of arms and ammunition, including MANPADS (Libyan Mine Action Centre, LMAC)	DE	US-DoS	0,8			first phase completed
Delivery of equipment for decontamination and analysis for Libyan forces to enable them for work on the disposal of chemical weapons	DE		0,6			planned for 2012
Cooperation and training on environmental issues and pollution caused by defence and security activities and facilities	EL					TBD

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TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Cooperation and training on weapons and ammunition import and export control	EL					TBD
Capacity building Ministry of Interior	ES	MIR	N/A		started	
Demining	ES	MAG	0,5			Contribution to MAG
Protection of vulnerable groups	EU	Mercy Corps, Scotland; Save the Children, UK	4,0		Will start in October	Developing effective protection systems for vulnerable groups, including minorities and migrants, and strengthening the capacity of national and local authorities and non-state actors to meet their particular needs.
Sector Security Reform and Rule of Law	EU		10,0		In pipeline	Will start early 2013
Capacity building for crisis response and criminal investigations	EU	UNDP Libya	4,3		Will start in December	Strengthen operational capacity to identify organised crime and improve interministerial coordination on crisis response.
Clearance of unexploded ordnances	EU	DCA	5,0		Will start December 2012	Creating a safe and secure environment by clearing explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnances and to enhance national clearance capacity, training and mentoring by targeting all conflict affected populations including former combatants and fighter
Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of conventional weapons and ammunition.	EU	GiZ	5,0	60	CODUN decision foreseen end of December	Ensure secure storage of ammunition and to rehabilitate some of the storage sites that have been damaged during the conflict in order to reduce the risk of illicit proliferation in/from Libya

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TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						and its broader region.
French training for custom officers	FR	Institut Français de Tripoli	N/A	10	July 2012	10 officers are being trained in French language in Nice.
VIP Protection trainings	FR	HPSP (French Minint)	N/A			75 NTC body guards trained
Civil Security	FR	French Minint	N/A		March 2012	
Training in democratic managing of crowds	FR	French Minint	N/A			
<b>National advisor to Libyan customs</b>	FR	<b>French MFA</b>	<b>0,42</b>		<b>September 2012</b>	Advisor to the Libyan customs Administration
<b>Training of Libyan officers in French Air Force School in Salon de Provence</b>	FR	<b>French MoD Défense Conseil International</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>March 2013</b>	<b>Long term training programs (4 years) for 10 pilots, 10 air defence officers and 10 ground air officers.</b>
<b>National advisor to Libyan Navy</b>	FR	<b>French MoD an MoFA</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>Summer 2012</b>	<b>A maritime mine warfare expert has been deployed to the Libyan Navy headquarter.</b>
<b>Maritime mines clearance</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>			
<b>Training of demining divers</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>March 2012</b>	<b>Long term training programs (3 years) for 72 Libyan divers.</b>
<b>Training of Navy officers</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>			<b>4 officers at the French Navy School, 16 officers are following a long-term program (20 months) in Toulon.</b>



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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
Higher military education	FR	French MoD (Ecole de Guerre)	N/A		2012/2013	2 officers are following a one year program at the French War college. This program should be renewed in 2013/2014.
Training on Aircrafts	MT	MCAST			In pipeline	The use of Maltese educational institutions to provide training for Libyan nationals, particularly at MCAST Aircraft Maintenance Technician Facilities.
Training on pilotage	MT	Transport Malta	N/A		In pipeline	Transport Malta is in a position to provide: (a) Pilotage Training; (b) Training for Harbour Master and other officials
Training to airtraffic controllers	MT	Malta Air Traffic Services	N/A		March, 2012	Training air traffic management
Immigration / Search and Rescue	MT	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	N/A		2012	a. Course in operational Maritime Law (07-18 May, 2012) for 4 Libyan Officers b. Course in SAR Mission Coordinator (21 May - 15 June, 2012) for 12 Libyan Officers; c. Course for Basid Boarding Officer/Counter Narcotics (03-14 September, 2012) for 8 Libyan Border Guards. d. Course for Basic Boarding Officer/counter Narcotics (01-12 October, 2012) for 3 Libyan Officers. e. Course for on scene coordinator (15-26 October, 2012) for 13 Libyan officers.

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<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Immigration / Search and Rescue</b>	<b>MT</b>	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	N/A		mars-12	Malta deployed a Mobile Training Team to Libya for one week in Mar 2012, whose aim was to provide initial support to Libya in setting up a maritime Search and Rescue organization, and developing complementary operational methods at sea as follows: a. Introduction to operational Maritime Law for 23 Libyan Officers; b. Introduction to SAR Fundamentals for 33 Libyan Officers; c. Introduction to Basic Boarding Techniques for 31 Libyan Border Guards
<b>Immigration / Search and Rescue</b>	<b>MT</b>	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	0,1		April, 2013	Four other courses, starting in April for Libyan officials, have been identified in the crucial areas of: (i) Operational Maritime Law; (ii) Search and Rescue Mission Coordination; (iii) Basic Boarding and Counter Narcotics; and (v) Search and Rescue on Scene Coordination
Border Control assistance	<b>MT</b>	Malta Police Force	0.005 (4,900)		In pipeline, 2013	The Malta Police Force would support their Libyan counterparts in relation to border control issues, particularly by way of training initiatives as well as training on investigation and crime suppression. In this regard, the Malta Police Force would provide training programmes in the form of train-the-trainer instruction, including through attachment to related Police Units in Malta: Air Border Immigration and

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
						Passport Control Procedures for four Officers from the Libyan Immigration Service; Document examination training for first and second level Border control services for four officers from the same services.
USAR training	<b>MT</b>	Civil Protection Department	0,2		In pipeline, 2013	Basic Dog Handling and Obedience; Light and Medium Urban Search and Rescue; Training of Canine Elements in Urban Search and Rescue. Such training can be provided to 60 students for a maximum of 63 weeks.
Training	<b>MT</b>	Malta Police Force	0,1		In pipeline	Training in relation to: Dog handling for four officers in drugs, explosives, protection and displays activities; drug investigation techniques, reporting and prosecution training for four officers; criminal investigation techniques in relation to general crime, including reporting and prosecution, for four officers; economic crime investigations, reporting prosecution for four officers; vice squad investigation techniques, reporting and prosecution for four officers; training at the Forensic Science Laboratory on document/ currency examination- Ballistics- fingerprinting- photography and DNA for four officers; Traffic Management Training for four officers; District and community police training

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
						which would include crime prevention, sporting events and other activities for four officers; and training on security organisation for major events and VIP protection for four officers. Three-week familiarisation visits for 2-3 groups of 10 officers may also be held.
Coopertion in the field of Justice	<b>MT</b>				In the pipeline	Malta is also prepared to provide cooperation in relation to: (i) Case Management IT Systems; (ii) best practices on training programmes for judges and prosecutors; (iii) an overview of Malta's judicial system and its operations; (v) assistance in criminal matters; (vi) legislation exchange, particularly in the fight against crime; and (vii) systems of public prosecution.
Quality assurance higher education	<b>MT</b>	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline, draft MoU has been prepared	a. Train Libyan nationals in establishing quality assurance mechanisms for programmes and institutions in higher education; b. Provide Maltese experts in setting up accreditation and licensing policies for programmes and institutions in higher education;

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						c. Identify academic areas of study in which Libyan authorities may require assistance in curriculum design and teaching
Higher education/vocational training	MT	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline. MoU was signed in Jan 2012. An update MoU was signed in September 2012	To provide training courses in languages, especially in general and special purpose English, at levels for Libyan citizens training in Malta; To provide vocational training in the areas that is specified by the Libyan authorities and which are offered by specialized training institutions licensed and accredited by the Maltese authorities.
Curriculum design	MT	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline, draft MoU has been prepared	a. Train Libyan nationals in the design of curriculum for compulsory education and the setting up of quality assurance mechanisms for all programmes and institutions in compulsory education; b. Provide Maltese experts in setting up educational services in schools and education institutions in compulsory education; c. Identification of areas of study in which Libyan authorities may require assistance in curriculum

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TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						design and teaching
Support to the war-wounded	<b>MT</b>	MHEC	0,4			Medical services to Libyans injured during the war
Provision of humanitarian aid	<b>MT</b>		1,1			Humanitarian aid for 100 adults and 100 children, airlifts and SFAX repatriation of injured Libyans
Coordination with International Agencies	<b>MT</b>	MHEC	N/A			MHEC coordinated with the World Health Organisation to set up a Humanitarian Hub in Malta within facilities of the Civil Protection Department ( Malta). MHEC also supported the United Nations Support Mission in Libya provide to Humanitarian assistance. MHEC worked with WHO EURO to assess the preparedness of the Maltese Health System to manage a potential mass influx of patients and displaced population from North African States

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TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Post graduate studies	MT	University of Malta		N/A	In pipeline	<p>a. The award of up to 5 scholarships to Libyan students by the UoM on an annual basis in specific areas of study at post-graduate level. – The AI Entisar Scholarship.</p> <p>b. The continued provision of scholarships by the Government of Libya to Libyan students seeking to engage in English Language Study programmes, foundation certificate and Degree programmes offered by the UoM.</p> <p>c. The award of a discount of 10% on an annual tuition fee to be paid by, or on behalf of, Libyan students registered at the UoM. The UoM will apply this discount as to from 2012/2013.</p>
Supply of medicines, medical consumables	MT	MHEC		0,078		MHEC took the lead to transfer various supplies of medicines and medical consumables according to requests from Misurata and Tripoli
Prison reform	NL	DJI - Custodial Institutions Agency (Dienst Justitiële Instellingen)	0,175 mln	24	Pipeline (expected mid-2013)	
Support to UNMAS Emergency Response in Libya	RO	UNMAS	0,09	24	2012	Demining activities in Central & Eastern Libya

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Defence Advisory Team	UK		0,85		April 2012 to March 2013	The Defence Assistance Team (DAT) is a key enabler for high level influencing and capacity-building within the Libyan MOD and military for the purpose of defence reform as part of wider Security Sector Reform
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	UK	EU	0,1	6	TBC	A short-term (2 pers for 6 months) Project Team to oversee the process for the establishment on an EOD Training School for the Libyan Authorities (MOD and MOI) in partnership with EU.
Personnel Training/best practice sharing for LMCD	UK		0,04	1 week	TBC	Facilitate a training symposium for key Libyan stakeholders with a reciprocal visit to UK in order to help them understand the breadth, width and depth of a modern military personnel training pipeline using the UK as a model not a solution. (8 pers for 5 days).
Development of a Joint Operations Unit	UK		0,72		TBC	Development of a joint operations unit

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Police Advice	UK	Libya Ministry of Interior	0,44	11	March, 2013	Two British Police Advisers – one providing strategic advice to the Interior Ministry and a second supporting policing within Tripoli. This



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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						figure includes funding for further support subject to the recommendations of an Autumn review. Police command training provided in June 2012.
Strategic advice and training to Libyan MOI	<b>UK</b>	Libya Ministry of Interior	1,1		July 2012 to March 2013	Increase capacity and capability of the MOI to manage strategic change, develop organisation and operational leadership skills and introduce effective means to investigate crime and protect the public
L	<b>UK</b>	International Centre for Prison Studies	0,26	12	Oct 2012 to Jan 2013	The ICPS team training to the Judicial Police to manage Libya's prisons and the transfer of detainees from custody of revolutionary brigades into official state custody. Focus on the principles of human rights and international law, and how to run prisons which conform to international standards for the treatment and welfare of the prisoners
Extension of Civilian de-mining Programme Manager	<b>UK</b>	Libyan MOD/MOI	0,2	6+	Sept 2012 to March 2013	Funding for the lead planner and coordinator for CP and CWP destruction in the Libyan MOD.
Implementation of a Prisoner-Records Management system and training courses in Libyan Prison Administration	<b>RO</b>	Intercultural Institute Timisoara and National Penitentiaries Administration of Romania	0,026		August 2012	
Small arms and insecurity in Libya and North africa	<b>NL</b>	Small arms survey	0,6	30	November 2012	Mapping small arms and weapons in Libya and North Africa
Demining	<b>NL</b>	Dan Church Aid	2,4	48	July 2012	Demining
Demining Awareness	<b>NL</b>	Handicap international	3,6	48	July 2012	Demining

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Demining	NL	Mines Advisory Group	2,3	48	July 2012	Demining
Demining	DK	Danish Demining Group (DDG)	0,6	14	April 2012	Humanitarian Mine Action and Protection in Libya
Freedom from Torture Programme in North Africa (transitional justice)	DK	Danish Institute Against Torture (Dignity)	0,4	19	December 2011	Capacity building of health professionals on rehabilitation of war trauma and torture victims, documentation of torture - special fact finding on torture and sexual violence, detention monitoring
Assistance to Libya in addressing the issue of missing persons 2012	DK	ICMP	0,2	18	January 2013	Assist Libya in developing its own capacity to undertake effective missing person's investigations as quickly as possible
Support to strengthening the rule of law and access to justice in Libya during the transition to democracy	DK	UNDP	1,3	47	November 2012	Strengthen the capacity of Libyan rule of law institutions, improve access to justice for conflict affected populations, strengthen the role of NGOs and CBOs in the transitional justice and reconciliation process
Support to the Process of Criminal Justice Reform in Libya	DK	UNDOC/UNSMIL	0,2	48	January 2013	Criminal Justice Reform
Support to Human Rights	DK	The Danish Institute for Human Rights	0,2	18	2011	Creation of dialogue on human rights related themes through the establishment of an NGO centre which gathers human rights organisations trying to influence the development in Libya on issues such as the introduction of rule of law and public participation. Building a professional capacity as a foundation for the development of a strong and pluralistic media sector, partly by establishing media institutes and partly by promoting professional organisation within the sector.
Support to independent and professional media in Libya	DK	International Media Support (IMS)	1,7	24	2012	Building a professional capacity as a foundation for the development of a strong and pluralistic media sector, partly by establishing media institutes and partly by promoting professional organisation within the sector.
Strengthening democracy in Libya through a dynamic and	DK	National Democratic	0,5	8	October 2012	Support to the process of creating an inclusive and participatory political environment and building the capacity of the political parties

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
participatory political party environment Support to the election process in Libya	<b>DK</b>	Institute (NDI)  The Carter Center	0.2		2012	with a gradual approach sensitive to the short and medium term needs of the parties.  Monitoring of the national elections in July 2012.

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities****Italian assistance to the Government of Libya in the field of Security*****Training of Security Forces***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Strategic Infrastructure Security  “Train the trainers” course	MoD (Carabinieri)	10 weeks each course	180.000 €	60 students	The training has been divided into 2 courses for 30 trainers each. First completed (29.08.12-24.10.12). Second started on 14.01.13.	Under the agreement with the Libyan MoD, the Carabinieri organized one training course at the CoESPU Vicenza, in favour of 60 Libyan instructors in order to re-build a Gendarmerie force, focused on strategic sites protection.
Strategic Infrastructure Security  Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	200 students	In the pipeline	Will be carried out in Libya by the above mentioned 60 Libyan instructors supervised by 22 Carabinieri advisors. Location TBD

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Operating procedures of police action  “Train the trainers” course	MoD (Carabinieri)	2 weeks each course	Not defined	60 students (20 + 20 + 20)	First completed (18.11.12-03.01.13). Second started on 06.01.13. Third planned in Feb.  Others to follow	Training course carried out by 5 Carabinieri advisors in Tripoli to form Instructors.  This is on going activity that will be continued throughout 2013.
Investigative Techniques Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	2 weeks	31.093 €	20 students	Planned 29.04.13 – 10.05.13	In favour of 20 Libyan trainers selected from the 60 participants of the above mentioned course
Public Order Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	200 students	In the pipeline	To be carried out in Libya (Gharyan, 80 Km south of Tripoli) as requested by Libya. This course is in favour of 200 new enrolled police cadets

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Light Protected Vehicle drivers  Training course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	Not defined	28 students	Started on 14.01.13	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
Infantry instructors “Train the trainers” course	MoD (ITA Army)	21 weeks for Officers 8 weeks for troops	Not defined	4 Officers 35 Troops as students	Started on 14.01.13	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
Infantry platoon in long range patrol missions Training course	MoD (ITA Army)	8 + 6 weeks	Not defined	30 students	Ready to start	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
C-IED and demining Train the trainers course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Flight qualification Training course	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined		5 pilots	In the pipeline	Support for the re-qualification on board SF-260 in Latina Flight School
Firefighting courses for Navy Personnel Training course	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Navy Training Centre in Taranto

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Ship Manoeuvre courses for Navy Officers Training Course	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Naval Base of Augusta

***Education***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Defence High Studies Institute (IASD)	MoD	6 months	50.100 €	1 student	ongoing	Academic Year 2012 - 2013
International Capstone Concept Course (ICC)	MoD	4 weeks		1 student	Planned 08.04.13-13.05.13	
Defence High Studies Institute (IASD)	MoD	9 months	1.040.095 €	1 student	Approved and financed	Academic Year 2013 - 2014
International Capstone Concept Course (ICC)	MoD	4 weeks		1 student	Approved and financed	
Joint Service Staff College(ISSMI)	MoD	10 months		1 student	Approved and financed	

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Basic Italian learning Course for Academy cadets	MoD	4 months		7 students	Planned April-July 2013	
Academy courses	MoD (ITA Army-Navy-AF)	5 years		7 students: - 5 Army - 2 Navy	Planned to start in September 2013	
Wheel vehicles maintenance course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	127.000 €	5 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
Electro-magnetisms operator course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks		3 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
EOD operator course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks		18 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
Specialist course at the ITA Navy Trg Center	MoD (ITA Navy)	Depending on the course		5 petty officers	Planned 2013-2014	
Basic course at IT Navy Petty-Officers School	MoD (ITA Navy)	Depending on the course		15 Sergeants	Planned 2013-2014	
CH 47 pilot course	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army
CH 47 maintenance course	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army



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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Diver/Deep Sea Diver course	MoD (ITA Navy)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Navy
Courses for artillery operators	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army
Air Defence and Air Traffic Management course	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	Good knowledge of English required
Theoretical Navigation courses for Navy Officers	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Naval Base of Augusta
Courses on Logistic software	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	In case the Libyan Armed Forces will use the Italian Navy uniforms and equipment
Port Authority and Coast Guard Management course	MoD (ITA Navy – Coast Guard)	8 weeks		8 Officers	In the pipeline	Planned 2013-2014
Crime Scene Investigation	MoI	12/03/2012 30/03/2012	€ 120.000	24 participants	Completed	
Border Police operators	MoI	30/04/2012 25/05/2012	€ 20.000	20 participants	Completed	

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Document Forgery	MoI	06/06/2012 29/06/2012	€. 30.000	22 participants	Completed	
Police Investigations	MoI	06/06/2012 29/06/2012	€. 30.000	24 participants	Completed	
Commanders of High Sea Naval Units	MoI	25/06/2012 20/11/2012	€. 250.000	24 participants (17 ended the training)	Completed	
Anti Drugs K9 Units	MoI	21 weeks	€. 180.000	8 participants	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet
Anti explosive K9 units	MoI	16 weeks	€. 160.000	8 participants	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet
Frogmen	MoI	3 months	€. 330.000	TBD	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet.
Police Investigative Techniques and controls against illegal immigration	MoI	TBD 10 days	€. 25.000	20 participants	Postponed	Libyan Authorities failed in finding quickly the students. We are waiting, from Libya, the list of the participants and the new starting date from the Central Directorate for the Education Institutes.
Civilian Air Traffic Contollers	Italian Civil Aviation Administration	TBD		150 beneficiaries	Ongoing	

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities*****Border Control***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
ITA Navy Patrol Units employed in water-space management and to avoid weapons smuggling	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	1.800.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	One Italian patrol ship involved
Technical and operational support for the installation of a costal radar network	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	Proposed the support for the connection to the Italian Operational Centre
Support for Maritime Surveillance and Security	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Combined training in the field of Maritime Security Operations	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Advising and training in border control (custom)	Italian Customs Agency and ITA Custom Police (“Guardia di Finanza”)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	5/6 ITA “Guardia di Finanza” personnel
Advising and training in border control (security)	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	10 Carabinieri personnel
Capacity and institution building project in favor of the Libyan Customs Authority.	Italian Customs Agency and Guardia di Finanza	12 + 12 months	About 1.000.000€		Phase 1 ongoing Phase 2 in the pipeline	Based on the cooperation Agreement signed on February 2012 by the Custom Authorities of Italy and Libya
Restoration of 4 patrol boats already supplied by Italy to Libya.	MoFA/Guardia di Finanza	TBD	About 4.300.000€		ongoing	A technical Italian mission will be deployed in Libya to carry out the activities needed to recover the full operability of the naval units, to be used in high sea for patrolling and SAR operations.

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Restoration of 3 Libyan patrol boats	MoI	TBD	About 3.500.000€		In the pipeline	A technical Italian mission will be deployed in Libya to carry out the activities needed to recover the full operability of the naval units to be used in brown waters patrolling operations.
Italian Navy Patrol Units employed in water-space management and smuggling fight	MoD	TBD	1.800.000 € per month		In the pipeline	One Italian patrol ship will be involved in the activities
Contribution and carrying out of the Sahmed project	MoI	TBD	600.000 €		In the pipeline	Italy is contributing to the project, carried out by the Italian MoI, financed by the EU and aimed at improving the Libyan capacity in migrants' reception. The project was suspended during the conflict and will re-start next march (pending EU formal authorization)

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Capacity building and assistance project in the field of reception and management of migrants	MoFA		About 800.000 €		Phase 1 ongoing Phase 2 in the pipeline	The project, carried out by Italian NGO CIR (in coordination with UNHCR, IOM, Caritas and Italian MoI) aims at improving the situation of migrants in the Libyan reception centres and at giving to potential refugees an adequate legal assistance
Restore of the surveying system of fingerprints.	MoI		€ 1.1000.000		Proposed to the counterparts	Pending the definition of the operational and financial aspects to follow what already defined by the parties.
Resumption of the project for the creation of a computerized system for managing the Libyan civil register	MoI		€ 6.358.000		Proposed to the counterparts	Pending the definition of the operational and financial aspects to follow what already defined by the parties. There are also problems related to the security situation in some of the 11 Libyan locations covered by the initiative.

***Justice***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Capacity Building on					Proposed to the	Italy has gathered extensive experience over

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Legal Drafting with specific reference to: - Criminal Code - Criminal Procedure - New Challenges in Criminal Law	MoJ				Counterparts	the years in providing legal drafting assistance to countries and areas ranging from Central Asia to Central America and the Middle East, and an initiative for the Horn of Africa is starting next March.
Judicial Training	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Italy is currently the main provider of judicial training under the EU based Euromed Justice Programme, especially focused on South Mediterranean countries. The admission of Libyan officials to already scheduled seminars should be carefully considered, other specific initiatives targeting Libya individually could be organized as early as late this spring or in September.
Forensic Investigation	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Specific techniques have to be taught requiring special equipment. Italy has developed long and world renowned expertise in forensic investigation, especially thanks to the criminal investigation department of our police.

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Prison Management	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Italy is committed to promoting high standards in prison management at a regional level. A conference with that aim was recently held in Rome, with the participation of the member states of the Council of Europe and South Mediterranean countries. A wide variety of topics were addresses, including prison overcrowding and probation services. Italy is eager to share with Libya the results of that conference and to develop a mutual cooperation.

***Experts***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Secondment of Ms. Simonetta Silvestri to EUDEL Tripoli as SSR Expert	MoFA	1 yr			Ongoing	



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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Secondment of Mr. Vincenzo Tagliaferri to EUDEL Tripoli as IBM Expert	MoFA	1yr			Ongoing	
ITA Military Expert/advisory mission	MoD	Undetermined	Under evaluation	Libya MoD	In the pipeline	15 ITA Armed forces personnel involved
Secondment of Gen. Luigi Scollo to EUDEL Tripoli as Defence Expert and his staff	MoD	Undetermined	200.000 € per month		Ongoing	1 General and 20 expert (of which 10 instructors) within the crisis cell management
C-IED and minefield advising	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	500.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	30 people involved in this activity
MANPADS and weapons/ammunition experts	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined	60.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	12 people involved in this activity

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
NBC reconnaissance experts	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	150.000 € per month	Undetermined	within the OPAC initiative	15 people involved in this activity Already officialised to Minister of foreign Affairs
Air traffic control and management team	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined	50.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	6 Airforce military personnel involved in this activity

***Equipment***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Electronic control system of the Libyan borders	MoED		152.000.000 €		ongoing	Italy is ready to restart the program, realized by the Italian company Selex S.I. and suspended during the conflict
Supply of 15 off road vehicles for sensitive infrastructure patrolling	MoFA		550.000 €		Completed	Formally handed over on January 21st 2012

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Donation of: 10 VBL PUMA 4x4 10 VBL PUMA 6x6	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	7.700.000 €	Undetermined	Delivered on 06.02.13	1.800.000€ maintenance and delivery + 2.700.000 € of value + 3.200.000 € of value
Donation of Navy Uniforms by the Italian Navy	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	About 500.000 €	Undetermined	Delivered on 06.02.13	
Donation of IT Patrol boat "Gigante"	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Supply of IT equipment	MoI				In the pipeline	100 PCs, 50 printers, 20 scanners, 20 laptops
Supply of 20 vehicles	MoI				In the pipeline	
Supply of 20 portable metal detectors	MoI				In the pipeline	
Supply of 15 Quad type motorcycles	MoI				In the pipeline	

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Demining	AT	-	0,2		2012	
disarmement	BE		0,1			Contribution to Manpads Project
Nuclear Research Centre Tadjoura, (NRCT)	DE	GRS, (Ass. for Facility and Reactor Security)				a) Physical protection of NRCT, b) Storage of irradiated nuclear fuel elements, c) Staff training LBY Nuclear Authority
Locating Radioactive Substances (RS)	DE	IAEA, Office of Nuclear Security, ONS	0,555			a) Border Control Assistance b)Monitoring civil use of RS (hospitals/industries) (out of 5 mil. allocated for IAEO)
Humanitarian demining - demining and ordnance disposal	DE	DEMIRA e.V.	0,5			ongoing project, increase of 200.000 \$ planned for 2012
Creation of a Libyan authority for demining and the location and safekeeping of arms and ammunition, including MANPADS (Libyan Mine Action Centre, LMAC)	DE	US-DoS	0,8			first phase completed
Delivery of equipment for decontamination and analysis for Libyan forces to enable them for work on the disposal of chemical weapons	DE		0,6			planned for 2012
Cooperation and training on environmental issues and pollution caused by defence and security activities and facilities	EL					TBD

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Cooperation and training on weapons and ammunition import and export control	EL					TBD
Capacity building Ministry of Interior	ES	MIR	N/A		started	
Demining	ES	MAG	0,5			Contribution to MAG
Protection of vulnerable groups	EU	Mercy Corps, Scotland; Save the Children, UK	4,0		Will start in October	Developing effective protection systems for vulnerable groups, including minorities and migrants, and strengthening the capacity of national and local authorities and non-state actors to meet their particular needs.
Sector Security Reform and Rule of Law	EU		10,0		In pipeline	Will start early 2013
Capacity building for crisis response and criminal investigations	EU	UNDP Libya	4,3		Will start in December	Strengthen operational capacity to identify organised crime and improve interministerial coordination on crisis response.
Clearance of unexploded ordnances	EU	DCA	5,0		Will start December 2012	Creating a safe and secure environment by clearing explosive remnants of war and unexploded ordnances and to enhance national clearance capacity, training and mentoring by targeting all conflict affected populations including former combatants and fighter
Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of conventional weapons and ammunition.	EU	GiZ	5,0	60	CODUN decision foreseen end of December	Ensure secure storage of ammunition and to rehabilitate some of the storage sites that have been damaged during the conflict in order to reduce the risk of illicit proliferation in/from Libya

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						and its broader region.
French training for custom officers	FR	Institut Français de Tripoli	N/A	10	July 2012	10 officers are being trained in French language in Nice.
VIP Protection trainings	FR	HPSP (French Minint)	N/A			75 NTC body guards trained
Civil Security	FR	French Minint	N/A		March 2012	
Training in democratic managing of crowds	FR	French Minint	N/A			
<b>National advisor to Libyan customs</b>	FR	<b>French MFA</b>	<b>0,42</b>		<b>September 2012</b>	Advisor to the Libyan customs Administration
<b>Training of Libyan officers in French Air Force School in Salon de Provence</b>	FR	<b>French MoD Défense Conseil International</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>March 2013</b>	<b>Long term training programs (4 years) for 10 pilots, 10 air defence officers and 10 ground air officers.</b>
<b>National advisor to Libyan Navy</b>	FR	<b>French MoD an MoFA</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>Summer 2012</b>	<b>A maritime mine warfare expert has been deployed to the Libyan Navy headquarter.</b>
<b>Maritime mines clearance</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>			
<b>Training of demining divers</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>		<b>March 2012</b>	<b>Long term training programs (3 years) for 72 Libyan divers.</b>
<b>Training of Navy officers</b>	FR	<b>French MoD</b>	<b>N/A</b>			<b>4 officers at the French Navy School, 16 officers are following a long-term program (20 months) in Toulon.</b>

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
Higher military education	FR	French MoD (Ecole de Guerre)	N/A		2012/2013	2 officers are following a one year program at the French War college. This program should be renewed in 2013/2014.
Training on Aircrafts	MT	MCAST			In pipeline	The use of Maltese educational institutions to provide training for Libyan nationals, particularly at MCAST Aircraft Maintenance Technician Facilities.
Training on pilotage	MT	Transport Malta	N/A		In pipeline	Transport Malta is in a position to provide: (a) Pilotage Training; (b) Training for Harbour Master and other officials
Training to airtraffic controllers	MT	Malta Air Traffic Services	N/A		March, 2012	Training air traffic management
Immigration / Search and Rescue	MT	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	N/A		2012	a. Course in operational Maritime Law (07-18 May, 2012) for 4 Libyan Officers b. Course in SAR Mission Coordinator (21 May - 15 June, 2012) for 12 Libyan Officers; c. Course for Basid Boarding Officer/Counter Narcotics (03-14 September, 2012) for 8 Libyan Border Guards. d. Course for Basic Boarding Officer/counter Narcotics (01-12 October, 2012) for 3 Libyan Officers. e. Course for on scene coordinator (15-26 October, 2012) for 13 Libyan officers.

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Immigration / Search and Rescue</b>	<b>MT</b>	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	N/A		mars-12	Malta deployed a Mobile Training Team to Libya for one week in Mar 2012, whose aim was to provide initial support to Libya in setting up a maritime Search and Rescue organization, and developing complementary operational methods at sea as follows: a. Introduction to operational Maritime Law for 23 Libyan Officers; b. Introduction to SAR Fundamentals for 33 Libyan Officers; c. Introduction to Basic Boarding Techniques for 31 Libyan Border Guards
<b>Immigration / Search and Rescue</b>	<b>MT</b>	Armed Forces of Malta and LY	0,1		April, 2013	Four other courses, starting in April for Libyan officials, have been identified in the crucial areas of: (i) Operational Maritime Law; (ii) Search and Rescue Mission Coordination; (iii) Basic Boarding and Counter Narcotics; and (v) Search and Rescue on Scene Coordination
Border Control assistance	<b>MT</b>	Malta Police Force	0.005 (4,900)		In pipeline, 2013	The Malta Police Force would support their Libyan counterparts in relation to border control issues, particularly by way of training initiatives as well as training on investigation and crime suppression. In this regard, the Malta Police Force would provide training programmes in the form of train-the-trainer instruction, including through attachment to related Police Units in Malta: Air Border Immigration and



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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
						Passport Control Procedures for four Officers from the Libyan Immigration Service; Document examination training for first and second level Border control services for four officers from the same services.
USAR training	<b>MT</b>	Civil Protection Department	0,2		In pipeline, 2013	Basic Dog Handling and Obedience; Light and Medium Urban Search and Rescue; Training of Canine Elements in Urban Search and Rescue. Such training can be provided to 60 students for a maximum of 63 weeks.
Training	<b>MT</b>	Malta Police Force	0,1		In pipeline	Training in relation to: Dog handling for four officers in drugs, explosives, protection and displays activities; drug investigation techniques, reporting and prosecution training for four officers; criminal investigation techniques in relation to general crime, including reporting and prosecution, for four officers; economic crime investigations, reporting prosecution for four officers; vice squad investigation techniques, reporting and prosecution for four officers; training at the Forensic Science Laboratory on document/ currency examination- Ballistics- fingerprinting- photography and DNA for four officers; Traffic Management Training for four officers; District and community police training

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>TITLE</b>	<b>Donor</b>	<b>Partner</b>	<b>€ million</b>	<b>Duration (months)</b>	<b>Start date</b>	<b>Description</b>
						which would include crime prevention, sporting events and other activities for four officers; and training on security organisation for major events and VIP protection for four officers. Three-week familiarisation visits for 2-3 groups of 10 officers may also be held.
Coopertion in the field of Justice	<b>MT</b>				In the pipeline	Malta is also prepared to provide cooperation in relation to: (i) Case Management IT Systems; (ii) best practices on training programmes for judges and prosecutors; (iii) an overview of Malta's judicial system and its operations; (v) assistance in criminal matters; (vi) legislation exchange, particularly in the fight against crime; and (vii) systems of public prosecution.
Quality assurance higher education	<b>MT</b>	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline, draft MoU has been prepared	a. Train Libyan nationals in establishing quality assurance mechanisms for programmes and institutions in higher education; b. Provide Maltese experts in setting up accreditation and licensing policies for programmes and institutions in higher education;

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						c. Identify academic areas of study in which Libyan authorities may require assistance in curriculum design and teaching
Higher education/vocational training	MT	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline. MoU was signed in Jan 2012. An update MoU was signed in September 2012	To provide training courses in languages, especially in general and special purpose English, at levels for Libyan citizens training in Malta; To provide vocational training in the areas that is specified by the Libyan authorities and which are offered by specialized training institutions licensed and accredited by the Maltese authorities.
Curriculum design	MT	Ministry of Education and Employment, Malta	N/A		In pipeline, draft MoU has been prepared	<p>a. Train Libyan nationals in the design of curriculum for compulsory education and the setting up of quality assurance mechanisms for all programmes and institutions in compulsory education;</p> <p>b. Provide Maltese experts in setting up educational services in schools and education institutions in compulsory education;</p> <p>c. Identification of areas of study in which Libyan authorities may require assistance in curriculum</p>

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						design and teaching
Support to the war-wounded	<b>MT</b>	MHEC	0,4			Medical services to Libyans injured during the war
Provision of humanitarian aid	<b>MT</b>		1,1			Humanitarian aid for 100 adults and 100 children, airlifts and SFAX repatriation of injured Libyans
Coordination with International Agencies	<b>MT</b>	MHEC	N/A			MHEC coordinated with the World Health Organisation to set up a Humanitarian Hub in Malta within facilities of the Civil Protection Department ( Malta). MHEC also supported the United Nations Support Mission in Libya provide to Humanitarian assistance. MHEC worked with WHO EURO to assess the preparedness of the Maltese Health System to manage a potential mass influx of patients and displaced population from North African States

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Post graduate studies	MT	University of Malta		N/A	In pipeline	<p>a. The award of up to 5 scholarships to Libyan students by the UoM on an annual basis in specific areas of study at post-graduate level. – The AI Entisar Scholarship.</p> <p>b. The continued provision of scholarships by the Government of Libya to Libyan students seeking to engage in English Language Study programmes, foundation certificate and Degree programmes offered by the UoM.</p> <p>c. The award of a discount of 10% on an annual tuition fee to be paid by, or on behalf of, Libyan students registered at the UoM. The UoM will apply this discount as to from 2012/2013.</p>
Supply of medicines, medical consumables	MT	MHEC		0,078		MHEC took the lead to transfer various supplies of medicines and medical consumables according to requests from Misurata and Tripoli
Prison reform	NL	DJI - Custodial Institutions Agency (Dienst Justitiële Instellingen)	0,175 mln	24	Pipeline (expected mid-2013)	
Support to UNMAS Emergency Response in Libya	RO	UNMAS	0,09	24	2012	Demining activities in Central & Eastern Libya

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Defence Advisory Team	UK		0,85		April 2012 to March 2013	The Defence Assistance Team (DAT) is a key enabler for high level influencing and capacity-building within the Libyan MOD and military for the purpose of defence reform as part of wider Security Sector Reform
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	UK	EU	0,1	6	TBC	A short-term (2 pers for 6 months) Project Team to oversee the process for the establishment on an EOD Training School for the Libyan Authorities (MOD and MOI) in partnership with EU.
Personnel Training/best practice sharing for LMCD	UK		0,04	1 week	TBC	Facilitate a training symposium for key Libyan stakeholders with a reciprocal visit to UK in order to help them understand the breadth, width and depth of a modern military personnel training pipeline using the UK as a model not a solution. (8 pers for 5 days).
Development of a Joint Operations Unit	UK		0,72		TBC	Development of a joint operations unit

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Police Advice	UK	Libya Ministry of Interior	0,44	11	March, 2013	Two British Police Advisers – one providing strategic advice to the Interior Ministry and a second supporting policing within Tripoli. This

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
						figure includes funding for further support subject to the recommendations of an Autumn review. Police command training provided in June 2012.
Strategic advice and training to Libyan MOI	<b>UK</b>	Libya Ministry of Interior	1,1		July 2012 to March 2013	Increase capacity and capability of the MOI to manage strategic change, develop organisation and operational leadership skills and introduce effective means to investigate crime and protect the public
L	<b>UK</b>	International Centre for Prison Studies	0,26	12	Oct 2012 to Jan 2013	The ICPS team training to the Judicial Police to manage Libya's prisons and the transfer of detainees from custody of revolutionary brigades into official state custody. Focus on the principles of human rights and international law, and how to run prisons which conform to international standards for the treatment and welfare of the prisoners
Extension of Civilian de-mining Programme Manager	<b>UK</b>	Libyan MOD/MOI	0,2	6+	Sept 2012 to March 2013	Funding for the lead planner and coordinator for CP and CWP destruction in the Libyan MOD.
Implementation of a Prisoner-Records Management system and training courses in Libyan Prison Administration	<b>RO</b>	Intercultural Institute Timisoara and National Penitentiaries Administration of Romania	0,026		August 2012	
Small arms and insecurity in Libya and North africa	<b>NL</b>	Small arms survey	0,6	30	November 2012	Mapping small arms and weapons in Libya and North Africa
Demining	<b>NL</b>	Dan Church Aid	2,4	48	July 2012	Demining
Demining Awareness	<b>NL</b>	Handicap international	3,6	48	July 2012	Demining

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
Demining	NL	Mines Advisory Group	2,3	48	July 2012	Demining
Demining	DK	Danish Demining Group (DDG)	0,6	14	April 2012	Humanitarian Mine Action and Protection in Libya
Freedom from Torture Programme in North Africa (transitional justice)	DK	Danish Institute Against Torture (Dignity)	0,4	19	December 2011	Capacity building of health professionals on rehabilitation of war trauma and torture victims, documentation of torture - special fact finding on torture and sexual violence, detention monitoring
Assistance to Libya in addressing the issue of missing persons 2012	DK	ICMP	0,2	18	January 2013	Assist Libya in developing its own capacity to undertake effective missing person's investigations as quickly as possible
Support to strengthening the rule of law and access to justice in Libya during the transition to democracy	DK	UNDP	1,3	47	November 2012	Strengthen the capacity of Libyan rule of law institutions, improve access to justice for conflict affected populations, strengthen the role of NGOs and CBOs in the transitional justice and reconciliation process
Support to the Process of Criminal Justice Reform in Libya	DK	UNDOC/UNSMIL	0,2	48	January 2013	Criminal Justice Reform
Support to Human Rights	DK	The Danish Institute for Human Rights	0,2	18	2011	Creation of dialogue on human rights related themes through the establishment of an NGO centre which gathers human rights organisations trying to influence the development in Libya on issues such as the introduction of rule of law and public participation. Building a professional capacity as a foundation for the development of a strong and pluralistic media sector, partly by establishing media institutes and partly by promoting professional organisation within the sector.
Support to independent and professional media in Libya	DK	International Media Support (IMS)	1,7	24	2012	Building a professional capacity as a foundation for the development of a strong and pluralistic media sector, partly by establishing media institutes and partly by promoting professional organisation within the sector.
Strengthening democracy in Libya through a dynamic and	DK	National Democratic	0,5	8	October 2012	Support to the process of creating an inclusive and participatory political environment and building the capacity of the political parties



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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

TITLE	Donor	Partner	€ million	Duration (months)	Start date	Description
participatory political party environment Support to the election process in Libya	<b>DK</b>	Institute (NDI)  The Carter Center	0.2		2012	with a gradual approach sensitive to the short and medium term needs of the parties.  Monitoring of the national elections in July 2012.

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities****Italian assistance to the Government of Libya in the field of Security*****Training of Security Forces***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Strategic Infrastructure Security  “Train the trainers” course	MoD (Carabinieri)	10 weeks each course	180.000 €	60 students	The training has been divided into 2 courses for 30 trainers each. First completed (29.08.12-24.10.12). Second started on 14.01.13.	Under the agreement with the Libyan MoD, the Carabinieri organized one training course at the CoESPU Vicenza, in favour of 60 Libyan instructors in order to re-build a Gendarmerie force, focused on strategic sites protection.
Strategic Infrastructure Security  Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	200 students	In the pipeline	Will be carried out in Libya by the above mentioned 60 Libyan instructors supervised by 22 Carabinieri advisors. Location TBD

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Operating procedures of police action  “Train the trainers” course	MoD (Carabinieri)	2 weeks each course	Not defined	60 students (20 + 20 + 20)	First completed (18.11.12-03.01.13). Second started on 06.01.13. Third planned in Feb.  Others to follow	Training course carried out by 5 Carabinieri advisors in Tripoli to form Instructors.  This is on going activity that will be continued throughout 2013.
Investigative Techniques Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	2 weeks	31.093 €	20 students	Planned 29.04.13 – 10.05.13	In favour of 20 Libyan trainers selected from the 60 participants of the above mentioned course
Public Order Training course	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	200 students	In the pipeline	To be carried out in Libya (Gharyan, 80 Km south of Tripoli) as requested by Libya. This course is in favour of 200 new enrolled police cadets

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Light Protected Vehicle drivers  Training course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	Not defined	28 students	Started on 14.01.13	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
Infantry instructors “Train the trainers” course	MoD (ITA Army)	21 weeks for Officers 8 weeks for troops	Not defined	4 Officers 35 Troops as students	Started on 14.01.13	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
Infantry platoon in long range patrol missions Training course	MoD (ITA Army)	8 + 6 weeks	Not defined	30 students	Ready to start	Training course for Libyan Armed Forces at ITA Army Infantry School (Cesano)
C-IED and demining Train the trainers course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Flight qualification Training course	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined		5 pilots	In the pipeline	Support for the re-qualification on board SF-260 in Latina Flight School
Firefighting courses for Navy Personnel Training course	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Navy Training Centre in Taranto

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Ship Manoeuvre courses for Navy Officers Training Course	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Naval Base of Augusta

***Education***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Defence High Studies Institute (IASD)	MoD	6 months	50.100 €	1 student	ongoing	Academic Year 2012 - 2013
International Capstone Concept Course (ICC)	MoD	4 weeks		1 student	Planned 08.04.13-13.05.13	
Defence High Studies Institute (IASD)	MoD	9 months	1.040.095 €	1 student	Approved and financed	Academic Year 2013 - 2014
International Capstone Concept Course (ICC)	MoD	4 weeks		1 student	Approved and financed	
Joint Service Staff College(ISSMI)	MoD	10 months		1 student	Approved and financed	

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Basic Italian learning Course for Academy cadets	MoD	4 months		7 students	Planned April-July 2013	
Academy courses	MoD (ITA Army-Navy-AF)	5 years		7 students: - 5 Army - 2 Navy	Planned to start in September 2013	
Wheel vehicles maintenance course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks	127.000 €	5 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
Electro-magnetisms operator course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks		3 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
EOD operator course	MoD (ITA Army)	4 weeks		18 students	Planned to start on 11.03.13	
Specialist course at the ITA Navy Trg Center	MoD (ITA Navy)	Depending on the course		5 petty officers	Planned 2013-2014	
Basic course at IT Navy Petty-Officers School	MoD (ITA Navy)	Depending on the course		15 Sergeants	Planned 2013-2014	
CH 47 pilot course	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army
CH 47 maintenance course	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Diver/Deep Sea Diver course	MoD (ITA Navy)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Navy
Courses for artillery operators	MoD (ITA Army)	To be defined	Not defined	To be defined	In the pipeline	Need to be coordinated with ITA Army
Air Defence and Air Traffic Management course	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	Good knowledge of English required
Theoretical Navigation courses for Navy Officers	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	To be held in the Naval Base of Augusta
Courses on Logistic software	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	In case the Libyan Armed Forces will use the Italian Navy uniforms and equipment
Port Authority and Coast Guard Management course	MoD (ITA Navy – Coast Guard)	8 weeks		8 Officers	In the pipeline	Planned 2013-2014
Crime Scene Investigation	MoI	12/03/2012 30/03/2012	€ 120.000	24 participants	Completed	
Border Police operators	MoI	30/04/2012 25/05/2012	€ 20.000	20 participants	Completed	

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Document Forgery	MoI	06/06/2012 29/06/2012	€. 30.000	22 participants	Completed	
Police Investigations	MoI	06/06/2012 29/06/2012	€. 30.000	24 participants	Completed	
Commanders of High Sea Naval Units	MoI	25/06/2012 20/11/2012	€. 250.000	24 participants (17 ended the training)	Completed	
Anti Drugs K9 Units	MoI	21 weeks	€. 180.000	8 participants	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet
Anti explosive K9 units	MoI	16 weeks	€. 160.000	8 participants	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet
Frogmen	MoI	3 months	€. 330.000	TBD	In the pipeline	Not scheduled yet.
Police Investigative Techniques and controls against illegal immigration	MoI	TBD 10 days	€. 25.000	20 participants	Postponed	Libyan Authorities failed in finding quickly the students. We are waiting, from Libya, the list of the participants and the new starting date from the Central Directorate for the Education Institutes.
Civilian Air Traffic Contollers	Italian Civil Aviation Administration	TBD		150 beneficiaries	Ongoing	



**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities*****Border Control***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
ITA Navy Patrol Units employed in water-space management and to avoid weapons smuggling	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	1.800.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	One Italian patrol ship involved
Technical and operational support for the installation of a costal radar network	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	Proposed the support for the connection to the Italian Operational Centre
Support for Maritime Surveillance and Security	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Combined training in the field of Maritime Security Operations	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	

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### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Advising and training in border control (custom)	Italian Customs Agency and ITA Custom Police (“Guardia di Finanza”)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	5/6 ITA “Guardia di Finanza” personnel
Advising and training in border control (security)	MoD (Carabinieri)	Undetermined	Not defined	Undetermined	In the pipeline	10 Carabinieri personnel
Capacity and institution building project in favor of the Libyan Customs Authority.	Italian Customs Agency and Guardia di Finanza	12 + 12 months	About 1.000.000€		Phase 1 ongoing Phase 2 in the pipeline	Based on the cooperation Agreement signed on February 2012 by the Custom Authorities of Italy and Libya
Restoration of 4 patrol boats already supplied by Italy to Libya.	MoFA/Guardia di Finanza	TBD	About 4.300.000€		ongoing	A technical Italian mission will be deployed in Libya to carry out the activities needed to recover the full operability of the naval units, to be used in high sea for patrolling and SAR operations.

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Restoration of 3 Libyan patrol boats	MoI	TBD	About 3.500.000€		In the pipeline	A technical Italian mission will be deployed in Libya to carry out the activities needed to recover the full operability of the naval units to be used in brown waters patrolling operations.
Italian Navy Patrol Units employed in water-space management and smuggling fight	MoD	TBD	1.800.000 € per month		In the pipeline	One Italian patrol ship will be involved in the activities
Contribution and carrying out of the Sahmed project	MoI	TBD	600.000 €		In the pipeline	Italy is contributing to the project, carried out by the Italian MoI, financed by the EU and aimed at improving the Libyan capacity in migrants' reception. The project was suspended during the conflict and will re-start next march (pending EU formal authorization)

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Capacity building and assistance project in the field of reception and management of migrants	MoFA		About 800.000 €		Phase 1 ongoing Phase 2 in the pipeline	The project, carried out by Italian NGO CIR (in coordination with UNHCR, IOM, Caritas and Italian MoI) aims at improving the situation of migrants in the Libyan reception centres and at giving to potential refugees an adequate legal assistance
Restore of the surveying system of fingerprints.	MoI		€ 1.1000.000		Proposed to the counterparts	Pending the definition of the operational and financial aspects to follow what already defined by the parties.
Resumption of the project for the creation of a computerized system for managing the Libyan civil register	MoI		€ 6.358.000		Proposed to the counterparts	Pending the definition of the operational and financial aspects to follow what already defined by the parties. There are also problems related to the security situation in some of the 11 Libyan locations covered by the initiative.

***Justice***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Capacity Building on					Proposed to the	Italy has gathered extensive experience over

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Legal Drafting with specific reference to: - Criminal Code - Criminal Procedure - New Challenges in Criminal Law	MoJ				Counterparts	the years in providing legal drafting assistance to countries and areas ranging from Central Asia to Central America and the Middle East, and an initiative for the Horn of Africa is starting next March.
Judicial Training	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Italy is currently the main provider of judicial training under the EU based Euromed Justice Programme, especially focused on South Mediterranean countries. The admission of Libyan officials to already scheduled seminars should be carefully considered, other specific initiatives targeting Libya individually could be organized as early as late this spring or in September.
Forensic Investigation	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Specific techniques have to be taught requiring special equipment. Italy has developed long and world renowned expertise in forensic investigation, especially thanks to the criminal investigation department of our police.

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**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Prison Management	MoJ				Proposed to the Counterparts	Italy is committed to promoting high standards in prison management at a regional level. A conference with that aim was recently held in Rome, with the participation of the member states of the Council of Europe and South Mediterranean countries. A wide variety of topics were addresses, including prison overcrowding and probation services. Italy is eager to share with Libya the results of that conference and to develop a mutual cooperation.

***Experts***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Secondment of Ms. Simonetta Silvestri to EUDEL Tripoli as SSR Expert	MoFA	1 yr			Ongoing	

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Secondment of Mr. Vincenzo Tagliaferri to EUDEL Tripoli as IBM Expert	MoFA	1yr			Ongoing	
ITA Military Expert/advisory mission	MoD	Undetermined	Under evaluation	Libya MoD	In the pipeline	15 ITA Armed forces personnel involved
Secondment of Gen. Luigi Scollo to EUDEL Tripoli as Defence Expert and his staff	MoD	Undetermined	200.000 € per month		Ongoing	1 General and 20 expert (of which 10 instructors) within the crisis cell management
C-IED and minefield advising	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	500.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	30 people involved in this activity
MANPADS and weapons/ammunition experts	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined	60.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	12 people involved in this activity

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
NBC reconnaissance experts	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	150.000 € per month	Undetermined	within the OPAC initiative	15 people involved in this activity Already officialised to Minister of foreign Affairs
Air traffic control and management team	MoD (ITA AF)	Undetermined	50.000 € per month	Undetermined	In the pipeline	6 Airforce military personnel involved in this activity

### *Equipment*

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Electronic control system of the Libyan borders	MoED		152.000.000 €		ongoing	Italy is ready to restart the program, realized by the Italian company Selex S.I. and suspended during the conflict
Supply of 15 off road vehicles for sensitive infrastructure patrolling	MoFA		550.000 €		Completed	Formally handed over on January 21st 2012



## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Donation of: 10 VBL PUMA 4x4 10 VBL PUMA 6x6	MoD (ITA Army)	Undetermined	7.700.000 €	Undetermined	Delivered on 06.02.13	1.800.000€ maintenance and delivery + 2.700.000 € of value + 3.200.000 € of value
Donation of Navy Uniforms by the Italian Navy	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined	About 500.000 €	Undetermined	Delivered on 06.02.13	
Donation of IT Patrol boat “Gigante”	MoD (ITA Navy)	Undetermined		Undetermined	In the pipeline	
Supply of IT equipment	MoI				In the pipeline	100 PCs, 50 printers, 20 scanners, 20 laptops
Supply of 20 vehicles	MoI				In the pipeline	
Supply of 20 portable metal detectors	MoI				In the pipeline	
Supply of 15 Quad type motorcycles	MoI				In the pipeline	

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities*****Technical assistance***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Survey and wreck removal operation in Tripoli	MoD (ITA Navy)	from 10 February to 15 March 2012	800.000 €		Completed	The Italian Navy conducted from 10 February to 15 March 2012, survey and wreck removal activities in the Port of Tripoli. It consisted of removing military wrecks, sunk or damaged, including military munitions on board
Mapping Libyan coasts	MoD (ITA Navy)	TBD	Not defined		Ongoing	The mapping surveys, carried out in the country in 2005 and 2007 by Italian hydrographic ships, allowed the collection of data recently (nov. 2012) sent to the Libyan hydrographic department. It is under examination by the two parties a mapping activity of the port of Tripoli
Technical assistance in facilities rebuilding	MoD (ITA Army/AF)	TBD	2.000.000 per month	TBD	Proposed to the counterparts	Italy offered to the Libyan Authorities the technical assistance of Italian facilities rebuilding teams in restoring public and private buildings and infrastructure in the Country. 450 Italian personnel will be involved in the program

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Airports functionality recovery	MoD (ITA AF)	TBD	300.000 per month	TBD	Proposed to the counterparts	Italy offered to the Libyan Authorities the technical assistance in fully restoring the functionality of airports. 30 people involved ( Air force)
Civil and Military cooperation, general coordination for stabilization and rebuilding activities	MoD (ITA Army)	TBD	300.000 per month	TBD	Proposed to the counterparts	Italy offered to the Libyan Authorities the technical assistance in coordinating the rebuilding activities in the country. 30 people involved
Development of Civilian Air Traffic Control Services and supply of ground air traffic management equipment	Italian Civil Aviation Administration			150 participants	Ongoing	

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED**

**Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities**

*Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration*

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Number of Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Voluntary Contribution to UNMAS for mine clearing activities	MoFA		1.450.000 €		ongoing	The initiative contributed to the creation of the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT)
DDR Project	Italian NGO Suggest Aid on behalf of MoFA		490.000 €	90 participants	ongoing	The project aims at training former militia men as “heritage police” in the archeological sites of Leptis Magna, Sabratha e Cyrene.
Voluntary contribution to UNESCO in the field of cultural heritage	MoFA		1.000.000 €		ongoing	The initiative includes a training module in the protection of cultural heritage.
Project in support to Cultural Heritage Protection			410.000€ through World Bank Multi Donor Trust Fund		ongoing	
Reactivation of 10 of the 13 Italian Archeological Missions previously operating in Libya			55.000 €.		completed	

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Training and technical assistance Project in favour of the Saray al Ahmra Museum in Tripoli	MoFA		315.000€		In the pipeline	The project aims at training qualified personnel and providing a modern cataloguing and archiving system for the museum.
Grant of 100 University Scholarships for a complete graduate or post-graduate cycle to Libyan students	MoFA/MoHE		840.000 € yearly	100	ongoing	
Capacity building program and supply of equipment in favour of the Libyan fire-brigades	MoFA		1.200.000€		in the pipeline	The project aims at reinforcing and supply the equipment of the Libyan fire-brigade corps, starting with training activities of former freedom fighters .
Capacity building program in favour of former militia men in the field of journalism and media	MoFA	2 15 day courses	About 800.000 €	60 beneficiaries	Phase 1 completed (30 beneficiaries) Phase 2 in the pipeline	Selection of candidates was done in cooperation with the Libyan Warrior Affairs Commission through the database of former freedom fighters

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Training program in Support of Libyan Radio and Television system.	MoFA		165.000€		In the pipeline	
Program for the support and development of coastal communities	MoFA		2.600.000€		In the pipeline	The initiative aims at supporting the development of cross border coastal areas of Libya, Egypt and Tunisia through the construction of irrigation and agricultural infrastructures, training of local and national associations and institutions devoted to research in the field of agriculture and fisheries, the supply of equipment for logistics, and for conservation of goods in a view of profit generation in favour of local communities.
Creation of an agricultural experimentation centre in Tobruk			4.000.000€		Ongoing	The initiative aims at supporting the creation of a training and technical assistance centre the help the agricultural development in Cyrenaica region

## RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED

### Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities

Subject	Implementing Administration	Duration	Value	Number of Beneficiaries	Status	Notes
Program for the valorization of date palms	MoFA		About 500.000€		Phase 1 completed (oasis of Jufra) Phase 2 in the pipeline	The location of the Phase 2 of the project has yet to be determined
Agricultural Development Program	MoFA		600.000€		In the pipeline	The program is a as a follow-up to the Program for the valorisation of date palms already completed in Jufra and aims at creating a rural development area in the proximity of the oasis
Training program in Governance and development of SMEs	MoFA with University of Bologna	2 months	300.000€	30 participants	In the pipeline	
Training in the field of Public procurement	MoFA		200.000€	24 participants	In the pipeline	
National Reconciliation support program	MoFA		About 250.000€		Phase 1 ongoing Phase 2 in the pipeline	Initiative aimed at favouring National reconciliation through the enhancement of the role of women in Libyan

**RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED****Annex 10- Summary of Member States relevant bilateral projects and activities*****Civil Society and Institution Building***

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Implementing Administration</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Notes</b>
Senior Advisor in support of Libyan MoD	MoD	Undetermined	Undetermined	Lybian MoD	In the pipeline	1 Officer (OF5)
Medical Assistance in Italy for Libyan war wounded	MoFA/MoH		Not Determined	Up to 1500		
Project in favor of children traumatized by the conflict	MoFA	12 months	1.500.000€		ongoing	The initiative, carried out through IOM, aims at providing assistance and psychological support to the more vulnerable members of Libyan society in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misurata.



**MISSION LOGO**

**PLACEHOLDER (Subject to approval of Libyan authorities)**

**RESTREINT UE - EU RESTRICTED**  
**ANNEX 12 - LIST OF RELEVANT GUIDELINES**  
**AND CONCEPTS FOR CIVILIAN CSDP**

**Mission planning**

- Standard language for planning documents and legal acts for civilian ESDP operations (doc. 11277/07, dated 28/06/2007);
- EU Concept for Geospatial Information (doc. 11124/08 dated 25 June 2008)
- Concept for Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) (doc. 15371/09, dated 4 November 2009);
- Overarching principles for the establishment of an analytical Capability in Civilian ESDP Crisis Management Operations - Mission Analytical Capability (MAC) (doc. 15417/1/09 dated 6 November 2009);
- Guidelines on the Implementation of Benchmarking in Civilian CSDP Missions (doc. 14219/1/11, dated 17 October 2011);
- Joint Staff Working Paper - Strengthening ties between CSDP and FSJ actors - Proposals for a way ahead (doc. 9878/11, dated 6 May 2011);
- Guidelines to design civilian CSDP mission-specific organisational structures (doc. 11833/12, dated 26 June 2012).

**Command and control**

- Concept paper on procedures for the termination, extension and refocusing of an EU civilian crisis management operation (doc. 5136/06, dated 9/1/2006);
- Draft guidelines for command and control structures for EU civilian operations in crisis management (doc. 9919/07, dated 23 May 2007);
- Civilian CSDP missions reporting – revised OPLAN annexes on reporting (doc. 7192/11 dated 3 March 2011 as approved by PSC).

**General establishment and police**

- Guidelines for police command and control aspects of EU crisis management (doc. 7854/1/02, dated 15 April 2002);

**RESTREINT UE - EU RESTRICTED**  
**ANNEX 12 - LIST OF RELEVANT GUIDELINES**  
**AND CONCEPTS FOR CIVILIAN CSDP**

- European Union Concept for Police Planning (doc. 6923/1/02, dated 6 March 2002);
- Handbook for Police Officers deploying to EU Police missions (doc. 12572/1/03, dated 30 September 2003);
- Comprehensive concept for strengthening of local police missions (interface with broader Rules of Law) (doc. 15031/09, dated 26 October 2009);
- Guidelines for the development of Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) in civilian CSDP Missions (doc. 16692/10 dated 17 December 2010).

**Rule of law**

- EU Guidelines on the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law (doc 15246/05, dated 5 December 2005);
- EU Concept for CSDP justice missions (within the Rule of Law framework) (doc. 18173/10 COR 1, dated 12 January 2011).

**Civilian Administration**

- Basic guidelines for crisis management missions in the field of Civilian Administration (doc. 9369/1/02, dated 30 May 2002);
- EU concept for Crisis Management Missions in the field of Civilian Administration (doc. 15311/03, dated 25 November 2003).

**Protection of Civilians**

- Draft Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians in CSDP missions and operations (doc. 13047/2/10, dated 9 September 2010).

**Coordination and cooperation**

- Recommendations for enhancing co-operation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the framework of EU civilian crisis management

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**AND CONCEPTS FOR CIVILIAN CSDP**

and conflict prevention (doc. 10114/1/08, dated 23 November 2006);

- Draft review of recommendations for enhancing co-operation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the framework of EU civilian crisis management and conflict prevention (doc. 10114/1/08, dated 17 March 2009).

### **Training**

- Draft EU training concept in ESDP (doc. 11970/04, dated 30 August 2004);
- EU Training Policy in ESDP (doc. 14176/2/03, dated 7 November 2003).

### **Lessons identified**

- Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons learned and best practices in civilian ESDP missions (doc. 15987/08 dated 19 November 2008).

### **Human rights and gender**

- Ensuring protection – EU guidelines on Human Rights Defenders (doc. 10056/1/04 dated 9 June 2004);
- Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP (doc. 11932/2/05 dated 29 September 2005);
- Mainstreaming human rights and gender into ESDP – Compilation of relevant documents (doc. 11359/07 dated 9 October 2007);
- Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security (doc. 15671/1/08 dated 1 December 2008);
- Implementation of UNSCR 1325 as reinforced by UNSCR 1820 in the context of ESDP (doc. 15782/3/08, dated 3 December 2008).

### **Security Sector Reform**

- EU concept of ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) (doc. 12566/4/05, dated 13

**RESTREINT UE - EU RESTRICTED**  
**ANNEX 12 - LIST OF RELEVANT GUIDELINES**  
**AND CONCEPTS FOR CIVILIAN CSDP**

October 2005).

**Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR)**

- Draft EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) (doc. 13727/4/06, dated 30 November 2006).

**Security of personnel**

- Policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (doc. 9490/06, dated 29/05/2006);
- Field Security Handbook.

**Information activity**

- Guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activity (doc. 13817/02, dated 18/11/2002).

**Mission Support**

- Initial Concept of Mission Support for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions (doc. 12457/06, dated 5 September 2006);
- Draft Guidelines for improving Force Generation for civilian ESDP Missions (doc. 8540/09, dated 6 April 2009);
- Generic list of Equipment for Civilian Crisis Management Operations (doc. 5611/10, dated 21 January 2010);
- Guidelines for allowances for seconded staff participating in EU civilian crisis management missions (doc. 7291/09, dated 10/03/2009);
- Draft Guidelines on the use of "Visiting Experts" in the context of civilian CSDP Missions (doc. 8551/12, dated 4 April 2012).

AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
BCP	Border Crossing Point
BG	Border Guard
C2	Command and Control
CivOpsCdr	Civilian Operations Commander
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
COS	Chief of Staff
CUS	Customs
DHOM	Deputy Head of Mission
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission Libya
EUDEL	European Union Delegation
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
HOM	Head of Mission
HR	Human Resources
GNC	General National Council
HoM	Head of Mission
HR	Human Resources
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IBMNA	Integrated Border Management Needs Assessment
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM	International Organisation for Migration

LSF	Libyan Shield Forces
MAC	Mission Analytical Capability
MHQ	Mission Headquarters
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOI	Ministry of Interiors
MOT	Ministry of Transport
MSD	Mission Support Department
MSO	Mission Security Officer
NCG	Naval Coast Guard
NCL	National Contingent Leader
NCP	National Contingent Point
OPCON	Operational Control
PM	Prime Minister
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PI	Press and Information
P&I	Policing and Immigration
<b>SAR</b>	<b>Search and Rescue</b>
SMSO	Senior Mission Security Officer
SSC	Supreme Security Council
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
VTMIS	Vessel Traffic Management and Information System
WCO	World Customs Organisation
WKC	Watchkeeping Capability